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Western Michigan University 
The only true and sustainable prosperity is shared prosperity.
 —Joseph Stiglitz 
Inequalities in our society abound, across space, over time, and in 
numerous other dimensions. While income inequality attracts consid-
erable attention in academic and policy arenas, there are many other 
aspects of social inequality that also deserve to be studied and addressed, 
such as wealth (assets), ability to borrow, education, employment, 
health care, political representation, and legal matters. In a sense, all 
of these can be generally characterized as inequalities of access or of 
opportunities. And all of them, if not resolved or mitigated, bear poten-
tially serious consequences of economic instability and political and 
social unrest. Many of these inequalities are also interrelated, making 
them vexing and difficult to combat. 
But for policymakers to do so, they must understand the extent of 
these inequalities, their trends, and, more precisely, how they corre-
late. What are the underlying root causes of these inequalities? What 
are plausible policies that could mitigate their impacts? These ques-
tions were recently addressed by six eminent scholars who were invited 
to provide insights and views from their respective areas of expertise 
through Western Michigan University’s 54th Werner Sichel Lecture 
Series, which took place during the 2017–2018 academic year. These 
experts’ presentations form the basis of this volume and cover the 
challenges of different inequalities in several countries, including the 
United States, member nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-
1 
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operation and Development, and developing countries in Africa and 
Latin America. 
We briefly summarize each of the six chapters in this introduction. 
Chapter 2, “The New Inequality: The Distribution of Retirement 
and Older Working Time in OECD Countries,” by Teresa Ghilarducci, 
the Bernard L. and Irene Schwartz Professor of Economics and Policy 
Analysis at the New School for Social Research, indicates that income 
and wealth inequality has been on the rise for years in rich nations. 
The chapter by Ghilarducci addresses inequality’s economic harms: 
inequality skews production toward what the rich want and away from 
public spending on education and health. Ghilarducci also notes that 
inequality skews political power to the rich, who use that power to cre-
ate and preserve economic rents, also known as monopoly rents. An 
economic rent is any payment to a factor of production that is more than 
what is needed to induce that factor to engage in production. Ghilar-
ducci’s chapter addresses a third kind of inequality—paid retirement 
time—and its potential damage to workers’ retirement. Retirement is 
the period after a lifetime of work and before death when people can 
exercise greater control over the pace and content of their time and con-
struct a personal narrative about the meaning of their lives. 
As nations grew richer, Ghilarducci says, voters and workers 
expanded paid time off, including retirement, widely across socioeco-
nomic classes. But in the late twentieth century, OECD policy shifted 
to emphasize austerity and finance-based retirement income, leading 
some in the elderly population to work more hours and longer years. 
More work at older ages is associated with higher poverty rates and 
greater retirement-time inequalities among the elderly. The first part of 
the chapter defines retirement time and explores the lopsided distribu-
tion of American retirement time. The second section describes changes 
in retirement time in the rest of the OECD countries. The third section 
discusses how rich nations changed their pension designs toward less 
social insurance and more financialization. The fourth section shows 
how pension financialization is correlated with increases in older peo-
ple’s labor-force participation and how nations with higher elderly 
labor-force participation also have higher rates of old-age poverty. The 
fifth and final section offers a conclusion. 
In Chapter 3, “The Economics and Politics of the Fall and Rise of 
Income Inequality in the United States,” Charles L. Ballard, professor 
 
 
The Political Economy of Inequality: Introduction 3 
of economics at Michigan State University, explores the issue of how 
income inequality in the United States has increased dramatically since 
the 1970s. Ballard notes that the U.S. economy actually experienced 
an equally dramatic equalization in the 1930s and 1940s. He argues 
that, consequently, if we are to develop a complete understanding of 
the evolution of the U.S. income distribution, we must analyze the ear-
lier “Great Compression” or “Great Convergence,” as well as the more 
recent “Great Divergence.” In this chapter, Ballard begins with a review 
of the facts of the changes in income inequality over the past century 
in the United States. He then discusses and evaluates the economic 
explanations for those trends. However, the economic trends cannot be 
understood fully without reference to political factors. He argues that 
both the Great Compression and the Great Divergence are primarily 
the result of deliberate political choices made by the party in power. 
Furthermore, he points out that race is the most important of the many 
factors leading to the political shifts that have, in turn, contributed to 
the Great Divergence of the past 40 years. Many whites, especially in 
the South, reacted to the Civil Rights movement by switching their alle-
giance from the Democratic to the Republican Party, and this has con-
tributed substantially to the adoption of more antiegalitarian economic 
policies. The best starting point for a discussion of long-term trends in 
U.S. income inequality, he says, is the journal article “Income Inequal-
ity in the United States, 1913–1998,” by Piketty and Saez (2003). Their 
original paper contains data through 1998, as the title indicates, but they 
have updated the data annually so that we now have a complete series 
covering a full century, from 1913 to 2015. 
Piketty and Saez (2003) use tax-return data, and this allows them to 
produce extremely detailed estimates for the income shares of the very 
top income strata. The data reveal that the shares of the top groups fell 
from the late 1920s to the early 1970s, and especially sharply in the 
early 1940s. Specifically, the share of the top 1 percent plummeted from 
15.7 percent of total income in 1940 to 10.5 percent in 1944 because 
of various public policies implemented, which are detailed in Ballard’s 
chapter. But then, following a decline through the early ’70s, the top 
income shares surged upward in the 1980s, almost as dramatically as 
they had fallen in the early 1940s. And over the past 10 years, the share 
of the top 1 percent has hovered around 18 percent of total income, 
which is higher than the average was in the first 15 years of the twen-
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tieth century. Thus, by some measures, the income distribution in the 
United States today is more unequal than it was a century ago. Fur-
thermore, the disequalization since the 1970s has been extremely top-
heavy. A majority of the gains in the share for the top 5 percent went 
to the top 1 percent. In turn, a majority of the gains in share for the top 
1 percent accrued to the top one-tenth of 1 percent. Finally, about half 
the gains in share for the top one-tenth of 1 percent accrued to the top 
one-hundredth of 1 percent. While Piketty and Saez’s paper focuses 
exclusively on the top 10 percent, Ballard notes that there have also 
been changes in the income distribution below the top 10 percent. Cen-
sus data analysis shows that, since the 1970s, the income of the typical 
household at the 90th percentile rose by substantially more than the 
income of the household at the 80th percentile. 
Chapter 4 is titled “America’s Unequal Playing Field: The Gaps 
between Poor and Rich Children’s Resources.” In it, Mary E. Corcoran, 
professor emerita of public policy, political science, and women’s stud-
ies at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michi-
gan, explores the phenomenon that growing up wealthy in the United 
States commands wide and profound advantages over growing up poor, 
and these advantages do not just involve the extra discretionary money 
that rich parents possess to spend on their children. Corcoran notes that, 
on average, children of the rich are more likely to avoid the disrup-
tion and trauma, both emotional and economic, from absent fathers 
due to out-of-wedlock births, divorce, and paternal incarceration. The 
rich children’s home environments are more likely to be education-
ally enriching. These children are more likely to have parents who are 
college graduates and less likely to have parents who are high school 
dropouts. They are more likely to be raised in safe neighborhoods with 
good schools. Rich parents have more money, time, and social capital 
to invest in their children. 
As a result, it is hardly surprising that rich children fare better eco-
nomically as adults than do middle-income and low-income children. 
Corcoran refers to two recent books, Whither Opportunity? and Dream 
Hoarders, and warns that the economic and noneconomic advantages 
of being raised by wealthy parents are increasingly bundled together 
and are growing rapidly in ways that could imperil the American ideal 
of fair opportunity (Duncan and Murnane 2011; Reeves 2017). Since 
the 1980s, changes to the economic and demographic landscape and 
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to the criminal justice system have widened the gaps between the eco-
nomic resources and social capital of affluent parents and those of mid-
dle-income and low-income families. Corcoran further notes that over 
the same period, a college degree has become increasingly important 
to children’s adult economic success. And at the same time that invest-
ing in children’s education has become more important for their eco-
nomic mobility, gaps have widened between affluent parents and the 
middle- and low-income parents in their financial capabilities to make 
such an investment. The recent academic admissions scandal is indeed 
a perfect case in point. “This,” Corcoran says, “leads to a very real 
worry: is the cherished U.S. norm of a level playing field—i.e., that a 
child’s economic origins do not determine his or her economic future— 
at risk?” Corcoran’s paper is organized as follows: she begins by pre-
senting a stylized picture of the associations between family income 
and children’s adult incomes, followed by a comparison of the rates 
of intergenerational economic mobility in the United States to those 
in other Western industrialized countries. It is evident that the United 
States comes off poorly in these comparisons. Corcoran then delineates 
how economic trends, demographic trends, and changes in the criminal 
justice system since the 1980s have altered the distribution of resources 
and social capital available to children in low-income, middle-income, 
and high-income families in the United States. She also documents how 
returns to a college degree have increased since 1980 in the United 
States. 
Corcoran next reviews studies showing that parental income more 
strongly predicts students’ achievement-test scores, college attendance, 
and college graduation today than it did in the past. She concludes by 
speculating on how the trends and evidence reviewed in this chapter 
might affect equal opportunity in the United States. She further elabo-
rates on how the background advantages of children from affluent fami-
lies vis-à-vis children from middle-income and low-income families 
have risen significantly. And she notes that college education affects a 
child’s adult economic attainments more strongly now than in the past, 
and that a child’s chance of acquiring a college degree is more tied 
to parental income now than in the past. She concludes by posing the 
following questions: Does this inevitably mean that the United States 
will become more stratified by income? What policy strategies might 
weaken the link between parental income and children’s adult success? 
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In Chapter 5, “Why Has Income Inequality Increased while Educa-
tion Inequality Has Decreased in Many Developing Countries?,” David 
Lam, professor of economics at the University of Michigan, points out 
that there is a great deal of concern about trends in income inequality 
around the world. On the domestic front, rising wage inequality in the 
United States has been a focus of attention for the past two decades. In 
addition, trends in income inequality in developing countries and in the 
world as a whole have been analyzed by the World Bank and a large 
number of researchers. However, less focus has been given to inequal-
ity in schooling. Lam’s chapter argues that inequality in schooling is a 
vital area of research, given the importance of education in affecting 
a wide variety of outcomes. Inequality in schooling is also important 
because it is integrally connected to income inequality. Several studies 
rely on the detailed data that are available on the distribution of school-
ing for a good number of low-income and middle-income countries. 
Comprehensive analysis of these data demonstrates that the distribution 
of schooling demographically changes in fairly regular patterns as the 
mean level of schooling increases. The standard deviation in years of 
schooling, which is shown theoretically to be an important driver of 
earnings inequality, tends to increase with mean schooling at low lev-
els of schooling, eventually reaching a peak and then falling as mean 
schooling reaches higher levels. This has important implications for 
trends in earnings inequality. The coefficient of variation in schooling, 
a standard mean-invariant measure of schooling inequality, tends to fall 
steadily as mean schooling increases, a result of the “compression” in 
schooling that occurs with the rising mean. Given the strong relation-
ship between schooling and earnings, this compression in the schooling 
distribution should be expected to reduce income inequality. However, 
data from several countries reveal a rather puzzling phenomenon: a 
number of African and Asian countries have seen increases in income 
inequality while at the same time experiencing significant declines in 
schooling inequality. 
In this chapter, Lam explores several reasons for this disconnect 
between falling schooling inequality and rising income inequality in 
those developing countries. One important factor is the convex rela-
tionship between schooling and earnings, as implied in the standard 
Mincer (1974) earnings equation, in which log earnings are a nonlin-
ear function of schooling. Another important factor is rising returns to 
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schooling, especially at the top of the schooling distribution. Lam’s 
paper reviews the evidence on trends in income inequality and poverty 
for a variety of countries. The paper then looks at the theoretical rela-
tionship between schooling and earnings. Data from a large number of 
countries from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program 
are then used to look at how the schooling distribution changes as mean 
schooling increases. These data show a consistent tendency for school-
ing inequality to decline as mean schooling increases. Lam concludes 
his chapter with a detailed analysis of schooling inequality and earnings 
inequality in Brazil and South Africa, the two countries with extreme 
earnings inequality and high-quality labor-market survey data that can 
be used to look at schooling inequality, returns to schooling, and earn-
ing inequality over several decades. 
In Chapter 6, “Institutions, Structures, and Policy Paradigms: 
Toward Understanding Inequality in Africa,” Howard Stein, professor 
of Afroamerican and African studies and of epidemiology at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, states that the trajectory of development in sub-
Saharan Africa remains puzzling to mainstream economists. Poverty 
stays stubbornly high, growth has been uneven, and life expectancy has 
continued to lag relative to other regions despite governments’ adopting 
active policies inspired by neoclassical economists. Economists have 
offered a host of extraneous explanations for “Africa’s tragedy,” includ-
ing ethnicity, geography, colonial history, slave trade, poor governance, 
and poorly developed social capital. Stein notes that the number of 
variables purportedly correlated with growth grew dramatically over 
time in the literature and reached, by one count, a rather implausible 86 
regressors by the year 2000. His chapter deals with new concerns about 
income inequality, and how orthodox economists have tried unconvinc-
ingly to explain the pattern of income distribution in Africa. 
Contrary to Kuznets’s hypothesis that regions with low industri-
alization and a high reliance on agriculture should have more equita-
ble distribution of income, sub-Saharan Africa has had high income 
inequality, which has been worsening in recent decades, despite evi-
dence of deindustrialization and most of its population living in rural 
areas. As argued by Stein, part of the problem with relying on Kuznets’s 
formulation is its reliance on the faux naturalism which is embedded in 
the neoclassical theory of distribution, in which factors of production 
in a competitive market are supposed to be paid according to their mar-
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ginal contribution to production. The belief in a Kuznets curve follows 
the erroneous assumption that peasants received income commensurate 
with their land and labor in economies dominated by rural production. 
With industrialization, the divide between urban-based wage income 
and rural income will grow, and income inequality will worsen. 
The neoclassical paradigm thus argues that only by shrinking the 
rural sector will equality be restored. But when this pattern is not 
observed, instead of questioning the underlying assumptions, neoclas-
sical economists tend to search for extraneous factors in an attempt to 
explain why the paradigm does not seem to hold true. Stein argues that 
to understand income inequality, we need to transcend the faux natural-
ism of neoclassical economics so as to take into account the evolution 
of the institutions, related economic structures, and the way Africa has 
been integrated into the global economy—factors that really underlie 
the current and historical patterns of income distribution. Stein sug-
gests that the core of explanation lies in the shifting structures of power 
which underlie the generation of disparities in material awards. Stein 
reviews the trends in income distribution in sub-Saharan Africa using 
Gini coefficients to measure inequality. His paper provides a critical 
alternative view to the mainstream view of distribution and its appli-
cations to understanding inequality in Africa, including its impact on 
policy formation, which has contributed to the exacerbation of distribu-
tion. The paper discusses the institutional approach to income distribu-
tion, which challenges the standard neoclassical economics approach 
and claims to offer a better understanding of the income distribution 
patterns that we have observed in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Stein presents detailed evidence to make a strong case for the insti-
tutional theory of distribution. According to Stein, factors of produc-
tion are integrated, and their ability to affect production is contingent 
and interactive. Resources, whether human or inanimate, derive their 
utility through their integration into a process dependent on many sub-
processes. The power of production is found in systems, not in land, 
capital, and labor. Stein further argues that neoclassical economic con-
structs have been institutionalized and created the dangerous notion that 
people are paid according to the natural laws of the market and receive 
what is deemed worthy of their contribution. They are not a product 
of human agency but of forces beyond human control. In contrast, the 
institutional theory of distribution points to the need to understand 
 
The Political Economy of Inequality: Introduction 9 
power and its relationship to the contesting of interests at the heart of 
the determination of the allocation of the shares of material rewards. 
Stein stresses that understanding the forces that select working rules 
and that shape and reshape the relative power of the parties involved in
transactions should be at the core of an institutional understanding of 
the distribution of income in any society. Transactions are not simply 
among domestic players but involve international participants, and the 
rules of those transactions are affected by international institutions. So 
how does this explain the pattern of income distribution in Africa? The 
key, according to Stein, is in understanding the forces that shaped and 
altered the conditions and rules that affected the comparative power of 
direct producers in transactions over time. Stein provides comprehen-
sive evidence to support the institutional perspective of inequality using 
his field studies in Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda. 
In Chapter 7, “Income Inequality, Progressive Taxation, and Tax 
Expenditures,” the final chapter, James R. Hines Jr., Richard A. Mus-
grave Collegiate Professor of Economics at the University of Michi-
gan, discusses the effect of progressive taxes and tax expenditures on 
inequality, alluding to the following four facts: 
1) Income and wealth are unequally distributed in the United 
States, and annual incomes appear to have become signifi-
cantly less equal over the past 40 years. 
2) The United States has a progressive income tax system that 
imposes burdens based on ability to pay, with rates that rise 
sharply with income. 
3) The primary function of the tax system is to raise revenue to 
finance the government, but in the process, the tax system also 
redistributes wealth. 
4) The tax system can do quite a bit more on redistribution and 
should, but perhaps paradoxically this is possible only by 
maintaining and adding to tax expenditures (“tax loopholes”) 
for the affluent. In explaining the effect of progressive taxes, 
which can reduce inequality, Hines asserts that the prevailing 
tax system includes certain preferences, such as deductions 
for mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and 
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Like so much else in the tax system these days, there is partisan 
bickering over these “tax expenditures.” Liberals are highly critical that 
tax expenditures have been going mostly to the rich—which they do. 
Only 30 percent of taxpayers itemize their deductions, and affluent tax-
payers are more apt to claim itemized deductions than are the less afflu-
ent. Affluent taxpayers have bigger mortgages and more state and local 
taxes from which to claim deductions. On the other hand, conservatives 
feel that tax expenditures smack of social engineering by government 
and prefer lower tax rates instead. Thus, neither political side likes tax 
expenditures. Yet, as we will see, they are essential aspects of a pro-
gressive tax system. Hines explains who benefits from tax benefits in 
various ways. Tax reductions from income tax expenditures go mostly 
to high-income taxpayers: 13.6 percent of the total goes to the bottom 
income quintile, 61.6 percent of the total goes to the top income quin-
tile, and 27.5 percent goes to the top 1 percent of income. But of course 
it is also true that, of the total amount of revenue brought in by taxes, 
most comes from high-income taxpayers. Only 0.8 percent of taxes is 
paid by the bottom-income quintile, whereas 68.9 percent is paid by the 
top income quintile. In fact, 27.9 percent of tax revenue is paid by the 
top 1 percent. Tax expenditures roughly track total tax liabilities. 
In discussing the equality issues of the U.S. tax system, Hines uses 
the example of one tax measure: the child tax credit. This credit reduces 
the tax burdens of families with children as compared to otherwise-sim-
ilar families without children. Is that a good thing to do? The political 
system has decided that it is. It is certainly true that a family with two 
children and an income of $50,000 is less well off than a family without 
children and an income of $50,000. But Hines points out that, after all, 
those couples chose to have children, so should we permit them to have 
a tax reduction on this basis? Reasonable minds might differ on answer-
ing this question, but the majority think that the answer is yes. 
Hines also addresses a few issues associated with the effect of elim-
inating or significantly reducing taxes. He speculates that such a reduc-
tion would have mixed effects. As a case in point, he takes the flat tax, 
whose advocates offer a coherent, three-step plan: 
1) Eliminate all deductions, credits, and exclusions. 
2) Impose a flat tax at 19 percent, 23 percent, or some other figure. 
3) Permit a zero-bracket amount so that the first $30,000 or so is 
untaxed. 
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While the flat-tax objectors argue that it is not a very progressive tax 
system—in fact it is regressive—it can also be argued that the cost of 
tax progressivity is that it creates greater distortions by subjecting some 
levels of income to high tax rates. And the more progressive an income 
tax system is, the more important it is to be smart about designing the 
system efficiently. Hines indicates that this alternative to the flat-tax 
system requires lots of special deductions and credits, many of which 
are targeted at high-income taxpayers. Advocates will decry these spe-
cial tax breaks as antiprogressive, whereas exactly the opposite is the 
case. 
Hines makes it clear that what most voters want are these two things: 
1) tax simplicity, to make the system easier to understand and 
prevent others from getting unwarranted tax breaks 
2) lower tax rates 
But with that said, still, many specific tax breaks have consider-
able political appeal. (In the United States, these would include owner-
occupied housing, charitable contributions, employer-provided health 
care and pensions, and deductions for state and local taxes, among other 
things.) The reality is that governments need revenue, and it is never 
going to be popular to get that revenue through taxation. But our history 
suggests that governments are aware of the need for tax policies that are 
sensitive to individual situations and economic conditions. 
Hines makes the following three important and provocative points: 
1) There is no principle of efficiency or equity that implies that 
the best tax system taxes a very broad definition of income at 
relatively low rates. 
2) Far from it: the prevailing theory is that taxation should be 
highly differentiated and individualized. 
3) In fact, the most efficient and equitable system has a rela-
tively narrow tax base with relatively high tax rates. Proposals 
(and there are some) to cap all tax deductions or reduce all 
tax deductions by a fixed fraction (say, by letting people claim 
only 80 percent) look odd through this lens. Hines concludes 
that good policy is messy and that we have no choice but to 
rely on governments to make it for us. That they have done so 
with many tax credits, deductions, and exemptions may not be 
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a bad thing, and we may need more of them. These govern-
ments may have much clearer appreciation of the nature of the 
tax problem than that with which we often credit them. 
Social inequality is multifaceted and very complicated. The chap-
ters in this volume can cover only a limited portion of these complexi-
ties. Nonetheless, they contain insightful analyses and viewpoints that 
are critical for illuminating different types of inequality and providing 
context for policies to address them. We invite readers to explore these 
insights and inform their own conclusions. 
Note 
https://inequality.org/ is an online portal to data, analysis, and commentary on income 
and wealth inequality. There readers can find information and insights that can help 
them better understand our deeply unequal world and how we can work to change it 
through the efforts of a think tank called the Institute for Policy Studies, in Washington, 
D.C. 
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The New Inequality 
The Distribution of Retirement and 
Older Working Time in OECD Countries 
Teresa Ghilarducci 
New School for Social Research 
Income inequality and wealth inequality have been on the rise for 
years in rich nations (OECD 2015a; World Bank 2015a). Chapters in 
this volume address inequality’s economic harms: inequality skews 
production toward what the rich want and away from public spending 
on education and health (Sctivosky 1976; World Bank 2015b). It also 
skews political power to the rich, who use that power to create and pre-
serve economic rents (also known as monopoly rents, which encompass 
any payment to a factor of production that is more than what is needed 
to induce that factor to engage in production (Stiglitz 2012). 
This chapter addresses another kind of inequality and the potential 
damage it could inflict on workers’ retirement. Retirement is the period 
after a lifetime of work and before death when people can exercise 
greater control over the pace and content of their time and construct a 
personal narrative about the meaning of their lives (Blackburn 2009). 
As nations grew richer, workers, through the ballot and their representa-
tives in Congress, expanded paid time off—including pension-funded 
retirement through their employers—widely across socioeconomic 
classes. But in the late twentieth century, policy at the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) emphasized auster-
ity and retirement income based on the financial markets, leading some 
elderly workers to work more hours per week and years longer. More 
work at older ages is associated with higher elderly poverty rates and 
retirement time inequalities. 
The next section in this chapter defines retirement time and explores 
the lopsided distribution of American retirement time. The section fol-
13 




lowing that describes changes in retirement time in the rest of the coun-
tries belonging to the OECD. The subsequent section discusses how 
rich nations changed their pension designs toward less social insurance 
and more financialization. The penultimate section shows how pension 
financialization is correlated with increases in older people’s labor force 
participation and how nations with higher elderly labor-force participa-
tion also have higher rates of old-age poverty. The last section offers 
conclusions. 
THE EQUALITY WE FORGET TO CELEBRATE:
THE DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT TIME 
Rich and poor workers’ ability to choose to retire or work in old age 
is a modern development. Before World War II, most men died during 
the time they were still working (Costa 1998), and only the well-off 
could choose whether to work or retire. One of the most underappre-
ciated accomplishments of U.S. social policy was the equalization of 
the distribution of retirement time across socioeconomic groups after 
WWII (Bonen and Ghilarducci 2014). However, since the 1980s, gains 
in retirement wealth, longevity, and morbidity have gone mostly to the 
highest-income workers, white men, and educated women. 
Ghilarducci (2008) was the first scholar to measure the distribution 
of retirement time, finding the distribution of retirement time was strik-
ingly equal for people who died between the ages of 50 and 65. (The 
data set was limited, and only people under 65 could be analyzed.) 
Retired men under the age of 65 in the top 20 percent of the retire-
ment asset distribution accounted for 22 percent of the total amount 
of retirement time, while men in the bottom 20 percent accounted for 
18 percent. Although the top quintile had 85 percent of all wealth and 
the poorest 20 percent were in debt, the distribution of retirement time 
before age 65 was almost equal. The distribution of pre-65 retirement 
time for women was similarly equal: the top and bottom fifths of women 
accounted for virtually the same share of retirement time—22.6 percent 
for the top and 22.7 percent for the bottom (Ghilarducci 2008, p. 145). 
Retirement time equity was the result of public policy decisions 
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Security, defined benefit (DB) pension plans, and disability insurance 
allowed pension income to be paid before age 62. That meant people 
with shorter life spans could start collecting a pension long before their 
mid-60s. More workers from the middle and lower socioeconomic 
classes were able to retire when social security old-age benefits and 
disability programs expanded significantly from the 1950s to the 1970s. 
Medicare, established in 1965, provided universal health insurance for 
those over age 65, which significantly improved the health and longev-
ity of the aged of all classes. Broad-based retirement health and pen-
sions gave workers in all socioeconomic groups the ability to control 
some of their own leisure time before they died. 
Furthermore, the design of workplace pensions and Social Secu-
rity made retirement income and wealth more equally distributed than 
preretirement income in the same time period (Wolff 2015). Unionized 
workers—many with physically taxing jobs—were more likely to be 
covered by DB pension plans, which enabled earlier retirement to com-
pensate for lower-than-average longevity. DB plan participants retire 
about two years earlier than similar workers covered by defined contri-
bution (DC) plans or otherwise similar uncovered workers. The earlier 
retirement of workers in DB plans reflects the design of DB plans, which 
do not increase pensions after a certain age. This provides an incentive 
for workers to retire earlier than they would otherwise (Friedberg and 
Webb 2005). Since the retirement income of DC participants depends 
partially on returns from financial markets, workers likely adapt to their 
considerable financial market risk by working longer.1 
But pension designs changed when the increased costs of popula-
tion aging coincided with austerity movements. Governments cut social 
insurance, and employers in the United States and Britain moved away 
from defined benefit plans in favor of voluntary, self-directed 401(k) 
plans.2 In the United States, Social Security benefits for mid-to-late 
baby boomers were reduced by Congress because the age at which peo-
ple could collect full benefits was increased from 65 to 67. The increase 
was phased in over 25 years, starting in 1984. For all workers born after 
1960, the normal retirement age is 67. Thus, Social Security was placed 
further into a worker’s future. Many OECD nations also reduced ben-
efits from social insurance by raising the normal retirement age. 
Over the same time period—1984 to the present—that Social Secu-




disproportionately went to those at the top of the income distribution 
(Auerbach et al. 2017; Buckles et al. 2016; Case and Deaton 2017). 
Blacks, independent of socioeconomic status, on average become sick 
and die sooner than whites (Geruso 2012). In addition, minorities and 
lower-income individuals are less likely to have adequate retirement 
resources (Even and Macpherson 2007). So the two growing inequali-
ties—longevity and secure retirement income—mean that people dying 
sooner cannot retire earlier, and retirement time becomes more unequal. 
Using a new and enlarged sample of HRS and AHEAD respondents, 
Ghilarducci, Papadopoulos, and Webb (2017) identified a growing gap 
in retirement time: the people with the lowest incomes and lowest edu-
cation average 14.5 years of retirement, whereas those with higher lev-
els of education enjoy, on average, 17 years of retirement. The class 
difference in retirement time is strongest for women, and having a DB 
pension is the most significant factor in explaining the difference in 
retirement time for American men: men with DB pensions live longer 
and retire earlier, especially compared to men without any workplace 
retirement plan. 
Depending on 401(k) plans and individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs) and having no workplace retirement plan leads older people 
(especially middle- and lower-income older workers) to delay retire-
ment. High earners are more likely to be able to afford retirement 
regardless of the type of plan they have. The individually directed and 
voluntary nature of 401(k)s and IRAs means that they form a system 
that works best for higher-income workers. Higher-income workers buy 
assets at the right time—when asset prices are low—because they are 
more likely to be employed in down markets. Higher earners also earn 
higher returns (because their portfolios are more diversified), pay lower 
fees, and have more favorable tax deductions. 
In sum, Social Security cuts, the decline of unions and DB plans, 
and the rise of financial-based retirement plans will cause the share of 
retirement income coming from insurance-based sources (Social Secu-
rity and DB plans) to fall for American middle-class retirees. Those born 
between 1946 and 1955 received 47 percent of their retirement income 
from insurance-based sources in 2010; people born between 1966 and 
1975 will receive 40 percent of their income from such sources (Butrica, 
Smith, and Iams 2012). And the inequality of income among the retired 
population is expected to grow (Gist and Hatch 2014). The financializa-
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tion of pension systems means more households are expected to bear 
more financial risks, which will affect the distribution of wealth income 
and security in old age (Clark, Strauss, and Knox-Hayes 2012). The 
lopsided distribution of secure retirement income and longevity gains 
means that those who die sooner will work longer, making the form 
of equity that often goes unnoticed—equity in retirement time—more 
unequal. 
As other nations cut social insurance and adopt American-type 
financialized retirement systems, some older people will work longer— 
perhaps those with the least resources and shorter life spans—or they 
will retire with lower incomes, leading to an increase in poverty and 
higher rates of labor force participation. Some older people will have to 
find and keep jobs in old age to make up for their lower incomes, lead-
ing to higher rates of labor force participation among certain groups. 
RETIREMENT TIME TRENDS IN THE OECD: TIME HAS
INCREASED, BUT GAINS MAY SLOW OR REVERSE
Over the past 60 years, people in OECD countries are living longer 
and retiring for longer periods of time. Simple math computes that if 
the average age of retirement is stable and average longevity is grow-
ing, then average retirement years will increase. On the other hand, 
if elderly labor force participation outpaces longevity improvements, 
average retirement time could shrink. It’s projected that from 1958 to 
2020, 27 out of 29 OECD nations will have experienced an increase 
in retirement time for men, and in all but one nation, women will have 
had more retirement time than men. Most of the increase in retirement 
time has come from increases in life expectancy outpacing the general 
increase in elderly work years. 
In 30 OECD nations, the labor force participation of older men and 
women has grown significantly since 1993. But the increase in elderly 
labor force participation is not explained by increased prosperity, as 
measured by the changes in gross domestic product (GDP). More peo-
ple working more when the economy grows is expected as pay and 
working conditions improve, but preliminary evidence does not sup-





elderly labor force participation is low, just 10 percent (Ghilarducci and 
Novello 2017).3 Falling pension income would, in theory, cause older 
people to work more, as the drop in nonearned income would lower 
their reservation wage. (The reservation wage is the lowest wage rate a 
worker would accept to move from not working and collecting, say, a 
pension, to looking for work.) Evidence suggests a link between falling 
pensions and older people working. For all OECD nations, when the 
retirement income replacement rate decreases by 1 percentage point, 
from, say, 30 percent to 29 percent, the elderly labor force increases by 
21 percent (author’s calculations in Ghilarducci and Novello). 
The OECD does not measure retirement time from microdata, as 
the American study did, but estimates retirement time using the dif-
ference between the age a person could retire based on the rules of the 
state pension plan and the average estimated age of death for a fifty-
year-old. The average growth in retirement time for 30 OECD nations 
between 1958 and 2010 (some countries only had data from 1971) was 
only slightly different for men and women: women’s retirement time 
increased by 23 percent and men’s increased by a little less, 20 per-
cent. However, the American pattern was quite different: between 1958 
and 2010, the difference between women’s effective retirement age and 
life expectancy increased by only 15 percent, while American men’s 
increased by much more, by 27 percent (Table 2.1).4 
Retirement Time Improvements 
What causes the variation in retirement time between nations? 
Longevity explains most of the variation in changes in retirement time 
between nations, but not all of it. The link between changes in male 
retirement time and male longevity at age 50 is 51 percent; for women, 
Table 2.1  Increase in Retirement Time (%) 
Women Men 
OECD countries, 1958–2010 23 20 
United States, 1958–2010 15 27 
NOTE: Age 50 life expectancy minus effective pension eligibility age, 1958–2010, for 
OECD and U.S. by sex. 
SOURCE: OECD (2015a). 
 
   




The New Inequality 19 
the Pearson correlation is a little less, 32 percent. Some of the varia-
tion is explained by women shrinking their retirement time by working 
more. The increase in the labor force participation rate of elderly men is 
correlated by only 6 percent with a decrease in retirement time. Elderly 
women’s work effort and changes in retirement time are correlated by 
a negative 25 percent. 
PENSION FINANCIALIZATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH
HIGHER ELDERLY LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
RATES AND OLD-AGE POVERTY 
The link between shrinking retirement time and elderly people 
working longer is smaller than the impact of longevity changes on 
retirement time changes, but as pension income shrinks and becomes 
more uncertain, I expect more retirement time to be lost because of 
an increase in elderly labor force participation. There is evidence for 
this view in the simple correlation between the financialization of pen-
sions—the percentage of income coming from capital—and increases 
in elderly work effort: 33 percent for men and 40 percent for women. A
multivariate analysis would of course control for the demand for older 
workers, including the wage rate, but nations where older workers are 
still working are not high-wage nations in general. 
Gruber and Wise (1998) argue that across the OECD member coun-
tries, the older the age at which workers can collect full pension ben-
efits (called normal retirement age), the greater the increases in their 
participation in the labor force. This conclusion makes sense given that 
people who do not have access to income without working are more 
likely to work. 
Gruber and Wise (1998) infer that nations intentionally seek to 
encourage older people to withdraw from working or looking for work 
because they see a correlation between nations making social security 
benefits more generous—as in the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s—and drops 
in elderly labor force participation. They call for nations to reverse the 
decline in elderly labor force participation by decreasing the amount of 
early retirement benefits and lowering the tax rates for older workers. 






terity programs were being implemented (Huber and Stephens 2001). 
Old-age programs that are funded by pay-as-you-go funding mecha-
nisms—current workers’ pay for retired workers’ benefits—become 
more expensive if a large cohort is followed by a small one. These were 
projected to rise in cost (expressed as payroll tax rates) and so became 
an obvious target for austerity policies. However, pay-as-you-go sys-
tems never add to the budget deficit because they are closed systems. 
If the revenue doesn’t match the liabilities, the revenue is increased or 
the benefits are cut. 
Gruber and Wise’s (1998) analysis provides a path to obtain social 
and economic benefits without obvious costs. Having older people 
work more serves to grow economies and increase household income 
with no extra effort from state programs—a classic “win-win.” All that 
was needed to obtain the gains was for states to change their pension 
design to induce older workers to work. 
The effect of the OECD pension design changes after 1990 is con-
sistent with Gruber and Wise’s recommendations that nations cut pen-
sions to induce more work among the elderly. Between 1990 and 2011, 
more than half of the OECD nations cut pension benefits by raising the 
normal retirement age (NRA). Nineteen raised the NRA for women, 
and 16 raised the NRA for men (OECD 2011). Raising the NRA—the 
age at which people can collect full benefits—effectively cuts benefits 
for everyone collecting at any age. 
Financializing retirement income shifts various risks to individuals, 
making retirement income less secure, so older people work more as 
they face higher risks of old-age poverty stemming from social insur-
ance cuts. Gruber and Wise (1998) recommend that nations cut social 
insurance to increase the labor force participation of men and women. 
When nations get richer, their inhabitants consume more of what 
are called normal goods, including paid time off. Holidays, paid vaca-
tions, and nonworking weekends become norms. Retirement is also a 
normal good; the demand for retirement time increases as nations get 
richer.5 However, as Gruber and Wise (1998) and Gruber, Milligan, and 
Wise (2009) argue, more retirement could cause a reversal in that afflu-
ence if pension expenses increase too much. 
The OECD’s “age of effective retirement” is computed based on the 
average age at which people withdraw from the labor force in a given 
period. In most nations, people retire at younger ages than the age at 
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which they can collect full retirement benefits under their nation’s state 
pension rules. For instance, in the United States, covered workers can 
collect a much-reduced Social Security pension benefit at age 62 or wait 
to receive a benefit that is worth more at age 70. Each person decides 
his or her time preference and makes an estimate of their longevity and 
morbidity in order to choose the age at which to collect reduced or full 
benefits. On average, people retire much sooner than the age required to 
collect full benefits. This is notable because it means the state systems 
are less generous than they would otherwise be. 
In the United States, the penalty for collecting at age 62, four years 
before the normal retirement age of 66 (for people born after 1960), is 
30 percent, and the delayed retirement credit for collecting at age 70 is 
32 percent. That means that for every $1,000 of benefit owed at 66, a 
worker could collect $700 per month at 62 for life, or $1,320 per month 
at 70 for life. More than 40 percent collect at age 62. Retirees in Japan 
and Korea are notable exceptions to this tendency. In those countries, 
the effective age of retirement, the age at which half of the people actu-
ally retire, is close to 70 for men despite a normal retirement age of 60. 
The demand for labor could be quite high, so that the wage offered to 
older workers is high, thus encouraging them to work; or the retirement 
benefits could be low, so that in order to meet a target income, these 
men need to work. 
Men, on average, are still in the workforce at age 65 in Denmark, 
Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Switzerland, but have left the labor force 
by age 60 in Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, and the 
Slovak Republic. Women, in general, retire around one to two years 
earlier than men do, on average, in the 30–32 OECD nations examined 
in this chapter (OECD 2015a). 
Overall, the labor force participation rates of elderly men and 
women increased in most OECD nations between 1995 and 2011. How-
ever, in 10 out of the 30 nations, women’s age of retirement is decreas-
ing, and in 15 nations, men’s age of retirement is decreasing. Women 
are working less and men more in New Zealand, Australia, and Russia, 
whereas in Greece, women are working longer and men are retiring at 
younger ages. The conclusions we draw from the international experi-
ence is that there is a general tendency for a national policy that cuts 
retirement benefits to lead to increases in retirement ages, but there is a 
great deal of variation in that relationship. 
22 Ghilarducci 
Financialization of pension systems/retirement is defined as having 
an increasing share of old-age income originating from financial assets, 
rather than from social insurance programs. The degree of financial-
ization varies by country; the elderly in some nations obtain relatively 
more income from capital than others (Table 2.2, showing 27 nations). 
Table 2.2  Source of Retirement Income from Capital, by Nation 
Share of income from capital, for 
Country household heads over age 65 
Slovak Republic 0.7 
Poland 1.0 























New Zealand 24.4 
Canada 40.6 
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For instance, Canadian elders get 40 percent of their average income 
from stocks and bonds, and Slovakian elders less than 1 percent. 
The boost in elderly work caused by shrinking and uncertain retire-
ment income is welcomed by governments that are engaged in aus-
terity policies. At one extreme is the United States, where the Social 
Security system has stagnated and job-related defined benefit pensions 
have been replaced by voluntary, individually directed, commercially 
defined contribution 401(k) plans, where fees vary considerably and 
payouts are almost always made in a lump sum. 
At the other extreme is Switzerland, where contributions to occu-
pational plans are mandatory, the contribution rates vary with age of 
worker, and the government sets the minimum rate of return that the 
plan must pay and a mandatory annuity rate at which the accumulation 
is converted into a flow of pension payments. 
Austerity and financialization affect people in lower socioeco-
nomic classes differently from those at the top. Those who depend most 
on social security and have little pension wealth will likely be more 
induced to work or look for work than others. 
And the negative and unintended effect of inducing more work 
from the elderly by eroding pension security, rather than luring more 
people into the workforce with better wages and working conditions, is 
that the people with the lowest levels of productivity will be forced to 
stay in the labor force longer, which causes average productivity to fall
(Burtless 2013). This “forced to work” hypothesis is consistent with 
the evidence that increases in labor force participation rates among the 
elderly are not correlated directly with GDP growth.6 
Since some increases in labor force participation of older workers 
are linked to financialization and austerity policies, it is not unantici-
pated that nations with high rates of labor force participation also show 
higher rates of elder poverty. 
But just how is pension financialization linked to higher poverty 
rates? First, policies that lead nations to shift away from defined con-
tribution–type retirement systems are often a part of larger austerity 
measures, in which nations reduce unemployment benefits, increase 
the normal pensionable age, and reduce social spending. In addition, 
income from personal assets is less secure and is subject to market fluc-
tuations and income shocks such as job loss, divorce, and health crises. 




social insurance income are nations that tolerate more hardship among 
their elderly. There is some evidence for this proposition. Unfortu-
nately, working longer signals poverty; the Pearson correlation between 
the labor force participation of older people and elderly poverty rates is 
38 percent (Figure 2.1). 
In countries where older people have a relatively high share of their 
income coming from capital, such as Mexico and the United States, we 
also see some of the highest rates of elderly poverty. In countries such as 
France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, where income comes mostly from 
sources other than capital (e.g., social insurance), we also see some of 
the lowest rates of elderly poverty (Figure 2.1). Nations that tolerate 
high levels of elderly poverty are more likely to accept riskier pensions. 
CONCLUSION
As many nations in the OECD shrink their social insurance pro-
grams, more elders will obtain their retirement income from individu-
ally saved or invested assets. The shift away from PAYGo (“pay as you 
go”) financing (which is a direct transfer from current workers to pen-
sioners) toward prefunded pensions that provide for future income is 
occurring in some OECD countries, but the financialization of pensions 
has taken place at different rates, intensities, and pacing. 
Retirement time will be reduced across income classes, but in par-
ticular for those who are unlucky in their finances, have high fees on 
their financial transactions, and suffer life shocks that prevented suf-
ficient accumulation of assets. 
Higher-income workers are most likely to have economic lives 
that are compatible with a financialized retirement system. The highest 
earners have better and more stable jobs, have larger and more sophisti-
cated employers, pay lower account fees, have more access to financial 
information networks, and benefit disproportionately from tax deduc-
tions for retirement fund earnings and contributions. 
Many nations in the OECD have adopted some aspects of the 
U.S. retirement system so that more elders will obtain their retirement 
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Figure 2.1  Relationship between Working More at Older Ages and 
Poverty Rates at Older Ages, Various European Countries 
and Mexico (r = 0.38) 
 of i older people from work





SOURCE: OECD (2011, 2015a,b). 
of risk—and the provision against risk—has been the most dramatic 
change in the form of pension provision in the OECD countries. 
In sum, there are two potential consequences of pension finan-
cialization. First, raising the age of eligibility for full social security 
benefits may increase elders’ labor force participation without making 
their retirement times shorter. Second, uncertain incomes and the non-
redistributive characteristic of financial assets could leave low-income 
and less-educated people more at risk of poverty rates in old age. In 
other words, retirement time may stay the same, but poverty will likely 
increase. 
Bottom line: The shift from social insurance to the relative insecu-
rity of financial-based retirement accounts will likely have the intended
effect of increasing elderly labor force participation rates and the unin-
tended effects of shrinking retirement time or not improving retirement 







1. Employers can sponsor defined benefit (DB) or 401(k) or other DC retirement 
plans. DB entitlements are computed using a formula that considers salary and 
length of employment. In contrast, DC plans pay a lump sum equal to employee 
and employer contributions plus net return on investments. DB plans are asso-
ciated with greater retirement security than 401(k) or other DC plans, because 
DB plans pay a lifetime annuity, do not allow people to withdraw money before 
retirement, earn higher returns, have lower fees, and do not allow nonparticipation 
by eligible employees. DB plan participants retire about two years earlier than 
otherwise similar workers covered by DC plans or uncovered workers, reflecting 
wealth accrual patterns that incent early retirement. 
2. Thus, DB plans, which used to pay a stream of income for the rest of a person’s 
life (an annuity), were switched to policies encouraging payments from an indi-
vidually owned retirement account. 
3. The Pearson correlation is a measure of the linear correlation between two 
variables. I have no good reason to imagine that the relationship between GDP 
growth and elderly labor force participation is not linear, though further thought 
and research should consider other specifications. The measure takes on values 
between +1 and −1, where 1 is total positive linear correlation, 0 is no linear 
correlation, and −1 is total negative linear correlation. The size of the correlation 
indicates the intensity of the relationship. 
4. Retirement time has increased, but the rate of increase has slowed. On average, 
we found that the estimated average retirement time for people in the 30 OECD 
nations since 1958 (some countries had data only from 1971 on) had increased 
by more than 20 percent between 1958 and 1992, with a 29 percent improvement 
for women and a 23 percent improvement for men. However, the rate of improve-
ments slowed to 8 percent improvement for women and 13 percent for men in the 
second period, from 1993 to 2010. 
5. As nations get richer, more resources are devoted to increasing longevity through 
public health campaigns, clean water, antismoking campaigns, clean air and water 
regulations, access to health care, and technologies for the treatment of heart dis-
ease, cancer, and other diseases. Simple two-way correlations between the GDP 
growth rate in each OECD nation and the growth of life expectancy for people 
over age 65 is 50 percent for men and women together and 64 percent for women 
(Ghilarducci and Novello 2017). 
6. Because employer health-care costs increase with the age of the employer’s labor 
force, the relationship of pay to productivity is distorted: older workers’ total com-
pensation increases as their productivity falls. Though older people are healthier 
than older people were in the past, there is evidence that the speed of technology 
has made for quicker rates of skill obsolescence, so productivity declines after age 
60. The argument that eroding pension security leads to declines in productivity is 
important to note because it feeds into one of the perennial policy concerns about 
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growth. We are not commenting on the strength of this argument, since other 
factors have important impacts on productivity, including, in particular, capital 
investment. 
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The Economics and Politics 
of the Fall and Rise of Income 
Inequality in the United States 
Charles L. Ballard 
Michigan State University 
Income inequality in the United States has increased dramatically 
since the 1970s. However, the U.S. economy also experienced an 
equally dramatic equalization in the 1930s and 1940s. Consequently, if 
we are to develop a complete understanding of the evolution of the U.S. 
income distribution, we must analyze the earlier “Great Compression” 
or “Great Convergence,” as well as the more recent “Great Divergence.” 
I begin with a review of the facts of the changes in income inequality 
over the past century in the United States. I will then discuss and evalu-
ate the economic explanations for those trends. However, the economic
trends cannot be understood fully without reference to political factors. 
I argue that both the Great Compression and the Great Divergence are 
primarily the result of deliberate political choices. Furthermore, I argue 
that race is the most important of the many factors leading to the politi-
cal shifts that have, in turn, contributed to the Great Divergence of the 
past 40 years: Many whites, especially in the South, reacted to the Civil 
Rights movement by switching their allegiance to the Republican Party, 
and this has contributed substantially to the adoption of more antiegali-
tarian economic policies. 
TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 
The best starting point for a discussion of long-term trends in U.S. 
income inequality is the paper by Piketty and Saez (2003). Their origi-
31 
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nal paper contains data through 1998, but they have updated the data 
annually, so that we now have a complete series covering a full century, 
from 1913 to 2017.1 Piketty and Saez use tax-return data, which allow 
them to produce extremely detailed estimates for the income shares of 
the very top income strata. 
Some of the trends in income shares derived by Piketty and Saez are 
shown in Figure 3.1. 
The data depicted in Figure 3.1 reveal that the shares of the top 
groups fell from the late 1920s to the early 1970s, and especially 
sharply in the early 1940s. The share of the top 1 percent plummeted 
from 15.7 percent of total income in 1940 to 10.5 percent in 1944. Top 
income shares surged upward in the 1980s, almost as dramatically as 
they had fallen in the early 1940s. In the most recent 10 years, the share 
of the top 1 percent has been around 18 percent of total income, which 
is higher than the average in the first 15 years, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
Thus, by some measures, the income distribution in the United States 
today is more unequal than it was a century ago. 
The disequalization since the 1970s has been extremely top-heavy. 
A majority of the gains in share for the top 5 percent went to the top 1 
percent, a majority of the gains in share for the top 1 percent accrued 
to the top one-tenth of 1 percent, and about half of the gains in share 
for the top one-tenth of 1 percent accrued to the top one-hundredth of 
1 percent. 
Piketty and Saez (2003) focus exclusively on the top 10 percent, but 
there have also been changes in the income distribution below the top 10 
percent. Census data from Semega, Fontenot, and Kollar (2017) show 
that, since the 1970s, the income of the typical household at the 90th 
percentile rose by substantially more than the income of the household 
at the 80th percentile, which rose faster than the income of the house-
hold at the 60th percentile, which rose faster than the income of the 
median household. However, the incomes of the households at the 40th 
and 20th percentiles grew only slightly more slowly than the income of 
the median household. Thus, during the Great Divergence, those at the 
very, very top of the income distribution pulled away from those merely 
at the very top, those at the very top pulled away from those at the top, 
and those at the top pulled away from those in the middle. On the other 
hand, those in the middle of the income distribution have gained only 
slightly when compared with those at the bottom. 
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Figure 3.1 Percentage of Income in the United States Received by the 
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SOURCE: Piketty and Saez (2003), with data updated to 2017 from http://eml.berkeley
.edu/~saez/. 
ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS FOR THE GREAT
CONVERGENCE OF THE EARLY AND MIDDLE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Each explanation described here is a phenomenon that could poten-
tially push the overall degree of income inequality in a particular direc-
tion, but each could possibly be offset by any of several other factors. 
The story told here is definitely not one of historical determinism or 
inevitability. 
Increased educational attainment. An increase in education will 
increase the supply of more highly skilled workers. All else being equal, 
this will tend to reduce wage differentials. 
Educational attainment in the United States increased with stun-





evidence suggests that this contributed substantially to the Great Com-
pression. The high school graduation rate increased from about 9 per-
cent in 1910 to about 70 percent in 1960. The rapid rise in attainment 
of a high school diploma was the result of a nationwide movement at 
the grassroots level. Compulsory attendance laws helped, but Goldin 
(1999) argues that an even more important source of change was the 
adoption of “free tuition laws,” under which school districts were com-
pelled to provide funds for secondary schools. As a result, by the 1930s 
and 1940s, the number of Americans who had acquired enough skills to 
compete for jobs above the rank of laborer had skyrocketed. The GI Bill 
of 1944 then provided the impetus for a surge in the college-educated 
population.
Wage-setting institutions. The National Labor Relations Act of 
1935 made it much easier for labor unions to organize successfully. In 
1935, about 13 percent of U.S. workers were members of a labor union. 
By 1945, the rate of union membership had risen to about 35 percent. 
The rapid rise in union membership contributed to the Great Com-
pression, as labor unions helped boost the incomes of Americans in 
the lower and middle strata of the income distribution. The Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 established, among other things, a federal mini-
mum wage of 25 cents per hour. The minimum wage also contributed 
somewhat to the Great Compression. 
Goldin and Margo (1992) document the crucial role played by the 
National War Labor Board during the Second World War. As part of 
the effort to control the inflationary pressures stemming from the war, 
the Board was given the power to approve or deny requests for wage 
increases. The Board was much more likely to approve wage increases 
for low-wage workers, and this contributed substantially to the Great 
Compression. 
Social norms. Even after the wartime wage controls were disman-
tled, the income distribution remained much more equal than it had 
been a decade before. This was partly due to the continuing trends of 
rising educational attainment, stronger unions, and substantial increases 
in the minimum wage, as well as to other factors that we will discuss 
below. But it was probably also due, at least in part, to a change in 
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widely accepted as fair, and that they remained widely accepted for a 
generation. 
Regulation of financial services. The first century and a half of 
U.S. history is littered with financial crises. The largest financial crisis 
of all contributed to the Great Depression in the 1930s, and this led the 
73rd Congress to establish a strong regulatory regime for the finan-
cial services sector. These regulations led to the only time in history 
that the United States went for a half-century without a financial crisis, 
and the regulations also reduced the incomes of financiers. Since those 
who work at Wall Street firms and big banks are very prominent in the 
extreme top of the income distribution, the reduction in their incomes 
was an important force for equalization. 
Progressive taxation. Until the twentieth century, the revenue sys-
tem of the United States relied primarily on customs duties and excise 
taxes, which tend to be regressive. However, during the Progressive 
Era, concern about the unequal distribution of income and wealth led to 
political pressure for enactment of more progressive revenue sources. 
In 1913, with the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the United 
States established a progressive income tax. The marginal tax rate faced 
by the highest-income Americans was increased dramatically during 
the Democratic administration of Franklin Roosevelt, reaching 94 per-
cent in 1944, and it stayed at 91 percent throughout the Republican 
administration of Dwight Eisenhower. 
Corporate-source income is disproportionately received by those 
with high incomes. Thus, the corporation income tax, established in 
1909, also increased the progressivity of the tax system. During the 
Second World War, the top marginal rate in the corporation tax reached 
53 percent, and the top rate stayed above 50 percent for two decades 
after the war. The third key element of the trend toward more progres-
sive taxation was the estate tax—levied, as the name implies, on the 
estates of wealthy decedents, and established in 1916. The top marginal 
rate in the estate tax reached 77 percent in 1941, and it stayed there until 
1976.
Restricted immigration. From 1890 to 1910, the rates of immi-





immigrants in the early twentieth century put downward pressure on 
the wages of low-skilled native-born workers in the United States. In 
reaction against this, Congress passed laws in the 1920s that severely 
restricted immigration. 
The reduced supply of immigrants led to an increase in wage rates 
for low-skilled workers through the ordinary interaction of supply and 
demand. Equally important, many of the immigrants who arrived in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries eventually became citizens 
and were able to vote. This, combined with the decrease in the number 
of new arrivals, greatly reduced the size of the low-wage population 
that had no political voice. 
ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS OF THE
GREAT DIVERGENCE 
I will consider the various explanations for the Great Divergence 
in what I consider to be their order of importance. However, I readily 
acknowledge that any judgment about the relative importance of these 
factors must necessarily be somewhat subjective. 
Changes in technology. If technological changes increase the 
demand for highly skilled workers and decrease the demand for less-
skilled workers, the technological changes will tend to increase wage 
differentials. 
In the final third of the twentieth century, the growth rate of highly 
skilled labor slowed as the high school graduation rate leveled off and 
the rate of increase of college completion slowed. At the same time, it 
appears that the demand for highly skilled workers rose rapidly. Many 
jobs that involved simple, repetitive tasks were replaced by automated 
processes. 
Predictably, this led to a widening earnings gap between college 
graduates and those with only a high school diploma. Not only that, 
but, as documented by Lemieux (2006), the earnings gap between those 
with education beyond a bachelor’s degree and those with only a bach-
elor’s degree has also widened. 
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Unions lose strength. As mentioned earlier, union membership 
soared in the decade following enactment of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act in 1935. Figure 3.2 shows that increase, as well as the subse-
quent erosion of the relative strength of unions, which has now contin-
ued fairly steadily for 60 years. As unions weakened, they lost some of 
their ability to secure more favorable wages and benefits. Blackburn, 
Bloom, and Freeman (1990) estimate that deunionization can explain 
20 percent of the increase in wage inequality for U.S. men. Also, unions 
have long been a bastion of support for the Democratic Party, which has 
been more egalitarian (or at least less antiegalitarian) than the Republi-
can Party during the period studied here. 
Deregulation of financial services. We have seen that regulation of 
the financial-services sector was greatly strengthened in the 1930s. Not 
surprisingly, however, Wall Street fought back. Beginning in the 1970s, 
the financial regulations were slowly but steadily stripped away. As a 














SOURCE: For years 1930–1978: BLS (1980). For years 1979–2018: Unionstats.com, 
a union membership and coverage database from the Current Population Survey, con-
structed by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson. 
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result, the incomes of financiers skyrocketed, and in the late 2000s, the 
financial system experienced its worst crisis since 1933. 
Philippon and Reshef (2012) show that the increased regulation of 
the 1930s led to a society in which the earnings of financial workers 
were only slightly higher than the earnings of comparably skilled work-
ers in other sectors. When the regulations were removed, it once again 
became possible for financial-service workers to earn a very substantial 
premium over comparable workers in the rest of the economy. Philip-
pon and Reshef estimate that finance accounts for 15–25 percent of the 
overall increase in income inequality since 1980. 
Changes in family structure. Increases in the prevalence of single-
parent families are likely to exacerbate inequality. In 1950, 7.4 percent 
of families with children were headed by a single parent. By 2016, that 
fraction had grown to 31.6 percent. Haskins and Sawhill (2016) esti-
mate that these changes in family structure are responsible for at least 
15 percent of the increase in inequality, and possibly much more. 
A substantial part of the change in family structure is probably due 
to changing attitudes toward marriage and divorce. However, mass 
incarceration has undoubtedly had an effect on family structure as well. 
The rate of incarceration in state and federal prisons was more than five 
times as high in the mid-2000s as it had been in 1972. Mass incarcera-
tion surely contributed to the breakdown of families, which, as we have 
seen, was a major force contributing to the Great Divergence. In addi-
tion to this indirect effect, mass incarceration has probably also played 
a direct role in the Great Divergence, since convicts often suffer per-
manent damage to their earnings prospects, even after they are released 
from prison. Finally, mass incarceration disenfranchises a part of the 
population that is disproportionately poor. 
At the same time that the breakdown of the family was increasing 
income inequality by increasing the number of single-parent families, 
another change in family structure was increasing income inequality 
by increasing the incomes of many relatively more affluent families. 
Assortative mating is the practice whereby men and women with simi-
lar levels of education are more likely to form families than are men 
and women with different levels of education. The evidence suggests 
that assortative mating has increased in the past few decades. When 
we combine increased assortative mating with increased female labor-
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force participation, we have yet another factor that contributes to the 
Great Divergence. Greenwood et al. (2014) find that assortative mating 
made essentially no difference in 1960, but that it contributed very sub-
stantially to inequality in 2005. 
Less progressive taxation. We have seen that U.S. tax rates on 
those with high incomes and large amounts of wealth were quite high in 
the middle of the twentieth century. However, the top marginal tax rate 
in the federal individual income tax was reduced to 70 percent in 1964 
and to 50 percent in 1981. In 2017, President Donald Trump signed a 
reduction in the top rate to 37 percent, once again providing large ben-
efits to the most affluent households. 
The time pattern of top marginal tax rates in the federal individual 
income tax, shown in Figure 3.3, is roughly inverse-U-shaped. The pat-
tern of top marginal tax rates is somewhat similar to the pattern of union-
ization, shown in Figure 3.2. The pattern for each of these is roughly the 
reverse of the U-shaped pattern for top income shares, shown in Figure 
Figure 3.3  Highest Marginal Tax Rate in the U.S. Federal Individual 
Income Tax, 1913–2019 


















3.1. These data suggest that a wide variety of political and economic 
phenomena went in one direction in the early and middle decades of 
the twentieth century and then reversed course in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The corporate tax rate stayed at 52 percent from 1952 to 1963. 
In 2017, it was reduced to 21 percent for domestic-source corporate 
income, and to zero for foreign-source corporate income. In 1945, the 
corporate tax raised 35 percent of the total revenues of the federal gov-
ernment. This proportion shrank to 22 percent in 1965 and to 10.6 per-
cent in 2015. 
The estate tax is a relatively small part of the revenue system, but it 
is strongly progressive, since it applies only to very wealthy decedents. 
The top rate in the federal estate tax was decreased to 70 percent in 
1977 and to 50 percent in 1982. The top rate in the estate tax is now 
40 percent, and the fraction of estates that is subject to tax has been 
reduced dramatically. 
Finally, in addition to cutting the top marginal tax rate generally, the 
tax cuts signed into law by George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003 reduced 
the tax rates on dividends and capital gains. Each of these types of 
income is disproportionately received by high-income households. 
International trade. Until the 1970s, international trade played a 
fairly small role in the U.S. economy. Thus, it does not appear that 
international trade had any substantial role in the Great Compression. 
However, the catastrophic effects of the Great Depression and the Sec-
ond World War led the United States to take the lead in building a more 
integrated global economy in the postwar period. The relative impor-
tance of international trade increased significantly in the 1970s, and it 
has continued to increase since then. 
Burtless (1995) suggests that import competition contributed to rising 
income inequality, and he was writing at a time when imports from China 
were relatively small. After China joined the World Trade Organization 
in 2001, the pressure on American manufacturing from Chinese imports 
intensified. Acemoglu et al. (2016) calculate that the increase in imports 
from China may have been responsible for the direct loss of more than 
800,000 American manufacturing jobs between 1991 and 2011. 
If we desire to slow down or reverse the increase of income inequal-
ity, many policies are available. For example, since the slowdown in 
educational attainment has contributed to the Great Divergence, the 
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obvious policy prescription is to increase investments in education. 
Since deregulation of the financial-services sector has contributed to 
the Great Divergence, the obvious policy prescription is to strengthen 
the regulation of financial firms. And since the decrease in the progres-
sivity of the tax system has also contributed to the Great Divergence, 
the obvious policy prescription would be to reverse the trend by making 
the tax system more progressive. Based on my values, which include a 
desire for a less unequal distribution of income, all three of the prescrip-
tions described in this paragraph would be sound policies. However, 
when we consider the fact that import competition has contributed to 
the Great Divergence, the obvious policy prescriptions of tariffs and 
import quotas are associated with great risks. A cycle of retaliatory tar-
iffs (such as that which followed the imposition of the Smoot-Hawley 
tariffs in 1930) could do profound damage to the export sector. Also, 
although tariffs can help domestic producers, they are unquestionably 
harmful for domestic consumers, since they bring fewer choices and 
higher prices. Although some may contend that tariffs and quotas are a 
“cure” for the “disease” of import competition, I believe that the cure 
could be much worse than the disease. 
Immigration. After immigration restrictions were relaxed in 1965, 
the rate of immigration rose substantially. It appears that this increase 
in immigration has contributed to the Great Divergence, just as the ear-
lier decrease in immigration contributed to the Great Compression. As 
before, the immigration increases of recent years have had both politi-
cal and economic effects. 
The size of the economic effect is a subject of controversy. Blau 
and Mackie (2017) have performed an extraordinarily comprehensive 
review of the literature. They find that “when measured over a period 
of 10 years or more, the impact of immigration on the wages of natives 
overall is very small. However, estimates for subgroups span a com-
paratively wider range” (p. 204). McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2016) 
emphasize the political effect: there has been a large increase in the 
number of low-income Americans who are not eligible to vote. 
The political economy of immigration stands in contrast to the 
political economy of the other issues discussed here. The antiegalitar-
ian policy reversals in the 1970s and 1980s were pushed by conser-





laws in 1965 was supported by those who were otherwise egalitarian. 
Ironically, a clampdown on immigration could have mild equalizing
effects, despite the fact that today’s most ardent advocates of reduced 
immigration are those who advocate antiegalitarian policies in other 
policy areas. 
The minimum wage. The inflation-adjusted federal minimum wage 
rose substantially in the 1950s and 1960s and reached its peak in 1968. 
Since then, however, the minimum wage has failed to keep up with 
inflation. Autor, Manning, and Smith (2016) find that the reduction in 
the real value of the minimum wage increased inequality in the 1980s, 
especially for women. I conclude that minimum wage laws contributed 
somewhat to the equalization of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, and that 
the falling real value of the minimum wage also contributed somewhat 
to the widening income gap of the 1980s. 
Executive compensation. Davis and Mishel (2014) calculate the 
average ratio of compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) to the 
compensation of the average worker in their firms, for a sample of 350 
large U.S. companies. In the 1960s and early 1970s, this ratio was in 
the low 20s. The ratio then began to rise rapidly, reaching 383 in 2000, 
before falling back to “only” 296 in 2013. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
discuss the explosion of executive compensation in detail. It is pos-
sible that some of the rise in CEO compensation may be a response to 
improved productivity on the part of executives. However, it is difficult 
to escape the conclusion that the phenomenal increases in executive 
compensation are largely due to a change in social norms. Skyrocketing 
CEO compensation since the 1970s is consistent with a change in social 
norms, under which executives and their boards of directors lost the 
“outrage constraint” that might previously have prevented them from 
pushing CEO compensation to stratospheric heights. 
POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS 
How could the Great Divergence take place in a country like the 
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elected leaders? The policies of the last 40 years have been extraordi-
narily beneficial for a relatively small number of affluent Americans, 
but these beneficiaries are greatly outnumbered by those whose eco-
nomic interests have been harmed by the changes. Thus, the question is 
why so many congressional and presidential elections have been won 
by those who espouse and carry out antiegalitarian economic policies. 
Social issues. Very often, candidates for public office who espouse 
conservative, antiegalitarian views on economic issues also have con-
servative views on social issues, such as abortion and gay rights. Thus, 
when a voter casts her vote primarily on the basis of opposition to abor-
tion or gay rights, she will usually be voting for a candidate who also 
has antiegalitarian views on economic issues. Unless this voter is fairly 
affluent, she will thereby be voting against her economic interests. 
Frank (2004) argues that conservatives have skillfully used social 
issues to drive a wedge between many voters and their economic inter-
ests. My view is that, although social issues are only a part of the picture, 
they cannot be dismissed. Elections are often won by small margins. If 
even a relatively small number of voters are persuaded to vote against 
their economic interests by social and cultural appeals, the effects on 
policy can be large. 
Political organization and voter turnout. Edsall (1984) describes 
a business community that developed a sense of class consciousness 
and class solidarity. Along with increasingly energetic conservative 
ideologues, the business community provided increasingly unified sup-
port, and plenty of money, to conservative, antiegalitarian candidates 
for public office. 
Edsall also identifies a series of changes that unmoored the Demo-
cratic Party from its long tradition of strong connections with working-
class voters. In the 1960s and 1970s, antiwar activists, environmen-
talists, and women’s-rights advocates joined the Democratic Party 
in increasing numbers. These groups were not necessarily hostile to 
organized labor and working-class Democrats, but workers’ issues and 
income inequality were not at the top of their agendas. Thus, the Demo-
cratic Party has been less effective than it might otherwise have been 
at resisting the antiegalitarian trend. The Reagan tax cuts of 1981 were 
passed by a Congress with a Democratic majority in the House of Rep-
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resentatives. Also, much of the deregulation of the financial services 
sector took place during the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton. 
Edsall also emphasizes that lower-income voters tend to have lower 
rates of turnout than those with higher incomes. If turnout in American 
elections were anywhere near 100 percent, the Great Divergence might 
have been much smaller than it has been. 
Electoral institutions. Proportional voting schemes are used in 
parliamentary elections in many European countries. These electoral 
systems stand in contrast to the “first-past-the-post” system used in 
elections for the U.S. Congress. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that 
proportional voting schemes contribute to the adoption of egalitarian 
policies. The first-past-the-post system rewards political parties whose 
supporters are not geographically concentrated, such as the Republican 
Party in the United States today. 
The first-past-the-post system is also subject to gerrymandering. 
Although gerrymandering has benefited Democratic candidates on 
some occasions in the past, it tends to benefit Republican candidates 
today, since so many state legislatures are controlled by Republicans. 
To the extent that the first-past-the-post system has come to favor 
Republicans, it has contributed to the Great Divergence. I believe that 
this is a relatively important effect. 
In the United States, presidents are chosen according to the Elec-
toral College, an eighteenth-century institution that was deliberately 
designed to reduce the influence of the broad public. In 2000, the 
Republican George W. Bush was elected, despite losing the popular 
vote to the Democrat Al Gore by more than 500,000 votes. The Repub-
lican Donald Trump was elected in 2016, despite losing the popular 
vote to the Democrat Hillary Clinton by more than 2.8 million votes. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that the Electoral College will only go 
against the popular vote in a way that favors the antiegalitarian candi-
date. Nevertheless, in 2000 and 2016, what actually happened was that 
antiegalitarian Republicans won the Electoral College while losing the 
popular vote. 
Small effects can accumulate and reinforce themselves over time. 
An important example of this is that Supreme Court justices in the 
United States are nominated by presidents who win the Electoral Col-
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Thus, the second-place vote getter in the 2000 presidential election, 
George W. Bush, was able to nominate two conservative justices (John 
Roberts and Samuel Alito) to the Supreme Court. It is quite likely that 
Gore nominees would have voted differently from Roberts and Alito 
in two very important cases. The first of these is the 2010 decision in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which the conser-
vative majority voted to reduce substantially the restrictions on politi-
cal expenditures. The second is the 2013 decision in Shelby County 
v. Holder, in which the conservative majority voted to eviscerate key 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. If presidential elections 
were always won by the top vote getter, it is likely that the decisions 
in Citizens United and Shelby County would have gone the other way. 
Voter ignorance. Bartels (2005, 2008) emphasizes voter misun-
derstanding of a variety of policies. For example, although surveys 
indicate that a majority of Americans favor a progressive tax structure, 
many do not seem to have comprehended the highly regressive nature 
of the 2001 tax cuts. However, there is no evidence that voter ignorance 
is a new phenomenon. It strains credulity to think that voters were well 
informed until the 1970s and then suddenly became ignorant 40 years 
ago. 
An even more telling piece of evidence against placing too much 
weight on the ignorance hypothesis is that the shift toward voting against 
one’s economic interests was confined almost exclusively to white vot-
ers. African American voters, who are disproportionately represented 
on the lower rungs of the income scale, tended to vote for candidates 
espousing relatively egalitarian policies in the early and middle part of 
the twentieth century (when they were allowed to vote). Black voters 
have continued to vote in overwhelming majorities for the Democratic 
Party, which is clearly the more egalitarian (or at least the less antiegali-
tarian) of the two major parties. Thus, in order to place a lot of weight 
on the ignorance hypothesis, it is necessary for us to believe that nearly 
all black voters avoided ignorance throughout the period studied here 
and thus retained their ability to vote in accordance with their economic 
interests, while substantial numbers of white voters suddenly became 
more ignorant and thus lost the ability to vote their economic interests. 
A related possibility is that large numbers of white voters were suscep-




news media. This leads me to the conclusion that racial issues provide 
more fertile ground for understanding the Great Divergence. 
Race. In my view, race explains more of the Great Divergence than 
any other single influence. This does not mean that I believe that the 
other explanations discussed above are invalid. In fact, I believe that 
all of them can explain some of what has happened. I cannot overem-
phasize the fact that many elections are won by margins of 52 percent 
to 48 percent, rather than, say, 93 percent to 7 percent. Thus, each of a 
number of factors can turn out to be critically important. 
My emphasis on the importance of race also does not suggest that 
no real progress has been made on racial issues in the United States. 
African Americans have made very significant strides in education, 
earnings, and income. In addition, as a result of the dismantling of Jim 
Crow laws, most African Americans do not have to endure as many 
daily humiliations as they once were forced to endure. In 2008 and 
2012, an African American, Barack Obama, won the presidential elec-
tion (with victories both in the Electoral College and in the popular 
vote), which would have been unimaginable for almost all of American 
history. 
My assertion about the importance of race also does not mean that 
the attitudes of a substantial portion of the white population have not 
changed for the better. Also, I am not saying that anyone whose policy 
preferences differ from mine is a racist. Nevertheless, I cannot avoid the 
conclusion that race has played a very important role in generating the 
Great Divergence, and that the role of race is more important than the 
roles of the other influences discussed above. 
From 1900 to 1944, Democratic candidates for president averaged 
68 percent of the popular vote in the 11 states of the former Confed-
eracy. From 1948 to 2016, this average was 44 percent, a decrease of 
24 percentage points.2 Thus the South, and especially the Deep South, 
transformed in a generation from solidly supporting the relatively 
more egalitarian Democratic Party to instead supporting the relatively 
antiegalitarian Republican Party. 
It is possible that the switch of political parties among white South-
erners was due, at least in part, to something other than race. Perhaps 
white Southerners voted for Barry Goldwater in 1964 because of his 
lack of enthusiasm for Social Security, or his support for a strong mili-
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tary. However, the racial history of the South leads me to believe that 
race was the dominant factor. 
The white backlash against the Civil Rights movement has been 
stronger in the South than elsewhere. But this does not mean that racial 
issues are unimportant in the rest of the country. Race is clearly very 
important in Michigan, a state whose largest metropolitan area, Detroit 
and its suburbs, is more heavily segregated by race than any other area 
in the country. 
The racial fears and hatreds of whites have also helped stimulate 
the antigovernment sentiments that have become widespread in recent 
decades. For most of American history, governments were openly and 
actively hostile to the interests of African Americans. Thus, the Civil 
Rights Act, and especially affirmative action programs, represented a 
dramatic reversal. This was enough to turn some whites against “gov-
ernment” generally. A watershed moment was the assertion in 1981 by 
Republican President Ronald Reagan, in his first inaugural address, that 
“government is the problem.” Of course, Reagan was really referring 
only to some governmental actions. In the same speech, he called for 
a more active policy to confront the Soviet Union. This policy was to 
be carried out by a large increase in spending by the Department of 
Defense, which is indeed a part of the federal government. Thus, anti-
government rhetoric came to be used as code for opposition to some 
activities of government but not others. (Antigovernment rhetoric has 
been used most prominently by Republicans, but it has also been used 
by Democrats such as President Clinton, who famously said in 1996 
that “the era of big government is over.”) 
Egalitarian government policies were essential to the Great Com-
pression. In my view, although the antigovernment rhetoric of the past 
40 years has sometimes had a libertarian element, its main effects have 
been to promote antiegalitarian policies, which have contributed to the 
Great Divergence.3 
If the assertions that I have made here are correct, they represent 
a remarkable irony. White voters of modest economic circumstances 
supported the egalitarian policies that led to the Great Compression, 
and this advanced their economic interests. Economic inequality was 
reduced dramatically, and the standard of living of low- and middle-
income whites skyrocketed. However, when the federal government 





espousing egalitarian economic policies among low- and middle-
income white voters fell dramatically. This reduction in support was 
enough to usher in the antiegalitarian tide of the past 40 years, to the 
detriment of many of those same white voters. 
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) describe “critical junctures”— 
moments in history that disturb the established system. They show that 
small differences in initial conditions can lead to large differences in the 
response to a critical juncture. Is the abrupt policy reversal of the 1970s 
and 1980s a critical juncture, and if so, where will it lead? 
On the one hand, there is plenty of reason to believe that the Great 
Divergence will continue, and that income inequality in the United 
States will remain very high. Wall Street firms have fought strenu-
ously to water down the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The strength of labor 
unions continues to erode. In 2017, a Republican Congress and presi-
dent passed a set of tax cuts that were very favorable to those with high 
incomes, especially those who owned large amounts of corporate stock. 
Wealthy antiegalitarians, such as Charles Koch and his brother, the late 
David Koch, continue to provide strong financial support for antiegali-
tarian causes and candidates. The flood of money into the political sys-
tem was further encouraged by the Citizens United decision (Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission), and enforcement of the Vot-
ing Rights Act was weakened by the Shelby County decision (Shelby 
County v. Holder). 
On the other hand, many of the egalitarian victories of American 
history are still intact. We still have universal elementary and secondary 
education. Despite huge reductions in public funding, we still have the 
strongest system of higher education in the world. No one is seriously 
suggesting that we should repeal the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, or Nine-
teenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Despite the fact that it is 
not in long-run balance, the Social Security system continues to provide 
income support for tens of millions of elderly Americans. We still have 
an income tax. Moreover, income inequality is probably getting more 
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attention than ever before, and some candidates for public office are 
campaigning on egalitarian platforms. 
Thus, I believe it is impossible to know for certain the future direc-
tion of income inequality in the United States. There is a growing clamor 
in the press and among Democratic challengers on the campaign trail, 
who contend that the majority of Americans would prefer to see a sub-
stantial reduction in inequality, and I believe that American democracy 
is still sufficiently vital that it is possible this will occur. 
Notes 
This chapter draws substantially from a revised version of a paper presented at the 
conference on “Inequality and Democracy Today,” held at Michigan State University, 
October 8–10, 2015. I am grateful to participants in that conference, to participants in a 
seminar at Western Michigan University on September 27, 2017, to my students in Eco-
nomics 495 at Michigan State University, and to Paul Menchik for helpful comments. I 
also thank Karan Bhakta, Laura Boisten, Lauren Bretz, Emily Gaertner, Kim Gannon, 
Matt Hinkel, Julia Jankowski, Jesse Nelson, and Matt Suandi for outstanding research 
assistance. Any errors are mine. 
1. The updated series can be found at http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/. Because of data 
limitations, some of the authors’ series begin in 1917. 
2. Note that few blacks were able to vote in these Southern states in the first six 
decades of the twentieth century. Thus, the decrease in the overall fraction of the 
southern vote going to Democrats is an understatement of the extent to which 
white southerners switched parties. 
3. The wave of antigovernment rhetoric has sometimes generated remarkable ironies 
and paradoxes, such as when a South Carolina woman in 2009 shouted to a mem-
ber of Congress that he should “keep your government hands off my Medicare.” 
Appelbaum and Gebeloff (2012) report on the tendency for conservative critics of 
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America’s Unequal Playing Field 
The Gaps between Poor and 
Rich Children’s Resources 
Mary E. Corcoran 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
Growing up wealthy in the United States confers advantages over 
growing up poor, and not just the extra discretionary money that rich 
parents have to spend on children. On average, children of the rich are 
more likely to avoid the disruption and trauma, both emotional and eco-
nomic, from absent fathers due to out-of-wedlock births, divorce, and 
paternal incarceration. Their home environments are more likely to be 
educationally enriching. They are more likely to have parents who are 
college graduates and less likely to have parents who are high school 
dropouts. They are more likely to be raised in safe neighborhoods with 
good schools. Rich parents have more money, time, and social capital 
to invest in children. Given this, it is hardly surprising that rich chil-
dren fare better economically as adults than do middle-income and low-
income children. 
The authors of two recent books, Whither Opportunity? and Dream 
Hoarders, warn that the economic and noneconomic advantages of 
being raised by wealthy parents are increasingly bundled together and 
are growing rapidly in ways that could imperil the American ideal of 
fair opportunity (Duncan and Murnane 2011b; Reeves 2017). Since the 
1980s, economic changes, demographic changes, and changes in the 
criminal justice system have widened the gaps between the economic 
resources and social capital of affluent parents and those of middle-
income and low-income families. Over the same period, a college 
degree has become increasingly important to children’s adult economic 
success. Investing in children’s education has become more important 





ing between the resources of affluent parents and those of middle- and 
low-income parents. Duncan and Murnane (2011b) write that this leads 
to a very real worry: “Is the cherished U.S. norm of a level playing 
field—i.e., that a child’s economic origins do not determine his or her 
economic future—at risk?” 
This chapter is organized as follows. I begin by presenting a styl-
ized picture of the associations between family income and children’s 
adult incomes. This is followed by a comparison of the rates of inter-
generational economic mobility in the United States to those in other 
Western industrialized countries. The United States comes off poorly in 
these comparisons. I then delineate how economic trends, demographic 
trends, and changes in the criminal justice system since the 1980s have 
altered the distribution of resources and social capital available to chil-
dren in low-income, middle-income, and high-income families in the 
United States, and I document how returns to a college degree have 
increased since 1980 in the United States. I next review studies show-
ing that parental income more strongly predicts students’ achievement 
test scores, college attendance, and college graduation today than it did 
in the past. I conclude by speculating on how the trends and evidence 
reviewed in this paper might affect equal opportunity in the United 
States. The background advantages of children from affluent families 
vis-à-vis the advantages of children from middle-income and low-
income families have risen. College education affects a child’s adult 
economic attainments more strongly now than in the past; and a child’s 
chance of acquiring a college degree is more tied to parental income 
now than in the past. Does this inevitably mean that the United States 
will become more stratified by income? What policy strategies might 
weaken the link between parental income and children’s adult success? 
Figure 4.1 presents a stylized picture of the relationships between 
family income during childhood, a child’s education, and a child’s adult 
income. Family income is depicted as influencing a child’s adult income 
through two distinct paths. 
The first path is through education. Parental income is positively 
associated with children’s education. Higher education, in turn, leads to 
higher adult income. In Figure 4.1, “a” depicts the association of family 
income with child education and “b” depicts the association of child 
education with child adult income. Mechanisms by which high-income 
parents may improve children’s educational outcomes include buying 
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NOTE: The correlation between parents’ income and children’s incomes equals ab + 
c, where ab is the indirect effect of parental income on child income through child 
education and c is the effect of parental income on child income that is independent 
of child education. 
homes in affluent communities with good schools, providing a stimu-
lating environment, tutoring, SAT prep classes, hiring coaches to help 
students with the college admissions process, and legacy admissions. 
Parental income is also correlated with other family resources, such as 
parental education or growing up in a stable home, that are associated 
with children’s educational attainment. 
In the second path, family income can affect a child’s adult income 
independently of education. Examples of influences include profes-
sional connections, social networks, and income transfers. In Figure 
4.1, “c” indicates the association of family income with a child’s adult 
income that is independent of the child’s education. 
IS THE UNITED STATES MORE ECONOMICALLY
MOBILE THAN OTHER COUNTRIES? 
Despite the popular notion that the United States is an open and 
mobile society, it is no more mobile—and, in most cases, is actually less 
mobile—than comparable Western nations. Jantii (2009) compiled esti-
mates of father-son intergenerational income elasticities for 11 Western 
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industrialized nations. The sons in these studies were typically born 
in the 1960s, and their incomes were typically measured over several 
years between the ages of 30 and 40. So these elasticities provide esti-
mates of intergenerational inequality for men born and raised prior to 
1980. Jantii (2009, p. 190) describes intergenerational elasticity as “a 
measure of the number of percentage points by which a son’s income 
will increase if a father’s income increases by 1 percent.” The U.S. elas-
ticity of 0.45 is the highest of the 11 countries and is much higher than 
the father-son elasticities in the Nordic countries, which range from 
0.12 in Denmark to 0.28 in Finland. 
Elasticities tell us about overall rates of intergenerational mobil-
ity across countries but do not tell us the extent to which children who 
grow up in poor families remain poor as adults or the extent to which 
children who grow up in rich families remain rich as adults. Nor can 
elasticities tell how likely it is that a poor child grows up to be a rich 
adult—that is, that the child goes from “rags to riches.” 
Jantii et al. (2006) address these questions by estimating mobility 
matrices for sons’ adult earnings quintiles by fathers’ earning quintiles 
for six countries. If a society were completely mobile, then a son’s earn-
ings quintile as an adult should be unrelated to that of his father. In 
this discussion, low earners are men in the bottom earnings quintile, 
and high earners are men in the top income quintile. Thus, 20 percent 
of the sons of low earners should be low earners as adults; 20 percent 
should be high earners; and 60 percent should have earnings that fall in 
the middle three quintiles. The same should hold true for sons of high 
earners. In contrast, if a society were completely immobile, then a son 
should have a 100 percent chance of being in the same earnings quintile 
as his father. 
The bar graph in Figure 4.2 depicts the chances of going from “rags 
to rags” in six countries—that is, the percentage of sons of low-earning 
fathers who themselves become low earners as adults. The bar graph in 
Figure 4.3 depicts the chances of going from “rags to riches”—the per-
centage of sons of low earners who grow up to be high-earning adults. 
Figure 4.4 depicts the chances of going from “riches to riches”—the 
percentage of sons of high-earning fathers who also have high earnings 
as adults. 
Of these three possibilities, the chances of going from “rags to rags” 
are highest in the United States, and the chances of going from “rags to 
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Figure 4.2  Rags to Rags: Percentage of Sons of Low-Earner Fathers 
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Figure 4.3  Rags to Riches: Percentage of Sons of Low-Earner Fathers 
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Figure 4.4  Riches to Riches: Percentage of Sons of High Earners Who 
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riches” are lowest. The probability that the son of a low-earning father 
grew up to also be a low earner was 42 percent in the United States, 30 
percent in the United Kingdom, and about 25–28 percent in Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The probability that the son of a low 
earner grew up to be a high earner was 8 percent in the United States, 
14 percent in Denmark, and 11–12 percent in the other countries. Going 
from “riches to riches,” on the other hand, was similar across all of 
these countries: from 30 to 37 percent of sons of high earners grew up 
to also be high earners as adults. 
The Increase in Top Income Shares 
Since 1980, income in the United States has become concentrated 
among the richest households. In 1980, the richest 1 percent of house-
holds held 10 percent of all income, and the richest 10 percent of house-
holds held about 35 percent of all income (Saez 2016). By 2015, these 
income shares had increased to 20 percent for the richest 1 percent and 
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to almost 50 percent for the richest 10 percent of households (Saez 
2016). 
One result of this increased concentration is that the gaps between the 
incomes of high-income families and the incomes of low- and middle-
income families similarly widened since 1980. Table 4.1 reports on 
mean income (in 2016 dollars) of families in the top, middle, and bot-
tom income quintiles in 1980 and in 2016. (Families are defined as 
households that include two or more related individuals.) The mean 
income of families in the bottom quintile increased by a mere $300 (1.6 
percent) between 1980 and 2016, from $17,900 in 1980 to $18,200 in 
2016. The mean income of families in the middle income quintile rose 
by $11,600 (12 percent), from $61,400 in 1980 to $73,000 in 2016. 
In contrast, the mean income of families in the top quintile rose by 
$101,700 (73 percent) over the same period, from $137,800 in 1980 to 
$239,500 in 2016. As a consequence, the dollar gap between the mean 
incomes of high-income (top quintile) and low-income (bottom quin-
tile) families almost doubled, from about $120,000 in 1980 to about 
$221,000 by 2016. The dollar gap in the mean incomes of middle-
income families and high-income families also almost doubled, rising 
from about $76,000 in 1980 to about $147,000 by 2016. 
Wealth Inequality 
Wealth inequality is far greater than income inequality. In 2013, 
the households in the top wealth quintile controlled 89 percent of all 
wealth, and households in the top income quintile controlled 67 percent 
of all income (Wolff 2014). In a review of recent research on wealth 
inequality in the United States, Pfeffer and Schoeni (2016) identify 
Table 4.1  Mean Family Income (2016 dollars) by Quintile, 2016 and 1980 
Bottom income quintile Middle income quintile Top income quintile 
2016 ($) 18,200 73,000 239,500 
1980 ($) 17,900 61,400 137,800 
Change ($) 300 11,600 101,700 
Change (%) < 2 12 73 
NOTE: “Family” is defined as a household with two or more related individuals. 
SOURCE: Table was computed by author from Census Bureau Table F-3, “Mean 




two avenues by which parental wealth improves children’s economic 
futures: 1) by increasing chances of college graduation and 2) through 
direct cash or in-kind transfers. 
Wealth inequality, like income inequality, has risen over time (Pfef-
fer and Schoeni 2016; Wolff 2014). Pfeffer and Gross (2018) examine 
the distribution of wealth among households with children under the 
age of 18 between 1989 and 2013. Over those 25 years, the percentage 
of all wealth held by the wealthiest quintile of such households rose 
from 80.2 percent in 1989 to 90.3 percent in 2013, while the wealth 
share of the bottom 50 percent dropped from 2.3 percent to 0.2 percent. 
Table 4.2 reports dollar changes (in 2013 dollars) in net worth 
between 1989 and 2013 for households with children at the 90th, 50th, 
and 10th percentiles. The net worth of families at the 90th percentile 
rose by $295,000 (from $529,600 to $824,600) over those 25 years. In 
contrast, the net worth of the median family dropped by $24,700, from 
$67,700 to $43,000, and the net worth of families at the 10th percentile 
dropped from zero to a negative $6,300, meaning they went into debt. 
Trends in Income-Based Residential Segregation 
One way in which high-income, wealthy parents can promote chil-
dren’s economic futures is by buying homes in high-income, safe com-
munities with good schools and good public services. At the same time 
that gaps in families’ incomes and wealth were getting bigger, neigh-
borhoods were becoming more segregated by family income. Fry 
and Taylor (2012) computed the proportion of census tracts that were 
majority low income and majority high income.1 The percentage of 
high-income households who “lived mainly among themselves” (p. 1) 
doubled from 9 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2010. The percentage 
Table 4.2  Net Worth (in 2013 dollars) of Families with Children at the 
10th, 50th, and 90th Wealth Percentiles in 1989 and 2013 
10th 50th 90th 
2013 −6,300 43,000 824,600 
1989 0 67,700 529,600 
Change ($) −6,300 −24,700 295,000 
SOURCE: Pfeffer and Gross (2018). 
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of low-income households who lived mainly with other low-income 
households rose from 23 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 2010. 
Richard Reeves (2017) points out that income-based residential 
segregation can inhibit intergenerational mobility in two ways. First, 
richer communities have bigger tax bases and can allocate more money 
to public schools. Second, “economic sorting at the neighborhood level 
leads to social activity in terms of schools, churches, and community 
groups. This means fewer interactions and social ties across social 
classes” (Reeves 2017, p. 106). That is, children who reside in predomi-
nantly low- and moderate-income neighborhoods will have less access 
to mobility-enhancing social and job networks. 
The College Wage Premium 
The college wage premium (the ratio of median earnings of a col-
lege graduate to the median earnings of those with only a high school 
diploma or GED) rose steadily from 1.4 in 1980 to 1.84 in 2011 (James 
2012). As a result, two parental advantages, 1) parental income and 2) 
parental education, have become more correlated over time. The corre-
lation between parental income and parental education rose from about 
0.5 for parents whose children were born in 1960 to almost 0.8 for par-
ents whose children were born in 2001 (Reardon 2011). 
The Decoupling of Marriage and Fertility for Women without a 
College Degree 
McLanahan (2004) claims that in the United States, economic tra-
jectories have diverged for children whose mothers are college gradu-
ates versus children of women with less schooling, in large part because 
marriage and fertility have become increasingly decoupled for women 
without a college degree in recent decades (see also Edin and Kefalas 
[2005]). Out-of-wedlock births have risen sharply since the 1960s for 
women without a college degree. In 2009, more than half of all births 
to women with a high school diploma or less, and 38 percent of births 
to women with some college, occurred out of wedlock; in contrast, only 
8 percent of births to women with a four-year college degree occurred 
outside of marriage (see Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5  Percentage of Births Occurring outside of Marriage (to 
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SOURCE: Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, “Teaching Slides on Inequality,” 
from 2012. 
Women college graduates also have more stable marriages than 
women with less schooling, and this advantage has widened in recent 
decades (McLanahan 2004). Figure 4.6 reports trends in divorce rates 
within the first 10 years of a first marriage, by year of marriage, for 
wives with and without four-year college degrees. For marriages con-
tracted in the 1960s and 1970s, divorce rates grew both for wives with 
and without college degrees. Divorce rates then stabilized for wives 
without a bachelor of arts degree (BA) and dropped for wives with a 
bachelor of arts degree who married in the 1980s to mid-1990s (Martin 
2006). 
The decoupling of marriage and fertility among mothers without 
college degrees, and the increase in marital stability among wives with 
college degrees, means that children of college graduates are now much 
more likely to grow up in an intact home with both biological parents 
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Figure 4.6  Divorce and Educational Attainment 
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NOTE: Rates reflect marital dissolution within 10 years of a first marriage. 
SOURCE: Martin (2006). 
tions for the amount of time and money parents can devote to children. 
Because two-parent families have two potential earners, they typically 
have higher incomes than do single-parent families. Moreover, the 
income advantage of being raised in a two-parent household has grown 
since the 1980s. Increases in the labor-force participation of mothers 
with BAs and increases in assortative mating are two reasons for this 
growth.
Harsher Sentencing Policies 
Analysts only recently began to analyze the impacts of parental 
incarceration on children’s emotional, intellectual, and financial well-
being, perhaps because parental incarceration was considered relatively 
unusual before the 1980s. This is no longer true. Sizable minorities of 
men with only a high school diploma and of male high school drop-
outs will spend some time in prison or jail between age 18 and their 























enter incarceration. Prison disrupts these young men’s lives just at the 
point when they should be investing in education, gaining a foothold in 
the labor market, acquiring career-enhancing labor market experience, 
and taking on family obligations. It is well documented that incarcera-
tion has long-term negative repercussions for ex-prisoners’ economic 
futures, making it hard for them to maintain steady employment, earn a 
living wage, and support a family (Western 2006). 
Having a father go to jail or prison disrupts children’s lives. One 
impact is financial: fathers cannot provide financial support while in 
prison, and imprisonment severely reduces fathers’ earnings prospects 
after prison. Paternal incarceration disrupts children’s lives in noneco-
nomic ways as well. When a father is imprisoned, a child may suffer 
emotional trauma. Parental relationships are likely to be strained, and 
parental conflicts may cause children to lose contact with their fathers. 
Ex-prisoners may not be the best role models for family, work, and 
responsibility. 
Incarceration rates of noncollege men have more than tripled in the 
United States since 1980. In 2008, 12 percent of young (20 to 34) white 
male high school dropouts and 37 percent of young African American 
male high school dropouts were in prison or jail (Western and Pettit 
2010). 
The above figures only give annual rates of incarceration. A man’s 
chance of being incarcerated at some point between the ages of 18 and 
30–34 is much higher. Figure 4.7 compares noncollege men’s cumula-
tive risks of imprisonment by ages 30–34 for two birth cohorts: 1945– 
1949 and 1975–1979. Men born between 1945 and 1949 grew up in 
the 1950s and 1960s, prior to the rise in incarceration, and turned 30 by 
1980. White men in this birth cohort were unlikely to have been impris-
oned by ages 30–34. The cumulative risks of imprisonment were higher 
for African American men born between 1945 and 1949: 11 percent 
of high school graduates and 28 percent of high school dropouts had 
been incarcerated by ages 30–34. The cumulative risks of imprisonment 
were strikingly higher for both white and African American men who 
were born 20 years later, between 1975 and 1979, and who grew up in 
the 1980s and 1990s, after the rise in incarceration rates. Among men 
born between 1975 and 1979, the cumulative risks of imprisonment 
by ages 30–34 were 6 percent for white high school graduates and 21 
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SOURCE: Western and Pettit (2010). 
were even higher for high school dropouts: 28 percent for whites and 68 
percent for African Americans. 
One consequence of rising incarceration rates is that a sizable 
minority of children of less-educated men have a parent who has been in 
prison or jail. Wildeman (2009) computes the cumulative risk of pater-
nal imprisonment by the time a child turns age 5 for two birth cohorts 
of children: 1979–1986 and 1997–2000 (see Figure 4.8). Cumulative 
risks were higher for children born from 1997 to 2000. For this cohort, 
the cumulative risks of paternal imprisonment for children of men with 
a high school diploma or less education were 10 percent for whites and 
35 percent for African Americans. Cumulative risks of paternal impris-
onment for children of male high school dropouts were 16 percent for 
whites and 39 percent for African Americans. 
These high percentages are a worry. In a review of research on how 
paternal incarceration affects child outcomes, Murphey and Cooper 
(2015) compare the incidence of adverse childhood experiences for 
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data sets. 
dren who never had a residential parent incarcerated (see Table 4.3). 
Fully half (50 percent) of children with an incarcerated parent had 
experienced a family breakup, 1 in 10 (10 percent) had experienced the 
death of a parent, 3 in 8 (37 percent) had witnessed or been a victim of 
domestic abuse, 1 in 3 (33 percent) had witnessed or been a victim of 
neighborhood violence, more than 1 in 4 (28 percent) had resided in a 
household with someone who had a substance abuse problem, and more 
than half (55 percent) had resided in a household with a mentally ill or 
suicidal person. Each of these adverse childhood experiences was rela-
tively rare for children who never had an incarcerated parent. Haskins 
(2016b) notes that “paternal incarceration has been found to increase 
aggression, depression, anxiety, attention problems, and delinquency 
in young boys and adolescent men.” Haskins (2016a) shows that pater-
nal incarceration is negatively associated with boys’ cognitive develop-
ment in middle childhood. 
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Table 4.3  Children with Incarcerated Parents Suffer More Adverse 
Childhood Experiences (%) 
Incarcerated parent No incarcerated parent 
Divorce/separation 57 17 
Parental death 10 3 
Domestic abuse 37 5 
Witnessed/experienced neighborhood 33 7 
violence 
Substance abuse of household member 28 7 
Mentally ill/suicidal household member 55 7 
SOURCE: Murphey and Cooper (2015, p. 7, Figure 2). 
Gaps in Parental Investments in Children by Parental Income 
To recap briefly, the gaps in the spending power, income, and wealth 
of affluent families versus other families have gotten bigger since 1980. 
Families at the top of the income distribution control much larger shares 
of income and wealth relative to families at the middle and bottom 
of the income distribution. And family advantages are more bundled 
together now than in the past. Communities are more segregated by 
income. Parental income, parental wealth, and parental education are 
more correlated. The majority of children whose mothers have a college 
degree will grow up in intact families with both biological parents. The 
majority of children whose mothers do not have a college degree will 
spend some time in a single-mother home. The cumulative risk of pater-
nal incarceration by the time a child is five years old for children whose 
fathers have at most a high school education is considerably higher for 
black children than for white children. 
At the very same time that parental advantages have become more 
bundled together at the top of the income distribution and parental dis-
advantages have become more bundled together at the bottom of the 
income distribution, the payoff to a college degree has doubled. It has 
become increasingly necessary for parents to invest in their children’s 
education. Economic success depends more on a college degree today 
than it did in 1980. 
Unfortunately, as Reardon (2013) points out, although all parents 
have incentives to invest in improving their children’s cognitive skills, 




parents in a better position to afford such spending increases. Rear-
don notes that while parents at every income level have increased their 
investments in time and money on cognitively enriching activities for 
children over the past three to four decades, “middle-class and poor 
families . . . are not doing so as quickly or as deeply as the rich.” 
Duncan and Murnane (2011a) compare the annual spending of 
high-income and low-income parents on children’s enrichment activi-
ties from 1972 to 2006. They note that such enrichment goods and ser-
vices include books, computers, private-school tuition, music lessons, 
travel, and summer camps. Spending by high-income parents rose 150 
percent, from $3,928 in 1972 to $9,856 in 2006, while spending by low-
income parents rose by only 57 percent, from $927 in 1972 to $1,460 in 
2006.2 The dollar gap between the spending of high-income parents and 
the spending of low-income parents rose from about $3,000 in 1972 to 
$8,400 in 2006. Duncan and Murnane warn that the American ideal of 
a level playing field is in jeopardy. We have seen how education, par-
ticularly a college degree, strongly predicts children’s future economic 
attainments. If the correlations between parental income and children’s 
educational attainments are increasing, then this could potentially lead 
to increases in the correlation between parental incomes and children’s 
later adult incomes. 
Associations of Parental Income with Children’s 
Educational Attainments 
Several recent studies find that parental income became more 
strongly tied to children’s achievement test scores, college attendance, 
and college graduation over the past three decades (Avery and Hoxby 
2013; Bailey and Dynarski 2011; Reardon 2011, 2013). 
Reardon (2011) tracks the standardized reading and math achieve-
ment test scores for public school students from families at the 90th, 
50th, and 10th percentiles for children born from 1943 to 2001. Stu-
dents from high-income (90th percentile) families had higher standard-
ized test scores than did students from low-income (10th percentile) 
families. Students from high-income families also had higher test 
scores than students from middle-income (50th percentile) families. 
These gaps in test scores are large, positive, and stable across the 1950– 
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and low-income children (90/10 gap) and between high-income and 
middle-income children (90/50) rose substantially for children across 
the 1971–2001 birth cohorts. In contrast, the test-score gap between 
children from middle- and low-income families (50/10) was relatively 
constant across the 1971–2001 birth cohorts. 
Bailey and Dynarski (2011) compare college attendance and col-
lege completion rates by income quartile for students born 1961–1964 
to those of students born 18 years later, 1979–1982 (Figures 4.9 and 
4.10). As expected, given the big increase in the college wage premium, 
college attendance rates and college completion rates of students within 
each quartile increased across cohorts. But absolute percentage-point 
gains were small for students in the bottom income quartile and large 
for students in the top income quartile. As a result, gaps in the col-
lege attendance and college completion rates of high-income and low-
income students grew across cohorts. In the 1961–1964 birth cohort, 5 
percent of low-income and 36 percent of high-income students com-
pleted college—a gap of 31 percentage points. In the 1979–1982 birth 
Figure 4.9  Fraction of Students Entering College, by Income Quartile 
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Figure 4.10  Fraction of Students Completing College, by Income 
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SOURCE: Bailey and Dynarski (2011). 
cohort, 9 percent of low-income and 54 percent of high-income stu-
dents completed college—a gap of 45 percentage points. 
A particularly worrying statistic is that in both cohorts, the majority 
of college entrants from families in the bottom two income quartiles 
do not complete college, while the majority of college entrants from 
the upper quartile do complete college (see Figure 4.11). For exam-
ple, in the latter cohort, two out of three college entrants from the top 
income quartile completed college. In contrast, less than half of entrants 
from the second income quartile and less than one out of three college 
entrants from the bottom quartile graduated from college. 
A college degree is important for economic success, but not all 
colleges confer equal wage advantages. Colleges vary in selectivity, 
and selectivity matters for future income (Hoekstra 2009; Long 2008). 
Reardon, Baker, and Klasik (2012) report the family incomes of stu-
dents who entered selective colleges in 1982, 1992, and 2004. They 
report that students from the top income quintile were overrepresented 
in selective colleges in 1982 and that this overrepresentation appears 
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Figure 4.11  Graduation Rates of College Entrants by Income Quartile 














Lowest quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile Top quartile 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Bailey and Dynarski (2011), Figures 6.2 and 6.3. 
to have grown from 1982 to 2004. In 2004, 58 percent of students in 
highly selective colleges came from the top income quintile, and only 
6 percent of students came from the bottom income quintile (Reardon, 
Baker, and Klasik 2012). Avery and Hoxby (2013) report that even 
when one looks only at high-achieving students—students with high 
grades and high test scores—children from low-income families are 
much less likely than children from higher-income families to apply to 
and attend very selective schools. 
Will These Trends Increase Intergenerational Income Inequality? 
Most published assessments of intergenerational economic mobil-
ity are computed for individuals born in the 1960s and 1970s and raised 
in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.3 But, as I document in this paper, chil-
dren born and raised after 2000 are in a very different position from 





economic, demographic, and policy changes supports the following 
four conclusions: 
1) The divides in parental advantages between rich and poor 
children and between rich and middle-income children have 
grown substantially since 1980. 
2) Parental income has become a stronger predictor of parental 
spending on child enrichment activities since the 1970s. 
3) The gap between the achievement test scores of high-income 
children and those of middle- and low-income children has 
widened since 1980. The percentage-point differences in col-
lege attendance rates and college graduation rates between 
high-income students and low-income students widened as 
well. 
4) Returns to a college degree more than doubled since 1980. 
The accumulation of parental advantages for children at the top of 
the income distribution suggests that high-income children born and 
raised after 1980 may find it easier to maintain that same high level of 
income as adults—to go from “riches to riches.” The dollar gaps in the 
income and wealth of high-income families versus low- and middle-
income families are larger. High-income families now have even more 
discretionary income and more wealth than in the past. Parental advan-
tages are now more bundled together. This could lead to tighter preser-
vation of advantage across generations. 
The same logic applies to children from low- and moderate-income 
families. The gaps in parental resources (income, wealth, chances of 
being raised by both biological parents, college-educated parents, a 
father without a criminal record), as well as increases in income-based 
residential segregation, gaps in parental spending on child enrichment 
activities, and gaps in college enrollment rates and graduation rates all 
widened between children of high-income families and children of low-
income and moderate-income families. Children born after 2000 may 
be more likely than those born in the 1960s to go from “rags to rags” 
and less likely to go from “rags to riches.” These changes are not good 
news either for children raised in low- and moderate-income families or 
for advocates of equal opportunity. 
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What’s Next? 
Three changes could increase the extent to which children’s eco-
nomic fortunes are tied to their parents’ economic fortunes. These are 
1) the growing gaps in background advantages of high-income 
families vis-à-vis low-income and middle-income families, 
2) the increases in the associations between parental income and 
children’s educational outcomes, and 
3) the growing returns to a college degree. 
Poor children could become even less able to escape poverty as 
adults and even less able to achieve the American ideal of rising from 
the bottom-most quintile. Conversely, high-income parents could 
become even more likely to pass their advantages onto their children 
or to “hoard opportunities,” as Reeves (2017) warns in his book Dream 
Hoarders. 
One way to change the above scenario is to focus on cushioning the 
impacts of these three changes on children’s economic prospects. Let’s 
begin with the increases in the resources of rich children relative to those 
of poor children. Most rich children do not have a father who has been 
in prison. A significant minority of children of less-educated fathers do 
have a father who spent time in prison because of the rapid increase in 
male incarceration rates since the late 1970s. Prison sentencing reforms 
could reduce the incidence of imprisonment among low-skilled men, 
and prisoner reentry programs might better reintegrate ex-prisoners into 
work and family life. In their recent book, When Parents Are Incarcer-
ated: Interdisciplinary Research and Interventions to Support Children, 
Wildeman, Haskins, and Poehlmann-Tynan (2018) review evidence on 
interventions to support children of incarcerated parents. 
Reardon (2013) writes that the widening gap in family incomes 
means that low-income and middle-income parents cannot invest “as 
quickly or as deeply” as rich parents can in cognitive-enhancing activi-
ties for children. He further notes that 90 percent of the inequality in 
children’s achievement test scores by family income is present at the 
time children enter kindergarten.4 According to the OECD (2012), the 
United States ranks “26th in the percentage of 4-year-olds enrolled in 
early childhood education.” Increasing the availability of public pre-
school programs that are free or offered on a sliding scale might pro-
 
74 Corcoran 
vide low-income and middle-income children a wider range of enrich-
ment activities. Other services, such as health screening and health care, 
might be included in preschool programs. 
Autor and Dorn (2013) and Goldin and Katz (2010) argue that 
the college wage premium is so high in the United States because the 
growth in the supply of college graduates is not keeping up with the 
demand for highly educated workers. These authors maintain that we 
need to increase the rates of college attendance and graduation in the 
United States. There is certainly room for improving the college enroll-
ment and graduation rates among high school students whose families 
are in the bottom half of the income distribution in the United States: 
only 9 percent of children from low-income families graduate from col-
lege. Moreover, college graduation rates are rising more slowly in the 
United States than in other nations. According to OECD: Education at 
a Glance: 2012, “Between 2000 and 2010 [higher education] attain-
ment levels increased by an average of 1.3 percentage points annually 
in the U.S., while its OECD counterparts boasted a 3.7 percentage-
point change per year.” 
Bailey and Dynarski’s (2011) findings suggest that increasing col-
lege enrollment rates of children from families in the bottom half of the 
income distribution is only a first step. The majority of students from 
these families who enroll in a four-year college never obtain a degree. 
It is equally important to increase retention and graduation rates. See 
Holzer and Baum (2017) for a cogent overview of programs designed 
to improve low-income students’ retention and graduation rates. 
I end on a note of optimism by describing two promising local higher 
education initiatives—the Kalamazoo Promise and the brand-new Uni-
versity of Michigan Go Blue Guarantee. The Kalamazoo Promise was 
launched in 2005. It covers up to 100 percent of tuition and fees for four 
years at any public or private postsecondary institution in Michigan. 
The Kalamazoo Promise was the first place-based scholarship in the 
United States. It is open to all students who reside in Kalamazoo and 
who attended public high school there from ninth grade on. Since 2005, 
about 100 such place-based programs have been launched (Bartik,
Hershbein, and Lachowska 2016). 
Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2017) evaluated the effects of 
the Kalamazoo Promise in its initial years. They report, “We estimate 
that the Promise increased the chance of students enrolling in any col-
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lege within six months of high school graduation by 14 percent and the 
chances of enrolling in a four-year college by 23 percent . . . . As of six 
years after high school graduation, the Promise increased the percent-
age of students earning any postsecondary credential by 10 percentage 
points, from a pre-Promise baseline of 36 percent to 46 percent . . . .
About three-fourths of this boost . . . is due to more students receiving 
a four-year bachelor’s degree” (pp. 5–6). Furthermore, they report that 
the college completion results are not different for students from lower-
income families. 
The University of Michigan’s Go Blue Guarantee program was 
launched in January 2018. This program provides free tuition for up to 
four years for in-state students at the University of Michigan who come 
from families with incomes of less than $65,000. Since the average 
family income in Michigan is about $64,000, this covers students from 
the bottom half of the income distribution. 
One strength of the Kalamazoo Promise and the Go Blue Guaran-
tee is that both cover four years of tuition. This reduces pressure on 
students to find funding while in college, and it should improve reten-
tion and graduation rates as well as enrollment. A second strength is 
that both programs’ eligibility criteria provide few conditions and are 
easy to understand. This should increase incentives for both parents 
and students to begin planning for college early in students’ educational 
trajectories. 
Notes 
I thank Eric VanDeventer for his efficient and careful preparation of this manuscript and 
Howard Erman for comments and edits. Neither of these individuals is responsible for 
the information or opinions in this chapter. 
1. Fry and Taylor (2012) define low-income households as those with incomes of 
less than two-thirds of median income ($34,000 in 2010), middle-income house-
holds as those with two-thirds to twice the median income ($34,000 to $104,000 
in 2010), and high-income households as those with more than twice the median 
income (over $104,000 in 2010). 
2. Duncan and Murnane (2011a) reported their expenditures in 2008 dollars. I have 
converted their numbers to 2016 dollars. 
3. The reason for this is that precise measures of intergenerational income elasticities 
require several years of data on children’s incomes after age 30. 






ently on school reading scores when they enter kindergarten and this gap grows by 
less than 10 percent between kindergarten and high school. Evaluation studies find 
that high quality intensive interventions between ages 0–5 years positively affect 
children’s later educational and work outcomes” (Heckman 2011; Currie 2006; 
Knudsen et al. 2006; Waldfogel 2006). 
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Why Has Income Inequality 
Increased while Education 




There is a great deal of interest in trends in income inequality around 
the world. Rising wage inequality in the United States has been a focus 
of attention for the past two decades (Bound and Johnson 1992; Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce 1993). Trends in income inequality in developing 
countries and the world as a whole have been analyzed by the World 
Bank and many researchers (Beegle et al. 2016; Milanovic 2012; Raval-
lion 2014; World Bank 2011). Less focus has been given to inequality in 
schooling. This chapter will argue that inequality in schooling is a vital 
area for research. Inequality in schooling is interesting and important in 
its own right, given the critical role education plays in a wide variety 
of outcomes. But inequality in schooling is also important because it is 
integrally connected to income inequality (Knight and Sabot 1983; Lam 
and Levison 1992; Ram 1990). 
As will be seen below, there are good data available on the distribu-
tion of schooling for a broad range of low-income and middle-income 
countries. Analysis of these data demonstrates that the distribution of 
schooling changes in fairly regular patterns as the mean level of school-
ing increases. The standard deviation in years of schooling, which 
is shown theoretically to be an important driver of earnings inequal-
ity, tends to increase with mean schooling at low levels of schooling, 
eventually reaching a peak, and then falling as mean schooling reaches 
higher levels. This has important implications for trends in earnings 




measure of schooling inequality, tends to fall steadily as mean school-
ing increases, a result of the “compression” in schooling that occurs 
with the rising mean. Given the strong relationship between school-
ing and earnings, this compression in the schooling distribution should 
be expected to reduce income inequality. Data from a wide range of 
countries, however, show that a number of countries in Africa and Asia 
have experienced increases in income inequality at the same time that 
schooling inequality has declined. The chapter discusses the theoreti-
cal reasons for this disconnect between falling schooling inequality and 
rising income inequality in many countries. One important factor is the 
convex relationship between schooling and earnings, as implied in the 
standard Mincer (1974) earnings equation, in which log earnings are a 
linear function of schooling. Another important factor is rising returns 
to schooling, especially at the top of the schooling distribution. 
The chapter begins by looking at evidence on trends in income 
inequality and poverty for a variety of countries. The chapter then 
examines the theoretical relationship between schooling and earnings. 
Data from a large number of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
are used to look at how inequality in schooling changes as average 
schooling increases. These data show a strong tendency for schooling 
inequality to decline as the mean level of schooling increases. 
The chapter concludes with a detailed analysis of schooling inequal-
ity and earnings inequality in Brazil and South Africa, two countries 
with extreme earnings inequality and high-quality labor-market survey 
data that can be used to look at schooling inequality, returns to school-
ing, and earnings inequality over several decades. As shown in Lam, 
Finn, and Leibbrandt (2015), rising returns to postsecondary schooling 
in South Africa help explain why South Africa has had no improvement 
in earnings inequality in spite of large declines in schooling inequality, 
a contrast with the declines in earnings inequality that have occurred in 
recent decades in Brazil. This suggests that rising returns to schooling, 
an important factor in U.S. inequality, may be playing an important role 
in many developing countries as well, offsetting what would otherwise 
be the equalizing effects of falling inequality in schooling. 
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EVIDENCE ON TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY 
It is useful to begin by looking at evidence on recent trends in 
income inequality around the world. Before looking at the data, there 
are a number of important issues of definition and measurement that 
should be considered. One of the most basic is whether to use income, 
consumption, labor-market earnings, or some other concept as the focus 
of analysis. This chapter is mainly interested in inequality in labor mar-
ket earnings at the individual level. Most research on income inequality 
in developing countries uses measures of consumption at the household 
level, however—usually a measure of per-person household consump-
tion. This is often motivated by an argument that consumption is the 
best measure of welfare, with the household being an appropriate unit 
of analysis since the household plays a key role in distributing resources 
across household members (Deaton 1997). It may also be the case that 
consumption is simpler to measure than income, especially in predomi-
nantly rural countries with a high proportion of subsistence agriculture. 
Another important consideration is whether inequality is measured 
before or after redistributive programs such as taxes and social trans-
fer programs. A measure of consumption takes into account all such 
transfers, which may be best for measuring inequality in welfare but 
will be less informative about trends in inequality in before-tax labor 
market earnings. The results presented in this section include studies 
using both income and consumption, and the term income will often be 
used to represent both. Unfortunately, there is much less data available 
on trends in inequality in labor market earnings, the main focus of this 
chapter. Since inequality in income and consumption will tend to move 
in the same direction as inequality in earnings, the evidence on trends 
in income inequality will be taken as informative about trends in earn-
ings inequality, though it must be recognized that they need not move 
in the same direction, especially when there are large social transfer 
programs. This chapter does not look at inequality in wealth (assets), 
which tends to be much more unequally distributed than income and is 
both a cause and effect of income inequality. 
Ravallion (2014) shows that the population-weighted average of 
within-country income inequality (using the mean log deviation mea-






as a whole, although it has been falling slightly since around 2000.
This overall trend masks considerable regional variation, however. 
Ravallion shows a generally rising trend in within-country inequality in 
East Asia. Latin America, on the other hand, had increasing inequality 
until around 1995, followed by substantial declines in inequality since 
then (Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez 2013; World Bank 2011). 
Trends in sub-Saharan Africa, like trends in other regions, are 
mixed. A recent World Bank study of poverty and inequality across 
Africa found that inequality fell in about half of African countries, while 
it increased in the other half, comparing the two most recent surveys in 
each country that have data on inequality in household level income or 
consumption (Beegle et al. 2016). 
The figures below are based on data on income inequality from the 
World Bank’s PovCalNet online database (World Bank 2018). The fig-
ures show the Gini coefficient, a widely used measure of inequality in 
which 0 indicates that all individuals have the same income (perfect 
equality) and 100 is maximum inequality (as scaled in these data). 
Figure 5.1 shows income inequality in several African countries that 
appear to have fairly reliable data over a range of years. South Africa 
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has the highest level of inequality in this group, and indeed it has one 
of the highest levels of income inequality in the world (Lam, Finn, and 
Leibbrandt 2015). Beginning from a Gini coefficient of more than 60 at 
the end of apartheid in 1994, the level has increased over time. Ghana, 
which has had relatively high economic growth in recent years, has also 
experienced a general trend of rising inequality. Rwanda, too, experi-
enced rising inequality, although after 2005 there appears to have been 
a decline, according to these data. Uganda’s Gini coefficient has fluctu-
ated, with no strong tendency to increase or decrease over time. These 
patterns are consistent with the conclusions of Beegle et al. (2016) that 
inequality has been rising in some countries and falling in others. 
Figure 5.2 shows inequality for a set of Asian countries. It should 
be noted that the Gini coefficient in these countries is generally on the 
low side by international standards. The evidence is, once again, mixed. 
The Philippines and Pakistan have relatively constant inequality (at 
quite different levels), Bangladesh has had a fairly substantial decline 
in inequality, and Thailand appears to have rising inequality. 
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Figure 5.3 shows a group of Latin American countries. All dem-
onstrate the typical Latin American pattern of relatively high inequal-
ity, and all have had fairly substantial declines in inequality in recent 
decades. This is consistent with the pattern of recent declines in inequal-
ity in Latin America as documented in research from the World Bank 
(2011) and Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez (2013). 
TRENDS IN POVERTY 
While this chapter is mainly interested in inequality, it is important 
to note that the mixed evidence regarding trends in inequality in devel-
oping countries should not be taken to mean that there has been no 
progress in poverty alleviation. There is strong evidence that the propor-
tion of the population in poverty has been declining in most developing 
countries in recent decades, including those in which income inequality 
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has been rising. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, which has generally had 
the slowest declines in poverty, World Bank estimates indicate that the 
proportion of the population in poverty fell from 57 percent to 43 per-
cent between 1990 and 2012. 
Figures 5.4 through 5.6 show trends in poverty based on the same 
World Bank PovNet data used to analyze inequality in Figures 5.1 
through 5.3 (World Bank 2018). The poverty measure used here is the 
World Bank’s “extreme poverty” measure, the proportion of the popula-
tion with less than US$1.90 a day in per capita household consumption 
based on Purchasing Power Parity adjustments of local currency (an 
update of the World Bank’s earlier $1.00 a day measure). 
Figure 5.4 shows trends in extreme poverty for the same set of Afri-
can countries used to plot inequality trends in Figure 5.1. There is a 
clear pattern of falling inequality, although Rwanda has rising poverty 
between 1984 and 2000, a period that included the devastating period 
of genocide in 1994. Uganda shows an impressive decline in extreme 
poverty, from 87 percent in 1989 to 35 percent in 2012, even though, 
Figure 5.4  Trends in Poverty Rate for Selected African Countries 
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as shown in Figure 5.1, inequality was relatively flat over this period. 
South Africa and Ghana also show substantial declines in poverty, even 
though inequality has been rising in both countries. 
Figure 5.5 depicts falling rates of extreme poverty in the four Asian 
countries that were used to analyze inequality trends in Figure 5.2. The 
biggest drop is in Pakistan, which shows a decline in the poverty rate 
from 62 percent in 1987 to 6 percent in 2013, even though we saw fairly 
flat inequality over this period. 
Figure 5.6 tracks poverty rates in four Latin American countries. 
Extreme poverty was already fairly low in Latin America in the 1980s, 
and there were some increases in poverty in some countries in the 
1990s. However, the trend since 2000 has been for falling poverty in 
all four countries shown, a pattern consistent with the evidence for the 
region as a whole. 
The overall pattern shown in Figures 5.1 through 5.6 is a combina-
tion of falling poverty rates and a mixed set of trends for inequality. 
Figure 5.5  Trends in Poverty Rate for Selected Asian Countries 
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Figure 5.6  Trends in Poverty Rate for Selected Latin American 
Countries (% households with less than $1.90 per day 
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The falling poverty in countries with rising inequality is evidence of a 
fairly common pattern in which incomes have been rising in all parts 
of the income distribution but rising faster at the higher income lev-
els. Rising income inequality, while not a universal pattern in develop-
ing countries, is a fairly common pattern. I will argue below that one 
reason this pattern is surprising is that there has been an almost uni-
versal trend toward declines in schooling inequality in these countries. 
Given a strong positive relationship between schooling and earnings, 
we might expect that falling inequality in schooling should be pushing 
toward falling inequality in earnings. The next section will explore this 







LINKS BETWEEN SCHOOLING INEQUALITY AND
EARNINGS INEQUALITY 
As shown in Lam and Levison (1992) and further developed in 
Lam, Finn, and Leibbrandt (2015), some key theoretical points can be 
seen using a simplified version of the standard human capital earnings 
equation. Using the standard theoretical approach developed by Mincer 
(1974), and leaving experience and other determinants of earnings 
aside, the logarithm of the ith worker’s earnings can be expressed as 
(5.1) logYi = α + BSi + ui ,
where Yi is earnings, Si is years of schooling, and ui is a residual uncor-
related with schooling. Using Equation (5.1), it is easy to see that the 
variance of log earnings, a standard mean-invariant measure of wage 
inequality, is given by 
(5.2) V(logY) = β2V(S) + V(u) , 
where V denotes variance. This simple result demonstrates an important 
point about the link between schooling inequality and earnings inequal-
ity. If the relationship between schooling and earnings is log-linear as 
in Equation (5.1), then earnings inequality (as measured by the variance 
of log earnings) is a simple linear function of the variance in school-
ing. There are several direct implications related to the links between 
schooling inequality and earnings inequality. Suppose, for example, 
that we doubled the schooling of every worker while holding returns 
to schooling constant. This would quadruple the variance in years of 
schooling and thus quadruple the “explained” component of earnings 
inequality. If we measure inequality in schooling by some standard 
mean-invariant measure of inequality, this doubling of schooling would 
imply no change in schooling inequality. Alternatively, giving each 
worker one additional year of schooling would unambiguously reduce 
schooling inequality, but it would have no effect on earnings inequal-
ity. The bottom line of Equation (5.2) is that decreases in schooling 
inequality need not translate into decreases in earnings inequality, even 
if returns to schooling are constant across schooling levels and constant 
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over time, given the convex relationship between schooling and earn-
ings. This was shown by Lam and Levison (1992) to be an important 
explanation of why declines in schooling inequality had not translated 
into declines in earnings inequality in Brazil in the 1980s, and why they 
are likely to be an important factor in many other countries. The finding 
suggests that it will be useful to look at both the standard deviation of 
schooling and at the coefficient of variation in schooling. This approach 
will be taken in the empirical analysis in the next section. 
EVIDENCE ON TRENDS IN SCHOOLING INEQUALITY 
If we want to analyze schooling inequality in a manner similar to 
the analysis of income inequality, we need data on single years of com-
pleted schooling. One convenient source of such data for many low-
income countries is the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), a rich 
set of surveys designed primarily to collect data on fertility and con-
traceptive use, but also providing data on other key variables such as 
education (Demographic and Health Surveys 2018). 
It is instructive to begin by looking at how the distribution of 
schooling changes over time in some fairly typical developing coun-
tries. Panels A and B of Figure 5.7 show the distribution of single years 
of completed schooling (i.e., the highest grade completed) for three 
cohorts born 20 years apart in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is an interesting 
case since, as shown above, it has experienced a combination of rising 
income inequality and falling rates of poverty, a pattern often seen in 
countries that have experienced economic growth in recent decades. 
Looking at the distribution of schooling for the 1950 Bangladesh birth 
cohort in Panel A, about 38 percent of men had no schooling, a figure 
that drops to 11 percent for the 1990 birth cohort. Comparing this to the 
distribution for females in Panel B, we see that 69 percent of women 
in the 1950 cohort had zero schooling, with a substantial decline to 12 
percent in the 1990 cohort. The percentage completing grade 12 rises 
dramatically for both men and women—from 4 percent to 16 percent 
for men, and from under 1 percent to 9 percent for women between the 
1950 and 1990 birth cohorts. 
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Figure 5.7  Distribution of Years of Schooling for 1950, 1970, and 1990 
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Figure 5.7 (continued) 
Panel C 
120% 
1950 1970 1990 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 

























1950 1970 1990 
1950 1970 1990 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 


















Understanding improvements in schooling from densities like those 
shown in Panel A of Figure 5.7 is difficult, since improvements are indi-
cated both by decreases in the proportion with low levels of school-
ing and increases in the proportion with higher levels of schooling. A
clearer picture comes from looking at cumulative distribution functions 
(CDFs), shown in Panels C and D of Figure 5.7. A point on the CDF 
can be interpreted as the proportion of the population that has a given 
level of schooling or less. Looking at the distributions for the 1950 
birth cohort, for example, 69 percent of men and 96 percent of women 
had five years of schooling or less. This fell to 37 percent of men and 
41 percent of women in the 1990 cohort. Shifts downward in the CDF 
show improvements in the distribution. Panels C and D in Figure 5.7 
clearly show the steady improvements in the distribution of schooling 
in Bangladesh in a way that is difficult to see in the densities in Panels A
and B. Especially clear is the improvement in the proportion advancing 
to secondary school, although there is only slight improvement in the 
proportions going beyond grade 12. Also clear from Panels C and D of 
Figure 5.7 is the enormous decline in the gender gap in schooling, with 
the proportions reaching a given level of schooling only slightly less for 
women than for men in the 1990 birth cohort. 
Figure 5.8 shows key summary statistics for the distribution of 
schooling in Bangladesh from the 1930 birth cohort to the 1995 birth 
cohort. The top panel shows the mean and standard deviation for males 
and females. Mean years of completed schooling have risen substan-
tially for both men and women, with the mean for women actually over-
taking the mean for men around the 1990 birth cohort. The standard 
deviation, which was shown theoretically above to be a driving factor in 
income inequality (as measured by the variance of log earnings), shows 
an inverted U-shape for both men and women. For men the peak in the 
standard deviation occurs around the 1970 birth cohort, while the peak 
for women occurs around the 1980 birth cohort. This inverted U-shape 
for the standard deviation in years of schooling is the same result that 
was observed by Lam and Levison (1992) for Brazil, a pattern they 
argued was important in understanding why income inequality had not 
fallen in Brazil in spite of declining inequality in schooling. 
The standard deviation is not typically used as a measure of inequal-
ity, since it is not invariant to changes in the mean. A doubling of every-
one’s schooling, for example, will double the standard deviation, even 
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Figure 5.8  Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of 
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though mean-adjusted inequality, as conventionally measured, will not 
change (the Lorenz curve, for example, will be unchanged by a dou-
bling of schooling). A more appropriate measure of schooling inequal-
ity is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the 
mean), which is invariant to the overall level of schooling. The bottom 
panel of Figure 5.8 plots the coefficient of variation (CV) for males and 
females in Bangladesh, using the standard deviation and mean in the 
top panel. The overall pattern is of steady declines in schooling inequal-
ity by this measure. This results from the fact that the standard deviation 
rises at a slower rate than the mean during the period in which the stan-
dard deviation is rising. This is a simple indicator of the “compression” 
in schooling that tends to occur in most populations as the overall level 
of schooling increases. Since there is essentially an upper bound on 
years of completed schooling, increases in mean schooling tend to take 
the form of the CDFs (such as those in Figure 5.7) being shifted down 
and to the right, a change that tends to reduce schooling inequality. The 
decline in schooling inequality in Bangladesh that is demonstrated by 
the coefficient of variation in Figure 5.8 is also found using other mea-
sures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, and in Lorenz curves, 
the most general representation of inequality. 
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show the same information for eight countries 
representing a range of levels of economic development in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. All are plotted using the same scales in order to 
demonstrate the wide range of experiences in means, standard devia-
tions, and coefficients of variation in schooling. Figure 5.9 shows four 
African countries: Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana. Note that some 
of the figures, notably those for Nigeria and Ghana, show erratic move-
ments in the variables. These are likely to be the result of age misreport-
ing that varies systematically with level of education, and so they are 
unlikely to reflect actual jumps in schooling, even using the three-year 
moving averages that are used for these plots. 
One notable feature in Figure 5.9 is rising mean schooling, with a 
convergence in schooling for men and women. Nigeria deviates some-
what from this pattern, with little improvement in mean schooling (and 
perhaps even a decline starting around the 1990 birth cohort) and little 
change in the gender gap. Another important feature is the inverted 
U-shape in the standard deviation of years of schooling, a pattern seen 
in all countries. Referring back to Equation (5.2), this implies that earn-
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Figure 5.9  Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of 
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Figure 5.10  Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of 
Schooling by Year of Birth, Males and Females, Selected 
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ings inequality would have increased and then decreased, following the 
pattern of the standard deviation if earnings were log-linear in school-
ing and the returns to schooling were constant. 
Although the standard deviation in schooling rises for some period 
in every country, the coefficient of variation tends to steadily decline for 
both men and women. The coefficient of variation is higher for women 
in the early cohorts that have low mean schooling for women, with a 
strong convergence as the mean schooling converges. As was seen in 
Bangladesh, there is a strong tendency for schooling inequality, as mea-
sured by the coefficient of variation, to fall rapidly as mean schooling 
increases. 
Figure 5.10 shows similar patterns for Bolivia, Colombia, Pakistan, 
and the Philippines. Mean schooling increases, the gender gap declines 
or even reverses (reversal is seen in Colombia, Pakistan, and the Philip-
pines), the standard of deviation shows a U-shaped pattern over time, 
and the coefficient of variation falls steadily. 
Analysis of the differences across time and countries in Figures 5.9 
and 5.10 suggests that countries and time periods characterized by low 
mean schooling are also characterized by a high coefficient of varia-
tion in schooling. There is also evidence that the inverted U-shaped 
pattern in the standard deviation of schooling over time is mapping out 
an inverted U-shaped pattern in the relationship between the standard 
deviation and the mean. In order to analyze this directly, Figures 5.11 
and 5.12 show plots of the standard deviation and coefficient of varia-
tion against the mean years of schooling. 
The top panel of Figure 5.11 shows a clear inverted U-shape in 
the relationship between the standard deviation and the mean for men. 
Each data point is a birth cohort in a specific country, so the figure com-
bines variation over time in a given country with variation across coun-
tries. The inverted U-shape is very clear in the scatter plot, with a cubic 
polynomial function fitted to the scatter showing a peak in the standard 
deviation at a mean of about five to six years of schooling. 
The bottom panel shows the relationship between the coefficient 
of the variation and the mean. There is a very strong negative concave 
relationship, almost the shape of a rectangular hyperbola. The figure 
shows that a quadratric in the log of the mean fits the shape of the scat-
ter quite well. 
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Figure 5.11  Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation of Schooling 
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The two panels give a very clear indication of the compression that 
takes place in the schooling distribution as mean schooling increases. 
The standard deviation tends to rise more slowly than the mean as the 
mean increases, eventually reaching a peak and then falling. The coef-
ficient of variation tends to fall steadily as the mean increases. A simi-
lar decline in schooling inequality as mean schooling increases would 
be seen for virtually all measures of schooling inequality, including 
Lorenz curves. 
Figure 5.12 shows that these same patterns apply to female school-
ing. It should be noted for both male and female schooling that there 
is some evidence that the standard deviation levels off when the mean 
reaches around 12 years. It is important to keep in mind that only coun-
tries with DHS data are used here. This means the data are limited to 
low-income and middle-income countries, with relatively few cohort/ 
country data points having mean schooling above 11 years of school-
ing. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze schooling inequal-
ity at higher levels of schooling, but this is an interesting area for further 
analysis. 
RETURNS TO SCHOOLING AND EARNINGS
INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA 
The evidence on schooling inequality documented in the previous 
section makes a compelling case that inequality in years of completed 
schooling tends to decline steadily and substantially as mean school-
ing increases in all parts of the world. Most countries have seen sub-
stantial increases in mean schooling, declines in schooling inequality, 
and a U-shaped pattern in the standard deviation that has been on the 
declining part of the curve in recent decades. If the relationship between 
schooling and earnings were remaining constant, these factors should 
have produced a decline in earnings inequality in most countries. But, 
as shown in the first part of the chapter, inequality in income and con-
sumption has been rising in many countries and has been fairly flat in 
other countries. It is important to note that these measures of income 
and consumption inequality are not the same as earnings inequality. 
Labor earnings are just one component of income and consumption, 
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Figure 5.12  Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation of Schooling 
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albeit a very important component in most countries. We unfortunately 
have good data on labor market earnings only for a much smaller set 
of countries, especially across multiple years and especially in Africa. 
This section of the chapter will focus on Brazil and South Africa, two 
countries that have excellent data on labor market earnings in addition 
to education, drawing on results in Lam, Finn, and Leibbrandt (2015). 
Brazil and South Africa are particularly interesting cases because they 
historically have had two of the highest levels of income inequality 
in the world. The data are taken from nationally representative labor 
market surveys conducted by the national statistical agencies in each 
country. Brazilian data are from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra 
de Domicilios (PNAD) from 1976 to 2012, collected by the Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE, various years). The South 
African data are from the October Household Survey and the Labour 
Market Survey, collected by Statistics South Africa and integrated to 
increase consistency across years in the Post Apartheid Labour Market 
Series (PALMS, for years 1994 through 2011) (Kerr, Lam, and Wit-
tenberg 2014). All earnings data are monthly and are reported in real 
terms, and all data are weighted so as to be nationally representative. 
The one major difference between the Brazilian and South African earn-
ings data is that the former are reported before taxes, while the latter are 
reported net of taxes. Data after 2012 are not used for either country
because changes in the labor market surveys create inconsisten-
cies in the series.
Figure 5.13 shows the variance of log earnings for Brazil and South 
Africa for the sample of all workers, both males and females, with posi-
tive earnings, aged 25–60. The data for South Africa, which begin after 
the end of apartheid in 1994, can be compared to the series for South 
Africa in Figure 5.1, which shows the Gini coefficient for household 
income per capita. Both figures show an increase in inequality in South 
Africa since 1994, with relatively constant earnings inequality since 
about 2000. Comparing South Africa to Brazil, earnings inequality in 
Brazil was similar to earnings inequality in South Africa at the time 
apartheid ended, and it had been at fairly similar levels in previous 
decades. Earnings inequality began to decline in Brazil in the 1990s, 
however, falling substantially from 1994 to 2012. As shown in Lam, 
Finn, and Leibbrandt (2015), Gini coefficients for earnings show very 
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Figure 5.13 also shows the “explained variance” component of the 
variance of log earnings. This is the variance of predicted log earn-
ings based on a regression of log earnings on dummy variables for 
single years of schooling, along with controls for age and age squared. 
Explained variance follows very similar trends to overall variance, with 
Brazil showing a decline in explained variance starting around 1994 
and South Africa having relatively constant explained variance. This 
is important, since it means that some combination of the change in 
the distribution of schooling and changes in returns to schooling help 
explain the divergent patterns in earnings inequality in the two countries. 
Figure 5.14 shows trends in the mean, standard deviation, and coef-
ficient of variation in years of completed schooling for both countries. 
As in the patterns shown for many other countries in Figures 5.8, 5.9, 
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Figure 5.14  Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of 
Years of Completed Schooling, Brazilian and South African 
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ing, some evidence of a U-shaped pattern in the standard deviation, and 
rapid declines in schooling inequality, as measured by the coefficient 
of variation. South Africa has higher mean schooling, a lower standard 
deviation in schooling, and a lower coefficient of variation, adding to 
the puzzle of why it has higher earnings inequality than Brazil and has 
had flat or rising earnings inequality during a period in which Brazil has 
had falling earnings inequality. 
A major factor explaining this puzzle can be seen in Figure 5.15, 
which shows what has happened to the relationship between school-
ing and earnings in Brazil and South Africa over the periods shown. 
The two panels show the estimate of the average return to an addi-
tional year of schooling for three different schooling ranges that can 
roughly be considered low schooling, medium schooling, and advanced 
schooling, with natural breaks in each country’s schooling system 
used for the breakdowns. The top panel shows the returns to school-
ing in the 1–7 year range, the 8–10 year range, and the 11+ range—11 
years corresponding to completion of secondary school. Returns are 
estimated using standard Mincer earnings regressions that estimate a 
spline function that is linear within each of the three schooling levels. 
For example, the estimate of 0.15 for the 1–7 year schooling level in 
Brazil in 1976 means that one additional year of schooling was associ-
ated with a 15 percent increase in earnings over the range of schooling 
from 1 to 7 years. Returns to one additional year of schooling in the 
8–10 year range were almost 20 percent in the 1970s, while returns to 
one additional year beyond grade 11 were about 25 percent, a very high 
rate of return. Note that these are conventional estimates of returns that 
do not attempt to deal with selection bias and should not be consid-
ered the causal impact of schooling on earnings. They also do not take 
into account the fairly high levels of grade repetition that take place in 
both Brazil and South Africa (Lam, Ardington, and Leibbrandt 2011). 
They are nonetheless useful in thinking about the relationship between 
schooling inequality and earnings inequality. 
There are several striking features about the returns to schooling in 
Brazil in the top panel of Figure 5.15. Returns to schooling are signifi-
cantly higher at higher levels of schooling, with the gap between returns 
at the postsecondary level and returns at the incomplete secondary level 
increasing over time. Returns to schooling in the bottom two levels fall 
substantially over time, with returns to a year of incomplete secondary 
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Figure 5.15 Estimated Returns to Schooling, Brazilian and South 
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school falling roughly in half, from about 20 percent to 10 percent, 
between 1976 and 2012. Returns to an additional year of postsecond-
ary school stay relatively constant, with evidence of a decline starting 
around 2006. 
The bottom panel shows similar estimates for South Africa. Returns 
to an additional year of schooling in 1994 are fairly similar to those in 
Brazil—about 10 percent in the 1–7 year range, about 20 percent in the 
8–11 range, and about 25 percent in the 12+ range, with 12 years mark-
ing the end of secondary school in South Africa. As in Brazil, returns to 
the lower two levels of schooling fall over time. Returns to each year 
of postsecondary schooling dramatically increase over time, however, 
rising from 25 percent per year to about 40 percent per year between 
1994 and 2011. This is an enormous increase in what were already very 
high returns to postsecondary schooling. It should be noted that these 
returns are estimated using only the sample of men and women with 
positive labor market earnings. In South Africa, there is also a strong 
relationship between schooling and the probability of being employed, 
with very high unemployment levels at lower levels of schooling. 
Incorporating employment into the picture would create an even larger 
economic advantage for those with higher levels of education, an addi-
tional source of income inequality. 
The striking difference between the two panels in Figure 5.15 is 
the large increase in returns to each year of postsecondary education 
in South Africa compared to flat or falling returns to each year of post-
secondary education in Brazil. As shown in Lam, Finn, and Leibbrandt 
(2015), this increase in returns to postsecondary schooling in South 
Africa is an important factor in explaining why the decline in schooling 
inequality in South Africa has not translated into a decline in earnings 
inequality. More surprisingly, Lam et al. also show that the decline in 
returns to schooling in the incomplete secondary range is also a con-
tributing factor to rising inequality, since this group of workers is now 
a relatively lower-earning part of the income distribution. In Brazil, 
by contrast, the decline in schooling inequality has not been offset by 
increasing returns to schooling at the top. This follows a more general 
trend in Latin America in which a decline in the earnings gap between 
high-skilled and lower-skilled workers has worked in the direction 
of reducing earnings inequality in recent decades (World Bank 2011; 
Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez 2013). The South African pattern 
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is more consistent with the trend toward rising skill premiums, which 
has played an important role in explaining rising wage inequality in 
the United States (Bound and Johnson 1992; Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
1993) and other high-income countries. Evidence for low-income and 
middle-income countries outside Latin America is much more limited, 
however, in part because of the challenges in estimating returns to 
schooling in predominantly agricultural economies, and also because 
few countries have high-quality labor market survey data that is col-
lected consistently over time to allow comparable measures of returns 
to schooling for different time periods. 
CONCLUSION
A major goal of this chapter has been to demonstrate that inequality 
in years of completed schooling has been declining in most developing 
countries in recent decades. Data from a wide distribution of countries 
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America demonstrate that increases in the 
mean level of schooling tend to be associated with a compression in the 
distribution of schooling. Unlike the growth trend that often happens 
with a family’s earnings from one generation to the next, the children 
of highly educated individuals do not tend to get higher and higher lev-
els of schooling across generations, given the upper bound on years of 
schooling. As a result, inequality in schooling, measured here by the 
coefficient of variation, tends to fall as mean schooling rises and the 
schooling distribution compresses. 
Given the strong positive relationship between schooling and earn-
ings, a compression in the distribution of schooling might be expected 
to reduce earnings inequality and, more broadly, inequality in house-
hold income. There is not, however, a general trend toward declining 
inequality in earnings and household income in developing countries, 
in spite of the substantial declines in schooling inequality. This chap-
ter provides several explanations for this disconnect between trends 
in schooling inequality, which is declining almost everywhere in the 
developing world, and trends in income inequality, which is rising or 
fairly constant in a number of countries. 
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The first explanation for this disconnect is theoretical. When earn-
ings are a log-linear (convex) function of schooling, as predicted by 
Mincer (1974) and as found in much empirical research, it is easy to 
construct examples in which expansions in schooling that reduce school-
ing inequality may also increase earnings inequality. Any increase in 
the standard deviation of schooling will increase the variance of log 
earnings, a standard measure of earnings inequality, even if there is 
a decrease in the coefficient of variation and all other mean-invariant 
measures of schooling inequality. Empirical evidence on changes in 
the distribution of schooling for a large number of low- and middle-
income countries using Demographic and Health Surveys data shows 
that schooling expansions often follow this pattern. Initial increases in 
mean schooling are associated with an increase in the standard devia-
tion of schooling but a decline in the coefficient of variation in school-
ing. This means that earnings inequality will tend to increase at the 
same time that schooling inequality is decreasing, even if the returns to 
schooling are constant and there are no other changes affecting earnings 
inequality. As mean schooling continues to increase, there is eventually 
a decline in both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation, 
changes that would in and of themselves imply declines in both earn-
ings inequality and schooling inequality. 
Another factor often works in the direction of increasing earnings 
inequality, however, even when changes in the schooling distribution 
should lead to declining earnings inequality. This factor is returns to 
schooling—the relationship between years of schooling and earnings. 
Increases in the returns to schooling, especially at the highest levels 
of schooling, have played an important role in the increase in earn-
ings inequality in the United States, and similar patterns are seen in a 
number of developing countries. This chapter documents this pattern 
for the case of South Africa, where earnings inequality continues to be 
one of the most extreme in the world in spite of declines in schooling 
inequality that would have otherwise led to falling earnings inequality. 
A large increase in returns to postsecondary schooling has had disequal-
izing effects that offset the equalizing effects of declining inequality in 
schooling. This contrasts with the case of Brazil, where there was not 
the same increase in returns to postsecondary schooling, with the result 
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Unfortunately, we do not have high-quality labor-market survey 
data to analyze trends in returns to schooling in many low-income 
countries. It seems likely that in many of the countries that have experi-
enced rising inequality in household income and consumption, there is 
an important contribution to be made by increases in returns to school-
ing, especially at the top of the schooling distribution. These changes 
are likely to offset what would otherwise be the equalizing effect of 
declines in inequality in schooling. Future research will hopefully 
provide a clearer picture of the extent to which other low-income and 
middle-income countries are experiencing the South African pattern, in 
which increasing returns to schooling are a key factor in the disconnect 
between falling inequality in schooling and rising inequality in income. 
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and Policy Paradigms 
Toward Understanding Inequality in Africa 
Howard Stein 
University of Michigan 
The trajectory of development in sub-Saharan Africa remains puz-
zling to mainstream economists. Poverty stays stubbornly high, growth 
has been uneven, and life expectancy has continued to lag relative to 
other regions, despite governments adopting policies inspired by neo-
classical economics. Economists have used a host of extraneous expla-
nations for what some have called “Africa’s tragedy,” including eth-
nicity, geography, colonial history, the legacy of the slave trade, poor 
governance, poorly developed social capital, and other things. The 
number of variables purportedly correlated with growth grew dramati-
cally over time in the literature, reaching by one count a rather implau-
sible 86 regressors by 2000 (Chitonge 2015). 
More recently, in line with new concerns about income inequal-
ity, orthodox economics has turned to trying to explain the pattern of 
income distribution in Africa. Contrary to Kuznets’s prediction that 
regions with low industrialization and a high reliance on agriculture 
should have an equitable distribution of income, sub-Saharan Africa has 
had high and worsening income inequality in recent decades, despite 
evidence of deindustrialization and despite most of its population liv-
ing in rural areas. As argued in this chapter, part of the problem with 
using Kuznets’s formulation is its reliance on the faux naturalism that is 
embedded in the neoclassical theory of distribution, in which factors of 
production in a competitive market are supposed to be paid according 
to their marginal contribution to production.1 
The belief in Kuznets’s curve follows this erroneous presumption— 
e.g., that peasants received income commensurate with their land and 
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labor, which is comparatively equitable in economies dominated by 
rural production. With industrialization, the divide between urban-
based wage income and rural income will grow, and income inequality 
will worsen. Only with the shrinking of the rural sector will equality be 
restored. When this pattern is not being observed, instead of question-
ing the underlying assumption, neoclassicals tend to search for extrane-
ous factors that can explain this exceptionalism. As we will argue in this 
chapter, the effort to understand income inequality needs to transcend 
the faux naturalism of neoclassical economics to focus on the evolution 
of the institutions, related economic structures, and the way Africa has 
been integrated into the global economy, all of which determine the 
current and historical patterns of income distribution. At the core of 
the explanation are the shifting structures of power which underlie the 
generation of disparities in material awards. 
The chapter begins with a review of trends in income distribution 
in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on Gini coefficients. The chapter then 
turns to a critical review of the mainstream economic view of distribu-
tion and its applications to understanding inequality in Africa, includ-
ing its impact on policy formation, which has contributed to the exa-
cerbation of distribution. The paper will then discuss the institutional 
approach to income distribution. The final section will apply the theory 
to understanding the patterns we have observed in sub-Saharan Africa. 
TRENDS IN INEQUALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
The picture of income distribution in sub-Saharan Africa is not a 
pretty one. Nel (2018) compiled the Gini coefficients on consumption 
and wealth dispersal for different regions of sub-Saharan Africa based 
on the latest data he was able to access. These are summarized in Table 
6.1. 
We can see that while there are enormous variations in the Gini 
coefficients in Africa, there are a surprising number of countries above 
the 50 threshold, which is considered to be highly unequal. Nearly 25 
percent of the countries listed in Nel’s Table 8.1 (p. 107) are above 50. 
In contrast, only two countries would be deemed to be highly equitable, 
or having a Gini below 30 (Kenya in 2007; Niger in 2011). The vast 
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Table 6.1  Inequality of Consumption and Wealth: Various Years 
Gini of consumption Gini of wealth 
Years dispersal—mean dispersal—mean 
African region of survey and range and range 
Southern 1994–2010 52.4 75.3 
Western 2002–2011 41.1 68.7 
Central 2003–2011 44.4 69.8 
Sahel 2008–2011 37.5 66.0 
Eastern 2002–2011 41.0 69.0 
Total 1994–2011 44.0 (29.9–73.5) 70.2 (62.4–82.9) 
SOURCE: Nel (2018). 
majority are above 40, which according to Nel is “surprisingly high, 
given the low level of modernization” (Nel 2018). As we will discuss 
below, these figures are likely to understate the extent of inequality in 
Africa. One should also recognize the variations of dates in which the 
surveys were undertaken (these different spans are shown in the col-
umn of Table 6.1 titled “Years of survey”). Nel also presents “less reli-
able” wealth dispersal Ginis, which seem to be more uniformly and 
disturbingly high. While this provides a snapshot of the inequality in 
the region, it does not tell us if distribution is improving or worsening 
over time. 
Jirasavetakul and Lakner (2016) have examined the aggregate trends 
in the region from 1993 to 2008 based on household budget surveys 
that also focus on consumption expenditures. The authors’ approach 
is to use interpersonal inequality, in which everyone is assigned his or 
her own income, rather than looking at average or weighted averages 
of countries. They themselves admit that the numbers are bound to be 
understated, because they do not have data on the most fragile country 
economies, and because the surveys badly underestimate the consump-
tion expenditures of the richest segments of the population. It should 
be noted that these numbers are also likely understated given the well-
known underrepresentation of the poorest segments of the population in 
household budget surveys. The study also uses 2011 purchasing power 
parity (PPP), which tends to disproportionately raise lower incomes, 
given the overrepresentation in international price comparisons of the 
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Above, Figure 6.1 shows the Lorenz curve, which clearly illustrates 
negative trends. We can see the steady movement to the right of the 
Lorenz curve over time, indicating worsening inequality. Data on the 
Gini coefficient confirm this. The Gini rises from 51.68 in 1993 to 52.16 
in 1998, 54.13 in 2003, and 56.12 in 2008. In 2008, sub-Saharan Africa 
had the highest regional Gini in the world. (In 2007, the world’s mature 
economies were at 41.1 percent; Russia, Central Asia, and southeastern 
Europe at 42.7 percent; Latin America and the Caribbean at 52.2 per-
cent; and East Asia and the Pacific at 45.9 percent.) 
Table 6.2 attempts to follow trends over a longer period of time 
at the country level. Countries are selected from the UNU/WIDER 
inequality data set of the United Nations University World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER) based on the avail-
ability of information over the three periods. As much as possible, we 
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Table 6.2  Income Distribution Patterns in a Selection of Sub-Saharan 
African Countries 
Gini (year), early Gini, middle years Gini, latest 
Country SAP (’81–’91) (’96–’02) (’05–’14) 
Botswana 54.21 (1985) 64.73 (2002) 60.46 (2009) 
Cameroon 49 (1983) 54.4 (1996) 46.54 (2014) 
Côte d’Ivoire 41.2 (1985) 44.0 (1998) 43.94 (2008) 
Ethiopia 32.2 (1981) 29.5 (2000) 31.4 (2011) 
Ghana 35.99 (1988) 43.4 (1998) 42.77 (2005) 
Kenya 57.3 (1981–83) 46.5 (1997) 48.51 (2005) 
Lesotho 55.9 (1986) 51.57 (2002) 54.18 (2010) 
Madagascar 46.9 (1980) 40.2 (1999) 42.65 (2010) 
Malawi 57.3 (1983) 49.3 (1997) 46.12 (2010) 
Mali 36.5 (1989) 39.87 (2001) 38.93 (2006) 
Mauritania 42.5 (1988) 39.03 (2000) 32.42 (2014) 
Mauritius 35.2 (1980) 37.1 (2001) 35.84 (2012) 
Nigeria 35.2 (1981) 48.3 (1996) 48.8 (2010) 
Rwanda 28.89 (1984) 45.43 (2000) 50.44 (2013) 
South Africa 47 (1985) 54.5 (1997) 73.25 (2011) 
Tanzania 35.29 (1991) 37.3 (2000) 37.78 (2011) 
Uganda 37.13(1989) 43 (1999) 41.01(2012) 
Zambia 48.4 (1991) 57.4 (1998) 55.62(2010) 
Mean 43.11 45.86 46.15 
SOURCE: Stein (2011); WIDER (2017). 
have tried to focus on similar methodologies used in each country over 
time (though this was not always possible) and to have gaps in the data 
in each country in the three columns of at least five years. What we 
see on average is a rising trend in inequality over time. As we would 
expect, the unweighted average is much lower than the interpersonal 
inequality discussed above. Still, two-thirds of the countries have rising 
income inequality from the 1980s to the 1990s and early 2000s, and for 
more than 60 percent of the countries, the latest Gini coefficients are 
above the level of the 1980s. The majority of the declines were tiny— 
well under 10 percent. In the column for the latest figures, the majority 
of countries on the list have Ginis above 45, a sign of high inequality 
which is, as we will see, contrary to what the supporters of Kuznets and 




MAINSTREAM THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION 
The mainstream literature on inequality has been built around the 
myth that income is based on ownership of factors of production and 
that these factors are paid according to their marginal contribution to 
production.3 To quote John Bates Clark, the wunderkind proponent of 
the marginalist revolution in America and an early leader in the anti-
institutionalist movement, “We may now advance the more general the-
sis . . . that, where natural laws have their way, the share of income that 
attests to any productive function is gauged by the actual product of it. 
In other words, free competition tends to give to labor what labor cre-
ates, to capitalists what capital creates, and to entrepreneurs what the 
coordinating function creates” (Clark [1908], p. 13). 
Independent of the Cambridge critique of the problematic nature of 
measuring the value of capital—and hence the contribution of capital 
to production—which goes back to the 1960s, what we have here is 
clearly a normative argument dressed up to be objective. The share of 
income accruing to resource owners is given by the exchange value lost 
if the resource were held back from the production process. Here the 
invisible hand of the market ensures that the income received is equiva-
lent to the value contributed by the factor of production at the margin 
(Brown 2005). 
Hence, in standard economic texts like Mankiw and Taylor (2011), 
inequality is linked to the shifts in technology and their availability 
in the educational system. If the educational system develops at the 
same pace as technology, the highly educated groups will not gain at 
the expense of the lower educational ones. However, if it does not, the 
educated groups with the appropriate skills will be rewarded relative to 
the low-income groups with less education. Even in the face of rapidly 
rising inequality for the upper 1 percent, Mankiw defends the theory: 
If indeed a year of schooling guaranteed you precisely a 10 percent 
increase in earnings, then there is no way increasing education by 
a few years could move you from the middle class to the top 1 
percent. But it may be better to think of the return to education as 
stochastic. Education not only increases the average income a per-
son will earn, but it also changes the entire distribution of possible 
life outcomes. It does not guarantee that a person will end up in the 
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top 1 percent, but it increases the likelihood. I have not seen any 
data on this, but I am willing to bet that the top 1 percent are more 
educated than the average American; while their education did not 
ensure their economic success, it played a role. (Mankiw [2011], 
quoted in Syll [2014]) 
The argument has allowed some of the more prominent members of 
the economics profession to dismiss concerns about income inequality. 
The Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas (2004), for example, stated, “Of 
the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seduc-
tive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of 
distribution” (p. 20). How can one mess with the market when people 
are getting the rewards for the intrinsic worth that they have provided 
to the production process? 
Moreover, inequality for neoclassicals is at the heart of an incen-
tive system that compensates people for talents, sacrifice, and risk tak-
ing. Regimes that fail to properly reward such behavior are doomed to 
failure and will encourage the human propensity to shirk and free-ride 
(Brown 2005). 
This has led mainstream economists to argue for the classic tradeoff 
between efficiency and equity, which is drummed into multiple genera-
tions of students. Okun (1975) sums it up nicely: “Any insistence on 
carving the pie into equal slices would shrink the size of the pie. That 
fact poses the tradeoff between economic equality and economic effi-
ciency” (p. 46). 
To Okun, inefficiencies arise because redistribution is like a leaky 
bucket created to move income from the rich to the poor. Sources of 
leaks include the losses from administrative costs, a reduction and mis-
direction of work effort, and less motivation to undertake efficiency-
enhancing activity. 
To others working outside this paradigm, inequality is a disease that 
cripples those who are economically and socially disadvantaged from 
participating more fully in life processes. It is not a product of indi-
vidual choices but a result of social dynamics that divide people into 
gender, race, nationality, religion, and class, which form the core of the 
divisive separation between those enjoying privilege and those under-
going deprivation. The idea of a trade-off between efficiency and equity 
is perverse, and it effectively justifies the vested interests associated 
with the status quo (Dugger 1998). 
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MAINSTREAM REACTIONS TO HIGH
AFRICAN INEQUALITY 
While there was some growing concern by the late 1990s about the 
welfare implications of rising inequality, posed in the works of some 
mainstream writers like Stiglitz (1998) and Rodrik (1999), other econo-
mists were less worried about the pathologies of inequality and more 
worried about the inconsistency of the pattern relative to the predic-
tions arising from its theoretical propositions. Higgins and Williamson 
(1999) examine the Kuznets hypothesis around the world and claim 
that the African dummy—the dummy variable used to assess whether 
a country is African—is responsible for a Gini coefficient 10 points 
higher than predicted. 
Milanovic (2003), a member of the Development Research Group 
of the World Bank (“the Bank”) at the time, attempts to “explain away” 
the African dummy by running a series of regressions using 1,067 Gini 
observations from countries in different regions between 1950 and 
2000. He draws on political and social factors to try to explain the deter-
minants generating this higher-than-anticipated inequality in Africa. 
His independent variables in a series of regressions include variations 
on real GDP per capita, political measurements like political openness, 
type of political systems and index of government cohesion, an index of 
ethnic fragmentation, the extent of commodity independence, an inter-
active term for fractionalization, and the Africa dummy. The key is to 
identify the variables that remove the significance of the Africa dummy. 
Milanovic settles on an equation that has a strongly positive inter-
active term between the dummy for Africa and ethnicity, while the 
dummy variable itself becomes insignificant. Ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization also remains positive. He also finds that inequality is related 
to ethnic fractionalization in a few of his equations, looking only at 
a much smaller sample of African countries. However, it disappears 
when adding an interactive party competitiveness variable. 
Variables like ethnicity are attractive to econometricians focusing 
on explaining economic patterns in Africa like inequality or growth, 
since they avoid the common problem of endogeneity with other vari-
ables like governance (Jerven 2015). However, their meaning remains 
mysterious. Milanovic himself is uncertain how to interpret the results, 
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since he does not know why inequality is higher in the face of ethnic 
fractionalization compared to more homogenous societies, nor can he 
discern any policy implications. This reminds us that correlation is not 
causation. 
However, the real problem here is that Milanovic and others are 
asking the wrong questions—partly because they are in a faux natural 
world that assumes a singular direction based on the “laws” of neoclas-
sical economics. Hence, the search from their perspective is for some 
other “natural” cause that explains an outcome that disrupts these laws. 
One salient problem is that rising inequality within African countries or 
between African countries cannot be explained by a variable like eth-
nicity, which by its nature is invariant. Second, once one moves away 
from the “natural” exogenous-type causes of inequality, then one needs 
to understand the role of policy choices over time, and the way that role 
has influenced the institutions and structures that dictate how income is 
distributed in domestic and global production. 
POLICY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
The history of African economic policy reflects the shifting modali-
ties of aid and the policy paradigms associated with development assis-
tance. Following independence, government-sponsored planning and 
industrialization were based on import-substitution models and a heavy 
emphasis on the expansion of infrastructure. The 1970s saw a greater 
focus on integrated rural development strategies and social spending. 
Both approaches were rather skeptical of the ability of the market to 
deliver a distribution of income that would raise the standard of living 
for the majority of the population. 
After 1980, African countries began to follow the dictates of the 
neoclassical-inspired World Bank/IMF structural adjustment poli-
cies known to some as the Washington Consensus, with the promise 
of improved gains in both poverty reduction and income distribution. 
The arguments were firmly based on the neoclassical theory of distribu-
tion. The Berg report, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
(World Bank 1981), authored by Elliot Berg, very much set the adjust-




specialize in “those things that it can best produce as compared to 
other countries” (p. 24) and “produce them with the least use of limited 
resources” (ibid.) or static comparative advantage and static efficiency 
gains. In the latter case, the emphasis of the report is on improvements 
in allocative efficiency in line with the removal of state-imposed distor-
tions that have disrupted the ability of prices to properly reflect their 
scarcity values. 
The agenda on poverty reduction and income distribution was more 
implicit in the Berg report. 
The fundamental error of African governments was their ‘‘bias 
against agriculture’’ (World Bank [1981], p. 25)—even though that is 
the sector in which ‘‘most of the population earns its livelihoods’’ (p. 
45)—in favor of urban populations. In other words, African govern-
ment policies impeded farmers from producing crops consistent with 
the comparative advantage of the country, which curtailed the earning 
power by disrupting the ability of the market to effectively reward them 
in line with their contribution to production. The policies hurt the rural 
poor and exacerbated income distribution. The bias against agriculture 
was manifest in a number of ways, including import restrictions (tariffs 
and quotas), which forced farmers to purchase high-cost local inputs 
and raised the cost of consumer goods. Trade and exchange-rate poli-
cies also reduced the prices farmers received for their export crops. 
Price controls by state marketing boards and overvalued exchange rates 
greatly curtailed the incomes of farmers in local currency terms (p. 26). 
The key to raising farmer incomes was through devaluation, privatiz-
ing the marketing of input and outputs, removing pan-territorial pricing 
so farmers could specialize in the crops they produce most efficiently 
in their region, and removing subsidies on inputs like fertilizer. In this 
world, once governments removed the fetters to the operation of the 
market and specialized according to their comparative advantage in the 
international market, the standard of living for their population would 
rise relative to that of the developed world. 
The urban bias argument as a cause of inequality has its origins in 
the work of Lipton (1977) and was adopted by Bates (1981) to explain 
poor agricultural performance in Africa in the 1980s. The arguments 
and recommendations to reverse urban bias were promoted by chief 
economist Anne Krueger in the 1980s and culminated in a five-volume 
study on the political economy of agricultural pricing (Krueger, Schiff, 
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and Valdes 1991). Liberalization aimed at removing urban bias was 
widespread by the 1980s throughout sub-Saharan Africa. In the pread-
justment period, 25 of 28 governments surveyed set export crop prices. 
By the mid-1990s, only 11 were still setting prices (Boratav 2001). 
The trends were not at all surprising given the ubiquity of structural 
adjustment. 
Karshenas (2001) looks more systematically at the urban bias posi-
tion and the attempt to reverse it through liberalization. Contrary to the 
urban bias arguments, agriculture terms of trade in the preadjustment 
period were actually rising in sub-Saharan Africa at a rate that exceeded 
the sample of Asian countries (1.3 percent versus 0.8 percent). How-
ever, in the period of liberalization, the reverse occurred, with relative 
prices declining by an average of 0.6 percent per year, contributing to 
the rising income inequality. How do we explain this result, which was 
contrary to the predictions of orthodoxy? 
TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
DISTRIBUTION WITH APPLICATIONS TO SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
At the heart of the institutional theory of distribution is the rejec-
tion of the idea of value in severalty. Factors of production are inte-
grated, and their ability to affect production is contingent and interac-
tive. Resources, whether human or nonhuman in origin, derive their 
utility through their integration into a process, as Veblen put it, which 
“presupposes the proper working of many other processes” and needs 
the “running maintenance of interstitial adjustment between the several 
sub-processes” (1975; quoted in Brown [2005], p. 919). The power of 
production is found in systems, not in land, capital, and labor. Neoclas-
sical economic constructs have been institutionalized and created the 
dangerous notion that people are paid according to the natural laws of 
the market and receive what is deemed worthy of their contribution. 
They are not a product of human agency but of forces beyond human 
control (Brown 2005). 
In contrast, the institutional theory of distribution points to the need 




ests at the heart of the determination of the allocation of the shares of 
material rewards.4 As Brown (2005) puts it, “A theory of distribution 
should be indistinguishable from a theory of power.” Brown continues: 
“A satisfactory theory of power would, beyond defining what power 
is, elucidate principles to explain how power is established, enlarged 
or diminished, protected and perpetuated, redistributed, exercised, and 
rendered legitimate or illegitimate” (p. 920). Power is generally seen as 
the ability to act in a particular way to affect outcomes. 
Power is not simply the ability to coerce; rather, it gains effective-
ness when it is legitimate. Legitimate power arises when it stems from 
the “internalized values” of those who are subject to that power. Also 
important are the symbols of power, which are linked to how people 
interpret situations and, in turn, how they respond to them. Distribu-
tive mechanisms are a product of power relations and are institutional-
ized processes that are related to habits, customs, rules, and systems of 
belief. These generate the habits of thought that define the parameters 
of acceptable behavior. 
Power in a market context is related to transactions. “The ratio of 
exchange,” Commons writes, “measures the degree of power because 
it measures the ratio between what I give up and what I get back in the 
exercise of power” (Commons 1924, p. 30). Brown (2005, p. 22) says 
markets are contained within institutions and should be seen as “clus-
ters of working rules that guide conduct of transactions.” The working 
rules of transaction reflect the shifting nature of power asymmetries 
that affect the terms of transactions, which better or worsen outcomes 
of transactions. Understanding the forces that select working rules and 
that shape and reshape the relative power of the parties to transactions 
should be at the core of an institutional understanding of the distribu-
tion of income in any society. Transactions are not simply those made 
among domestic players but involve international participants, and the 
rules of those transactions are affected by international institutions. 
So how does this explain the pattern of income distribution in sub-
Saharan Africa? The key is in understanding the forces that shaped and 
altered the conditions and rules that affected the comparative power of 
direct producers in transactions over time. “Direct producers” are over-
whelmingly peasant farmers in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The story of skewed income distribution starts with the colonial 
experience. Colonization in Africa tended to have low settler popula-
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tion, was extractive in nature, and relied on a small, elite group of indi-
rect rulers and well-paid administrators to run the country. These people 
used fines and minimum acreage laws to encourage farmers to produce 
cash crops. Export crops were frequently sold to state marketing boards 
at a fraction of their value. The income garnered was used to support 
the high salaries of administrators, not to finance economic develop-
ment or encourage the intensification of agriculture through improved 
infrastructure, extension, or better inputs, which could have altered 
the systems of production and potentially raised farmer incomes (van 
de Walle 2009). Commerce among Africans was actively discouraged 
with laws that restricted the access of Africans to credit. Manufacturing 
was tiny except for that which took place in settler colonies like South 
Africa and Kenya. 
Following independence, many governments Africanized civil ser-
vices but frequently left the same pay scales in place, creating an elite of 
well-paid bureaucrats with earnings well above median incomes. Mar-
keting boards were kept in place and sometimes extended to new crops 
with comparatively little invested in agriculture, although fertilizer was 
subsidized in a number of countries. In some places, pan-territorial 
pricing was used, which provided a huge subsidy to farmers in remote 
areas of the country, and some farmers got access to credit at subsidized 
interest rates. Income from taxing cash crops was used to expand manu-
facturing. However, the power of workers to raise incomes was care-
fully controlled. In some countries like Tanzania, pay scales were set by 
the government, strikes were illegal, and the head of the unions became 
the Minister of Labor. Though data on income distribution is scarce, it 
is likely that there were some improvements in income distribution in 
the early postcolonial period. 
However, this changed with the arrival of neoliberalism, which dra-
matically altered the terrain of power and the working rules affecting 
the terms of transactions for farmers and workers in African countries. 
Spending on agriculture was further curtailed. Fertilizer use collapsed 
with the removal of subsidies, and farmer incomes plummeted because 
of the arrival of exploitative middle men and collusive purchasing. Poor 
roads, declining access to credit, lack of transportation, and a paucity 
of storage facilities weakened the power of farmers in transactions and 
forced them to sell their crops at a fraction of their wholesale price. In 
our nine-year study of 40 villages in Tanzania, we found farmers in 
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some villages getting as little as 50 percent of the wholesale price of 
maize. Farmers frequently complained about the exploitative nature of 
middlemen but felt they had no power to alter the terms and conditions 
(Maganga et al. 2016). 
The structural adjustment period also dramatically cut state or para-
statal wage and employment levels, which accounted for most of the 
formal-sector labor prior to 1980 and dramatically weakened labor’s 
market power, with implications for inequality. In Kenya, for example, 
wages and salaries consumed 31.7 percent of the budget but fell after a 
decade of adjustment to only 15.6 percent by 1990–1991. The propor-
tion of spending on economic and social services fell from 33.0 and 
35.0 percent in 1975 to 20.5 and 32.9 percent, respectively, with much 
of the decline going to service debt (Rono 2002). 
Austerity combined with liberalization and failed privatizations 
frequently led to the contraction of economic activity and the loss of 
employment. For example, of the 183 state divestments in Tanzania 
through 1998, only 83 were true privatizations. The rest were bankrupt-
cies and liquidations of assets, and they carried with them the loss of 
thousands of jobs (Gibbon 1999). 
Beginning in 1981, Malawi adopted a series of structural adjust-
ment programs following the global economic crisis of 1979–1981 
and local factors like the closure of access to ports through Mozam-
bique. Like so many African countries, there was rapid growth of
formal-sector employment, which expanded by an average of 9.5 per-
cent per annum during the 1970s. While in some countries employment 
increased more in the public sector, in Malawi, the expansion was 11.5 
percent per annum in the private sector, compared to 3.75 percent in the 
government. 
The impact of adjustment on formal-sector employment growth 
was almost entirely negative, with an increase in only one sector of 
production—mining and quarrying—compared to the 1970s. Overall 
growth fell to an average of only 2.96 percent during the adjustment 
period through 1995. By 1990, formal-sector employment dropped to 
only 11.6 percent of the labor force. Real monthly average wages fell by 
an astounding 41 percent. Contrary to the theory held by the proponents 
of orthodoxy, there was a rise in the ratio of urban to rural wages over 
the adjustment period. In the wake of the shrinking of the formal labor 
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grew and was likely affected by the comparative decline in real wages 
in the formal labor market (Chirwa 1999). 
Van der Hoeven (2000) examines the impact on income inequal-
ity in labor markets arising from structural adjustment. On a theoreti-
cal level, he argues that short-run policy changes under adjustment 
are generally aimed at improving allocative efficiency; this is done 
through cost cutting in labor markets and the removal of impedi-
ments like minimum wage regulation, which invariably leads to cuts in
formal-sector employment. At the same time, adjustment often deals with
balance-of-payment crises, which leads to tightened monetary policy 
and additional cuts in employment. The feedback effect of falling 
demand further exacerbates formal-sector employment. Along the same 
lines as with Malawi, Van der Hoeven finds widespread declines in
formal-sector employment relative to the total labor force in five Afri-
can countries studied, led by a drop of 25 percent in the ratio in Uganda 
between 1990 and 1995. Given the focus of adjustment, the fall in pub-
lic-sector employment was particularly acute. In four countries over the 
same period, it fell by an average of 30 percent to a level of only 6.6 
percent of the total labor force. In a fifth country (Zimbabwe), it stayed 
roughly constant at an already-low 4.5 percent. 
The rapid decline of formal-sector employment weakened labor, 
which presented implications for workers’ standard of living. The wage 
share of value added in manufacturing fell in seven African countries 
undertaking adjustment, for which data was available from the years
1980 to 1985 and 1985 to 1992. In some cases it was to ridiculously low 
levels (e.g., wage share in Ghana was only 13.8 percent in 1985–1992, 
or a fall of one-third compared to the late 1970s). Not surprisingly, 
with falling formal-sector employment and declining wage shares, real 
wages also declined by an average of 40 percent in five of the African 
countries between the late 1970s and early 1990s, also contributing to 
rising inequality. 
Trade union density also fell to very low levels in a number of 
African countries, further weakening the power of labor with implica-
tions for the distribution of income (Van der Hoeven 2000). One study 
showed a highly negative and significant correlation between income 
inequality and coordination in collective bargaining (−0.597). Coun-
tries with significant coordination had a Gini coefficient slightly lower 
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than 30, while countries with lower coordination had an average Gini 
coefficient above 45 (ILO 2000). 
Inequality was further exacerbated by an appreciable decline in gov-
ernment social spending on health and education. Van Der Hoeven esti-
mates that social spending fell to around 5.3 percent of GDP after adjust-
ment in sub-Saharan African countries from 5.9 percent. The data on
actual expenditures provides an even more depressing picture. A survey 
of real health expenditures in 12 countries, undertaking some adjust-
ment over the 1980s, indicated an average real per capita spending 
decline of close to 20 percent. These statistics on government expendi-
ture, however, were only a small part of the impact of adjustment. 
User fees in health and education, which were part of adjustment 
packages, caused a dramatic decline in attendance at health facilities 
and, when paid, reduced the real income of the poor (Stein 2015).5 On 
average, gross enrollment rates in primary and secondary schools in 
sub-Saharan Africa fell by an average of 0.5 percent per annum during 
adjustment and −4 percent after adjustment, compared to a rise of 4.7 
percent prior to adjustment, potentially harming the earning power of 
people at the lower spectrum of income (Van der Hoeven 2000). There 
was a similar impact on higher education. 
Following independence, there was enormous emphasis placed 
on higher education as part of the national development project. The 
expansion of higher education in almost every African country was 
seen as a key to overcoming the colonial inheritance and putting in 
place the resources to train a new generation of Africans that could 
take on vital new roles as doctors, teachers, lawyers, and civil servants. 
But the optimism of the 1960s and early 1970s gave way to growing 
pessimism and crises in the latter part of the 1970s. The crises pushed 
African governments to be more dependent on agencies like the World 
Bank for financial support for higher education, and with that aid came 
the conditionalities associated with the loans (Samoff and Carrol 2004). 
Increasingly in documents in the 1970s and ’80s, the Bank became 
more hostile to higher education in Africa. Higher education was seen 
as consuming too many educational resources relative to the educa-
tion needs elsewhere and as being inequitable, because higher income 
groups were overrepresented. Rather than alleviating poverty, higher 
education was adding to it. Universities were putting out too many 
graduates and emphasizing the wrong training relative to the needs of 
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labor markets. Hence, the Bank argued, resources should be directed 
away from higher to primary education (though in practice primary 
education also suffered), which gave higher net rates of return and so 
would lead to greater efficiency for the economy. The inevitable cut-
backs in higher education would be offset by charging tuition, raising 
class sizes, cutting back on nonacademic staff, and increasing private 
education (Samoff and Carrol 2004; Chachage 2016). 
The cutbacks imposed by the World Bank and the IMF were devas-
tating to universities. Expenditures fell by an average of 74 percent in 
the 1980s at African universities. Salaries collapsed and staff vacancies 
rose as universities, in order to cover their expenses, were forced to dra-
matically increase the number of students they accepted. For example, 
by 1991, the University of Dakar was forced to enroll 20,000 students 
on a campus meant for 3,500 students. In that same year, at Makerere 
University in Kampala, Uganda, lecturers were earning only $19 a day, 
and massive staff departures created vacancies of 48 percent. By 1992, 
the average salary in Nigeria was 10 percent of what had been paid in 
1978. At many African universities, infrastructure badly deteriorated 
and libraries became neglected. A survey of 31 African countries found 
that by 1990 the number of books per student had fallen by 86 percent 
(World Bank 1994). 
The neglect of higher education had a dramatic impact on the abil-
ity of African countries to participate in the global economy in a man-
ner that would have improved their standard of living and equality of 
income. At a time when global production was increasingly moving 
toward a greater reliance on information and technology, sub-Saharan 
Africa found itself marginalized and unable to gain the benefits from 
these shifts. 
AFRICA AND GLOBAL STRUCTURES OF TRADE
AND DISTRIBUTION 
On a global scale, the marginal theory of distribution provides the 
theoretical core of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model and 
the factor-price equalization theorem. In the world of HOS, free trade 





relative abundance will lead to a one-world price for labor and capi-
tal. The theory can be questioned for its ridiculous assumptions such 
as pure competition, equal access to technology for all countries, and 
single commodity prices everywhere. However, none is more absurd 
than the assumption of factor immobility in a world where capital has 
increasingly flowed freely between countries and where the mix of pro-
duction in a country is a product of the strategy of large multinational 
companies. 
Inequality has grown with the increasing expansion of global value 
chains, which have typically been driven by lead firms that link the 
production process, either through affiliates or subcontracting. A value 
chain “describes the sequence of activities that lead up to the sale of a 
final product, adding value at each stage of the process. Those activities 
can be contained within a single firm or divided among different firms 
and include, inter alia, design, production, marketing distribution, and 
postsale service” (UNCTAD 2015, p. 12). Companies divide and sub-
divide activities based on a host of production, coordination, transpor-
tation, and technological costs. Increasingly, global value chains have 
become more fragmented as production networks have extended across 
space with little regard for national boundaries. 
World manufacturing trade, as a percentage of world manufactur-
ing, tripled from 1970 to 2000 to nearly 130 percent, as trade moved 
from finished goods produced in one country to trade that linked each 
stage of production under the supply chain of multinationals in multiple 
countries. This has been driven by changes in technology, deregulation, 
and financialization. Transportation and the cost of coordination have 
dramatically declined because of new technologies spurring global 
value chains. 
The ease of doing business internationally has also been driven by 
deregulation. UNCTAD, for example, estimates that 9 out of every 10 
new policy measures linked to the internationalization of production 
and the related ease of capital flows were aimed at increasing liberal-
ization. Financialization has also had a profound impact on corporate 
governance structures by applying heightened shareholder pressures, 
which altered corporate pay structures. This greatly increased salaries 
and stock options at the upper end, squeezing labor costs and short-
ening horizons, with an emphasis on maximizing shareholder value. 
The functional redistribution of income toward profits at the expense of 
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wages abounds. Transnational corporations (TNCs) have been allowed 
greater space to generate new revenue, protect the rents associated with 
key assets, and dramatically squeeze the lower levels of the value chain, 
which is where most African countries find themselves. This is not an 
inevitable outcome of some law of globalization but a deliberate reflec-
tion of how states have set policy and the nature of the international 
power structure underlying the terms and conditions in which countries 
find themselves in the global distribution of value added (UNCTAD 
2015). 
In Africa, neoliberalism increased the reliance of African countries 
on exporting unprocessed raw materials and demobilized the ability of 
governments to alter the terms and conditions of international exchange 
by removing restrictions on capital flows, privatizing state enterprises, 
and liberalizing trade. Increasingly, value in production has moved to 
developed countries and offshore tax havens buttressed by international 
institutional structures, like the WTO, that reinforce the financial and 
technological power of transnational corporations. Data from UNCTAD
indicates that exports in the 2000s in Africa and other developing coun-
tries increased substantially without a comparable expansion in domes-
tic value added (de Medeiros and Trebat 2017). Being relegated to pri-
mary producers in the global value chain has meant that these African 
nations have had to forgo huge amounts of income because of a lack 
of value addition. Added to this has been the loss of associated formal-
sector jobs that could have helped reverse the trajectory of inequality 
in African countries. Instead, countries are subject to the vicissitudes 
of prices, which are driven today more by the speculative activities of 
hedge funds and other purveyors of global wealth than by the underly-
ing producers and users of commodities. (UNECA 2013). 
WORLD BANK AND THE POST–WASHINGTON
CONSENSUS 
Over time, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
began to shift their attitude toward cutbacks in education and health care,
partially due to a new commitment to poverty reduction in line with the

















    






ily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative allowed for a large increase
in expenditures in social spending in line with the stipulation in the debt
relief initiative that money released from debt servicing needed to be
reallocated to spending on education and, to some extent, on health care.
Following the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill of 2001, which 
ordered the U.S. Executive Director of the World Bank to stop approv-
ing loans conditional on charging a user fee, the Bank stopped demand-
ing user fees in health care and primary education. 
The withdrawal of user fees in a number of countries has had a dra-
matic effect on enrollment rates in those countries. In Burundi, 234,000
more children were enrolled in 2005 compared to the previous year— 
an 88 percent increase—after a $4.50 school fee was abolished. Similar
responses have occurred in Tanzania (2001) and Kenya (2003) after the
fees were abolished. Net primary-school enrollment rates, which were at
56 percent in sub-Saharan Africa in 1999, improved to 64 percent by 2004
(60 percent for females and 68 percent for males) (Stein 2015). 
In line with these trends, mainstream economists continue to focus on
the flawed relationship of productivity to income, discussed above. In this
world, the key to improving income inequality is to increase investment
in human capital. For decades, since economists came to dominate the
World Bank, the argument put forward is that improvements in education
will, ipso facto, lead to higher incomes, since “private and social returns
to education have consistently been high” (World Bank 2009, p. xxi). 
Adjustments in the 1980s, particularly, emphasized cutbacks at the ter-
tiary level in education and linked “short- to medium-term overproduc-
tion of high-level manpower” to the “growing problems of unemploy-
ment and underemployment among graduates” (World Bank 1988, pp. 
69–70). After 2000, the bias against tertiary education began to change
because “private returns to tertiary education in low-income countries 
are now frequently on par with the returns from primary education” 
(World Bank 2009, p. xxi). Human capital growth is seen as the main 
route to growth and transformation in the continent and “would enable 
African economies to increase allocative efficiency and maximize the 
returns from (initially) limited supplies of physical capital” (p. xx). 
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the broader structural
configuration of African economies, which have performed poorly in gen-
erating job opportunities that would improve income distribution. One
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sub-Saharan Africa. The poverty and employment elasticities of growth 
are very low in those countries. A percentage increase in GDP leads to 
a fall in poverty of only 0.95 percent, which is anemic by global stan-
dards. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest income elasticity of poverty 
among the six developing areas of the world (Page and Shimeles 2014). 
Even more disturbing, sub-Saharan Africa’s elasticity of employment 
relative to growth declined by nearly 30 percent between 1991–1995 
and 1999–2003 (Kapsos 2005). 
A key element in poverty reduction is the movement of the labor 
force from low to higher value-added activities, which has the poten-
tial to pay out higher wages. Institutionalists recognize that economic 
development requires structural transformation of the economy and that 
markets are not always effective in shifting resources between sectors. 
Industry, and particularly manufacturing, tends to have higher value-
added than the service and agricultural sectors. 
On average, in lower-income Africa, productivity in manufactur-
ing compared to agriculture is roughly 3.8 to 1. Structurally changing 
economies, from agriculture to industry, can have a significant impact 
on income. What is required is a commitment to industrial policy or the 
selective intervention of governmental policy that attempts to alter the 
sectoral structure of production toward areas that are expected to offer 
better prospects for raising incomes. This will mean not only changing 
the domestic mix of economic sectors but also altering the incentives, 
organization, and capabilities to improve the position of African produc-
tion in the global supply chain (Stein, Kinuthia, and Elhiraika, in prepa-
ration). However, that in itself is not sufficient to improve inequality. 
It will also require a systematic change in the configurations of power 
structures in support of labor and farmers to ensure that improvements 
in value added are passed on as higher incomes. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has documented and assessed competing explanations
of income inequality. Gini coefficients in sub-Saharan Africa are high,
and by some measures they have been worsening in recent years. This is
inconsistent with Kuznets’s mainstream distribution, as it predicts that
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regions with low industrialization and a high reliance on agriculture 
should have an equitable distribution of income. The Gini coefficient 
based on household budget surveys adjusted for PPP rose from 51.68 
in 1993 to 56.12 in 2008. By 2008, sub-Saharan Africa had the highest 
regional Gini coefficient in the world. The remainder of the chapter has 
endeavored to explain this pattern. 
The mainstream literature on inequality has been based on the notion 
that income is derived from the ownership of factors of production, and 
that these factors are paid according to their marginal contribution to 
production. The argument is flawed in multiple ways and is largely a 
normative argument dressed up to be objective. Factors of production 
are integrated, and their ability to affect production is contingent and 
interactive. The power of production is found in systems, not in land, 
capital, and labor. Neoclassical economic constructs have been institu-
tionalized and have created the dangerous notion that people are paid 
according to the natural laws of the market and receive what is deemed 
worthy of their contribution. In other words, the theory espouses that 
wages are not a product of human agency but of forces beyond human 
control. 
In contrast, the institutional approach to distribution points to the 
need to understand power and its relationship to the contestation of 
interests at the heart of the determination of the allocation of the shares 
of material rewards. Power in a market context is related to transactions 
in which the working rules of transaction reflect the shifting nature of 
power asymmetries. Understanding the forces that select working rules 
and that shape and reshape the relative power of the parties to transac-
tions should be at the core of an institutional understanding of the dis-
tribution of income in any society. Transactions are not simply among 
domestic players but involve international participants, and the rules of 
those transactions are affected by international institutions. 
In Africa, much of the deterioration of income distribution in recent 
decades can be traced to shifting policy regimes often generated by the 
same flawed neoclassical economic theories that weakened the power of 
direct producers in transactions, with implications for their income. On 
a global scale, the flawed marginal theory of distribution provided the 
core of Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory that free trade would lead to 
the equalization of income in the world. The theory can be questioned 
for many ridiculous assumptions, including pure competition and equal 
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access to technology for all countries. However, none is more absurd 
than the assumption of factor immobility in a world where capital has 
increasingly flowed freely between countries and where the mix of pro-
duction in a country is a product of the strategy of large multinational 
companies. 
Inequality has grown with the increasing expansion of global value 
chains, which have typically been driven by lead firms that link the pro-
duction process, either through affiliates or subcontracting. In Africa, 
neoliberalism increased the reliance of African countries on exporting 
unprocessed raw materials and demobilized the ability of governments 
to alter the terms and conditions of international exchange. African 
nations were relegated to being primary producers in the global value 
chain, which meant they had to forgo huge amounts of income because 
of a lack of value addition. This carried with it a loss of associated 
formal-sector jobs, which could have helped reverse the trajectory of 
inequality in African countries. Instead, countries are subject to the 
vicissitudes of prices, which are driven today more by the speculative 
activities of hedge funds. 
In recent years, the World Bank, the leading international agency 
in sub-Saharan Africa, has rediscovered the importance of all forms of 
education. However, in line with these trends, mainstream economists
continue to focus on the flawed productivity-to-income relationship out-
lined in the paper. In this world, the key to improving income inequality is
to increase investment in human capital. However, that in itself is insuffi-
cient. It will also require changes in institutions to support laborers and 
farmers by making sure that improvements in value added are passed 
along to them in the form of higher incomes. 
Notes 
1. Faux naturalism refers to the false or artificial referencing of laws similar to 
those governing the natural world when presenting economic theories and related 
behaviors. Typically, in the axiomatic world of neoclassical economics, “laws” 
are not rejected; instead, extraneous explanations are introduced that are aimed at 
perpetuating the “laws.” See Stein (2015) for a discussion of this. 
2. For example, the Gini below for Tanzania in 2011 is 37.8. However, our own 
survey of household imputed income in 40 randomly sampled villages in eight 
districts in Tanzania between 2010 and 2016 indicates much higher inequality. 
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overall level of 66.5. The data is compiled from the project “Transformations in 
Poverty and Property Rights in Rural Tanzania,” undertaken with my colleagues 
Faustin Maganga, Rie Odgaard, and Kelly Askew. 
3. There is little doubt that the myth that factors of production are paid in accordance 
to the value of their marginal contribution to production is also buttressed by the 
neoclassical utility theory of value, which replaced the labor theory of value. 
Instead of social classes battling with capitalists over who gets the shares of pro-
duction, atomistic utility-maximizing exchanges generate the prices, which in turn 
help determine the reward given to the individualized contributions to production. 
Hence the focus should not be on how much income capitalists were getting com-
pared to workers, but on the utility people were deriving. The danger that people 
might argue that the marginal utility of rich people was lower than that of poor 
people, and hence utility might be maximized through redistribution, was soon 
undercut by the introduction of Pareto optimality, which denied the possibility of 
interpersonal comparisons (Cook 2018). 
4. It still is useful to talk of average productivity per worker, income per worker, or 
value added per worker. Raising productivity is still important for the potential to 
pay higher incomes to workers. However, productivity does not guarantee higher 
wages, since any increase can go to greater wages, profits, or lower prices, which 
will be a reflection of the kinds of power configurations discussed in this section. 
From an institutionalist perspective, the rise of productivity can come from mul-
tiple sources, which may or may not have anything to do with worker efforts. This 
possibility is a product of the contingent and interactive nature of production. 
5. The World Bank (1986) argued, “One way to increase the efficiency and equity of 
a public education system is to impose selective charges” (p. 17). Efficiency and 
equity would be improved, since it would get rid of excess demand while giving 
government revenue to the state to expand the school system with higher spending 
per pupil. To the Bank there would be little or no effect, since “evidence . . . sug-
gests that household demand for education is relatively unresponsive to increases 
in private costs” (p. 18). The reality has been dramatically different. The education 
of much of a whole generation of Africans was lost following the imposition of 
user fees. 
References 
Bates, Robert H. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political 
Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univer-
sity of California Press. 
Boratav, Korkut. 2001. “Movements of Relative Agricultural Prices in Sub-
Saharan Africa.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25(3): 395–416. 
Brown, Christopher. 2005. “Is There an Institutional Theory of Distribution?” 
Journal of Economic Issues 39(4): 915–931. 
Chachage, Chachage Seithy L. 2016. “The Ghettoisation of Basic Research in 





Institutions, Structures, and Policy Paradigms 141 
Higher Education.” Kavazi Occasional Paper No. 4. Dar es Salaam, Tanza-
nia: Nyerere Resource Centre. 
Chirwa, Ephraim W. 1999. “Structural Adjustment Programs and the Labor Mar-
ket in Malawi.” Wadonda Consult Working Paper No. WC/06/99. Zomba, 
Malawi: University of Malawi. 
Chitonge, Horman. 2015. Economic Growth and Development in Africa: 
Understanding Trends and Prospects. London: Routledge. 
Clark, John Bates. 1908. The Distribution of Wealth. New York: Macmillan. 
Commons, John R. 1924. The Legal Foundations of Capitalism. Clifton, NJ: 
Augustus M. Kelley. 
Cook, Eli. 2018. “The Great Marginalization: Why Twentieth-Century Econ-
omists Neglected Inequality.” Real World Economics Review 83(March): 
20–34. http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue83/whole83.pdf (accessed 
April 4, 2019). 
de Medeiros, Carlos Aguiar, and Nicholas Trebat. 2017. “Inequality and 
Income Distribution in Global Value Chains.” Journal of Economic Issues
51(2): 401–408. 
Dugger, William M. 1998. “Against Inequality.” Journal of Economic Issues
32(2): 286–303. 
Gibbon, Peter. 1999. “Privatisation and Foreign Direct Investment in Mainland 
Tanzania, 1992–98.” CDR Working Paper Subseries, Vol. 99.1. Copenha-
gen: Center for Development Research. 
Higgins, Matthew, and Jeffrey Williamson. 1999. “Explaining Inequality the 
World Round: Cohort Size, Kuznets Curve, and Openness.” NBER Working 
Paper No. 7224. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
International Labour Organization (ILO). 2000. Organization, Bargaining 
and Social Dialogue in a Globalizing World. Geneva: International Labour 
Organization. 
Jerven, Morten. 2015. Africa: Why Economists Get It Wrong. London: Zed 
Books. 
Jirasavetakul, La-Bhus Fah, and Christoph Lakner. 2016. “The Distribution of 
Consumption Expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Inequality among 
All Africans.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 7557. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Kapsos, Steve. 2005. “The Employment Intensity of Growth: Trends and 
Macroeconomic Determinants.” Employment Strategy Paper No. 2005/12. 
Geneva: International Labour Organization. 
Karshenas, Massoud. 2001. “Agriculture and Economic Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25(3): 315– 
342. 




Economy of Agricultural Pricing. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press. 
Lipton, Michael. 1977. Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study of Urban Bias in 
World Development. London: Maurice Temple Smith. 
Lucas, Robert. 2004. “The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future.” 2003 
Annual Report Essay. Minneapolis: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
Maganga, Faustin, Howard Stein, Kelly Askew, and Rie Odgaard. 2016. 
“Inequality, Property Right Formalization, and Poverty in Rural Tanzania.” 
Paper presented at the African Studies Association Meeting, held in Wash-
ington, DC, December 1. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory. 2011. “Educating Oligarchs.” Greg Mankiw’s Blog, 
November 5. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, and Mark P. Taylor. 2011. Economics. Andover, MA: 
South-Western Cengage Learning. 
Milanovic, Branco. 2003. “Is Inequality in Africa Really Different?” World 
Bank Working Paper No. 3169. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Nel, Philip. 2018. “Inequality in Africa.” In The Routledge Handbook of Afri-
can Development, Tony Binns, Kenneth Lynch, and Etienne Nel, eds. Lon-
don: Routledge, pp. 104–119. 
Okun, Arthur M. 1975. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. Washing-
ton, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Page, John, and Abebe Shimeles. 2014. “Aid, Employment, and Poverty 
Reduction in Africa.” WIDER Working Paper No. 2014/043. Helsinki: 
World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations 
University. 
Rodrik, Dani. 1999. “Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social 
Conflict, and Growth Collapses.” Journal of Economic Growth 4(4): 385– 
412. 
Rono, Joseph K. 2002. “The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes on 
Kenyan Society.” Journal of Social Development in Africa 17(1): 81–98. 
Samoff, Joel, and Bidemi Carrol. 2004. “Conditions, Coalitions, and Influence: 
The World Bank and Higher Education in Africa.” Paper presented at the 
Annual Conference for the Comparative and International Education Soci-
ety, held in Salt Lake City, March 8–12. 
Stein, Howard. 2011. “World Bank Agricultural Policies, Poverty, and Income 
Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Econ-
omy, and Society 4(1): 79–90. 
———. 2015. Beyond the World Bank Agenda: An Institutional Approach to 
Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Stein, Howard, Bethuel Kinuthia, and Adam Elhiraika. In preparation. Insti-
tutions and Industrial Policy in Africa: Toward Structural Transformation 






Institutions, Structures, and Policy Paradigms 143 
Stiglitz, Joseph. 1998. “Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strate-
gies, Policies, and Processes.” Paper presented as the 1998 Prebisch Lec-
ture at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held in 
Geneva, October 19. 
Syll, Lars. 2014. “Piketty and the Limits of Marginal Productivity Theory.” 
Real World Economics Review 69(October 7): 36–43. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2015. 
Global Value Chains and South-South Trade: Economic Cooperation and 
Integration among Developing Countries. Geneva: United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). 2013. Economic 
Report for Africa 2013: Making the Most of Africa’s Commodities. Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 
van de Walle, Nicolas. 2009. “The Institutional Origins of Inequality in Sub-
Saharan Africa.” Annual Review of Political Science 12(2009): 307–327. 
Van der Hoeven, Rolph. 2000. “Labor Markets and Income Inequality: What 
Are the New Insights after the Washington Consensus?” UNU/WIDER 
Working Paper No. 209. Helsinki: United Nations University. 
Veblen, Thorstein. (1904) 1975. The Theory of Business Enterprise. 1975 
reprint. Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley. 
WIDER. 2017. World Income Inequality Data Base. Helsinki: World Insti-
tute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University.
https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/wiid-world-income-inequality-database
(accessed April 5, 2019). 
World Bank. 1981. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
———. 1986. Financing Education in Developing Countries: An Exploration of
Policy Options. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
———. 1988. Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Strategies for Adjustment, 
Revitalization, and Expansion. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
———. 1994. Higher Education: The Lessons of Experience. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
———. 2009. Accelerating Catch-Up: Tertiary Education for Growth in Sub-





Income Inequality, Progressive 
Taxation, and Tax Expenditures 
James R. Hines Jr. 
University of Michigan and NBER 
There are important and growing concerns about income inequality 
in the United States and other high-income countries. These concerns 
reflect rising apprehension about the political and social consequences 
of inequality and worries that the advance of technology, expanding 
international trade and investment, and other economic developments 
may have significantly widened income gaps in recent decades and will 
continue to do so in the future. In the United States, these concerns have 
prompted renewed calls for political activism and vigorous searches for 
policy measures that might improve the relative economic positions of 
low- and middle-income Americans. 
There are many ways in which government policies can and do 
influence the distribution of income, though redistributive policies can 
be costly from the standpoint of economic efficiency and growth. Since 
as a realistic matter it is unlikely that feasible reforms to any one indi-
vidual government program would fully address current income distri-
bution concerns, it is useful to consider a range of policy options and 
their likely effects on the distribution of income and the performance 
of the economy. It is particularly valuable to identify measures that 
address distributional concerns efficiently. 
This chapter considers the design of a tax system in an economy 
with significant income inequality, focusing on the impact of provi-
sions—such as tax deductions and tax credits—that offer benefits to 
some but not all taxpayers. Taxation directly affects the distribution of 
after-tax incomes by imposing larger burdens on some than it does on 
others, and it indirectly affects the distribution of income through the 
government programs it finances. A tax program designed to address 






ity to pay and that guarantees adequate funding for appropriate govern-
ment programs; consequently, tax reforms can be evaluated based on the 
extent to which they permit the tax system to perform these functions. 
The U.S. federal income tax imposes tax burdens based largely on 
ability to pay. The U.S. tax system is progressive, meaning that a tax-
payer’s burden measured as a percentage of income generally rises with 
income. The U.S. tax system achieves this progressivity largely with 
tax rates that increase with income and with the provision of refundable 
tax credits to low-income working families. As a result, most of the 
revenue raised by the U.S. federal income tax comes from high-income 
taxpayers, with a sizable portion of the income-earning U.S. population 
paying zero or negative federal income taxes. 
Despite the progressivity of the U.S. income tax, there are fre-
quently voiced concerns that the system affords too many unwarranted 
tax breaks, particularly for high-income taxpayers.1 These concerns are 
understandable but misplaced. They are understandable because much 
of the popular discussion of tax policy focuses on apparent inequities 
created by the availability of tax preferences for which certain taxpay-
ers and not others are eligible. For example, only those taxpayers who 
itemize their tax deductions are able to receive tax reductions due to 
mortgage payments, charitable contributions, and state and local tax 
payments. Prior to passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, only 
about 30 percent of the taxpaying population chose to itemize deduc-
tions, with the remaining 70 percent claiming the standard deduction 
instead.2 Since the 30 percent who itemized their deductions were 
concentrated among high-income taxpayers, it follows that this high-
income group received most of the benefits of the favorable federal tax 
treatment of mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and 
local tax payments. By increasing the standard deduction, the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act significantly reduced the number of U.S. taxpayers claim-
ing the standard deduction, and in the process it further concentrated 
the benefits of tax deductions among the wealthy. Hence, a simple cal-
culation of the distribution of the benefits of itemized deductions might 
conclude that the provision of these deductions reduces tax equity by 
providing benefits almost entirely to taxpayers with high incomes. 
On closer examination, it becomes apparent that equity-based con-
cerns about these tax preferences are misplaced, because in fact tax 
preferences are critical features of progressive tax systems—and indeed, 
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are what make it possible for tax systems to exhibit high degrees of 
progressivity, with all the social benefits that are associated with pro-
gressivity. There are two reasons for this, the first of which is that tax 
preferences make it possible to design taxes efficiently, since by provid-
ing preferential taxation of highly responsive activities it is possible to 
differentiate taxes in a way that is less costly to the economy. The eco-
nomic distortions associated with high tax rates are important consid-
erations in limiting the extent of taxation and tax progressivity, both in 
theory and in practice. Since high marginal tax rates discourage income 
production, the cost of imposing high tax rates rises with the degree 
to which economic activity is sensitive to taxation. Governments can 
choose to offer tax preferences for activities that are highly sensitive 
to taxation, which subjects these activities to lower effective tax rates, 
and thereby subjects relatively insensitive activities to comparatively 
higher rates of taxation. This type of tax design reduces the efficiency 
cost of high tax rates and thereby makes it feasible to implement a more 
progressive tax system. 
The second reason tax preferences facilitate tax progressivity is that 
properly designed tax preferences adjust tax burdens according to abil-
ity to pay, which increases the attractiveness of imposing a highly pro-
gressive tax-rate structure. One of the important equity concerns about 
high degrees of tax progressivity is that high tax rates may be unduly 
burdensome to taxpayers in certain circumstances. For example, even 
a very-high-income taxpayer may find it impossible or infeasible also 
to pay federal income taxes at high rates if simultaneously confronted 
with a combination of extraordinary medical bills, high state taxes, 
high alimony payments, and other claims on resources. The adoption 
of sympathetic tax treatment in the form of deductions for medical and 
other expenses makes legislators and the general public more willing 
than they would otherwise be to impose high tax rates on those with 
very high incomes. 
As a result, an equitable tax system has a relatively narrow tax base 
and high tax rates, with rates that increase sharply with income. By 
applying high tax rates to affluent taxpayers, the system can raise rev-
enue that more than compensates for revenue lost from tax deductions 
and tax credits, and that has desirable distributional properties in the bar-
gain. Such a system offers favorable rates, refundable credits, and other 
tax benefits for low-income families. The tax system thereby imposes 
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tax burdens according to ability to pay and raises revenue sufficient to 
fund needed government programs. By imposing burdens according to 
ability to pay and in offering a sound system of government finance, a 
tax system with high rates and appropriate deductions and tax credits 
automatically addresses the income-distribution concerns that appropri-
ately motivate much of the current tax-policy discussion. 
There is an alternative to such a system: it is a much more stripped-
down income tax that offers very few if any deductions and tax credits. 
There is considerable popular appeal to such a broad-based, low-rate 
tax system, due in part to its simplicity and in part to the low rates. The 
archetypal broad-based, low-rate tax system is known as a Haig-Simons 
income tax, after the fundamental contributions of Robert Murray Haig 
(1921) and Henry Calvert Simons (1938). In the Haig-Simons income 
tax, all income is subject to taxation, without provision of deductions or 
tax credits corresponding to individual taxpayer situations. The virtue 
of such simplicity is not to be lightly dismissed, but this form of sim-
plicity comes at the cost of considerable loss of tax equity, because such 
a tax fails to accommodate individual circumstances, and it is unreal-
istic to think that a Haig-Simons income tax would ever be imposed at 
highly progressive rates. Indeed, even the appeal to low tax rates imme-
diately reveals that there is a limit to the range of possible tax progres-
sivity, which limits the extent to which those who are best positioned 
to pay taxes ultimately do so. Those who advocate for broad-based, 
low-rate tax systems frequently fail to recognize the intimate connec-
tion between the breadth of the tax base and the extent to which the 
government is able to adopt a system that taxes according to ability to 
pay. The purpose of this chapter is to draw attention to this connection, 
and to recommend that the United States and other countries do more to 
tailor their tax systems in ways that make them more progressive. 
DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES OF THE U.S.
INCOME TAX 
The U.S. federal government collects revenue from several sources, 
of which two are by far the most important: 1) employment-related pay-
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sonal income tax, which finances most of the rest of the government.3 
This paper focuses on the income tax, which is the primary discretion-
ary source of revenue for the federal government—and which by its 
nature is the part of the revenue system that is most amenable to the 
imposition of burdens according to ability to pay. U.S. payroll taxes 
are unlike income and other taxes in that eligibility for retirement ben-
efits, disability insurance, and medical insurance requires payment of 
employment taxes—whereas receipt of other federal benefits are not 
conditional on paying income taxes. For example, workers who have 
higher wage and salary income, and therefore pay greater Social Secu-
rity taxes, receive higher monthly benefits from the Social Security sys-
tem when they retire. Furthermore, the Social Security system provides 
benefits in a highly progressive way, with income replacement rates 
that are much higher at low incomes than they are at higher incomes. 
Consequently, the Social Security system achieves its distributional 
objectives not through its tax features but instead through its benefit 
formula—which would make any distributional examination of Social 
Security taxes incomplete, given the close connection of Social Secu-
rity taxes and benefits. 
U.S. federal income-tax burdens rise with income, largely reflect-
ing the progressive nature of tax rates. The latest available data cover 
pre-2018 federal law, with Table 7.1 presenting calculations for tax year 
2014. In that year, an adjusted gross income of $465,600 put a taxpayer 
in the top 1 percent of the income distribution, and such taxpayers faced 
average tax rates of 27.2 percent. This top 1 percent of the U.S. income 
distribution had 20.6 percent of aggregate U.S. personal income that 
year and paid 39.5 percent of total federal income taxes. An adjusted 
gross income of $189,000 put a taxpayer in the top 5 percent of the 
income distribution; and this group faced average tax rates of 23.6 per-
cent, earned 36 percent of aggregate U.S. personal income that year, 
and paid 60 percent of federal income taxes. By contrast, the half of the 
United States that had incomes below $38,200 faced average tax rates 
of just 3.5 percent, had only 11.3 percent of personal income, and paid 
just 3.5 percent of federal income taxes. 
Federal personal-income tax burdens in 2014 (and in other years) 
rise with income levels. This is largely the product of tax rates that 
increase with income, exempt amounts, and standard and personal 
deductions that permit taxpayers to earn significant income before it 
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Table 7.1  Income Distribution, Tax Rates, and Tax Payments, 2014 
Income Income cutoffs Average tax Cumulative Cumulative tax 
groups (%) ($ 000s) rates (%) incomes (%) payments (%) 
Top 1 465.6 27.2 20.6 39.5 
Top 5 189.0 23.6 36.0 60.0 
Top 10 133.4 21.3 47.2 70.9 
Top 25 77.7 17.8 68.9 86.8 
Top 50 38.2 15.5 88.7 97.3 
Bottom 50 3.5 11.3 3.5 
NOTE: The table presents average federal income tax rates, total incomes, and total 
federal income tax payments by six income groups for tax year 2014. Income groups 
are classified by adjusted gross income (AGI) as reported on tax forms. Income cutoffs 
denote the minimum AGI to be included in the group. Cumulative incomes denote the 
fraction of total U.S. AGI earned by members of the income group; similarly, cumula-
tive tax payments denote the fraction of total U.S. federal income tax payments by 
members of the group. 
SOURCE: Dungan (2017). 
becomes taxable, as well as refundable tax credits available to low-
income earners. In 2014, a married couple was not taxable until its 
income exceeded amounts covered by exemptions and deductions, and 
then was initially taxable at just 10 percent for the first $18,150 of net 
taxable income. Such a couple then faced a 15 percent tax rate until its 
taxable income reached $73,800, after which point the marginal tax rate 
became 25 percent. The marginal income-tax rate rose to 28 percent at 
an income of $148,851, 33 percent at an income of $226,851, 35 percent 
at an income of $405,101, and 39.6 percent on any portion of income 
exceeding $457,601. Furthermore, the Earned Income Tax Credit and 
the Child Tax Credit were available primarily for low-income families. 
Despite the evident progressivity of the federal income tax, it is pos-
sible for tax reform to make the system much more progressive than it 
was in 2014 or is today. One aspect of federal taxation that is commonly 
argued to work against tax progressivity is the provision of exclusions, 
deductions, and tax credits, all of which are commonly called “tax 
expenditures” (Surrey 1973). The most important single “tax expendi-
ture” is the tax exclusion for employer-provided health insurance. Other 
significant tax expenditures include the preferential treatment of retire-
ment accounts; deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage inter-
est, and charitable contributions; the favorable tax treatment of capital 
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gains; and various tax credits. Table 7.2 displays the largest federal tax 
expenditures for Fiscal Year 2016, with accompanying magnitudes of 
forgone federal tax revenue because of these tax expenditures. Many of 
these tax expenditures benefit high-income taxpayers. 
Table 7.3 presents the distribution of federal personal income tax 
expenditures by income group for Tax Year 2013. The first column 
offers evidence on tax exclusions, which consist of the benefits of the 
favorable tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance, pension 
contributions, and income; the favorable tax treatment of capital gains 
on assets held until death; and other smaller exclusions. As the table 
indicates, 7 percent of the aggregate value of these tax exclusions is 
enjoyed by taxpayers whose incomes are in the top 1 percent of the U.S. 
income distribution. While the aggregate value of these benefits for the 
top 1 percent is obviously disproportionate to the number of taxpayers, 
it is actually rather small compared to the roughly 39.5 percent of tax 
Table 7.2  Largest Individual Tax Expenditures, 2016 
2016 amount 
Tax expenditure ($ billions) 
Exclusions from taxable income: 
Employer contributions for health care and insurance 164.6 
Employer pension contributions and earnings 156.1 
Social Security and railroad retirement benefits 38.4 
Capital gains at death 32.9 
Interest on state and local government bonds 32.9 
Fringe benefits provided under cafeteria plans 31.3 
Capital gains on sales of principal residences 29.2 
Tax deductions: 
State and local income, sales, and property taxes 96.6 
Mortgage interest on owner-occupied residences 59.0 
Charitable contributions 55.2 
Reduced tax rates on dividends and long-term capital gains 130.9 
Tax credits: 
Earned Income Tax Credit 73.0 
Child Tax Credit 55.0 
NOTE: The table presents the aggregate dollar values (in billions) of the largest indi-
vidual tax expenditure items for Fiscal Year 2016. 
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2017a). 
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Table 7.3  Share of Tax Expenditures by Income Group, 2013 
Tax Tax Capital gains Tax Total tax 
Income exclusions deductions preferences credits expenditures 
group (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Top 1 7 30 68 0 17 
Top 20 45 81 93 3 51 
60–80 23 13 5 12 18 
40–60 16 4 2 19 13 
20–40 10 1 0 29 10 
Bottom 20 5 0 0 37 8 
NOTE: Figures in the table report the fraction of total U.S. tax benefits of each tax 
preference category received by each of the designated income groups, as defined by 
adjusted gross income. “Tax exclusions” consist of tax benefits from the exclusion 
from taxable income of employer-provided health insurance, net pension contribu-
tions and earnings, capital gains on assets transferred at death, a portion of Social 
Security and railroad retirement benefits, and other items. “Tax deductions” consist of 
tax benefits from the itemized deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage interest, 
charitable contributions, and others. “Capital gains preferences” are the benefits of the 
preferential tax rates at which long-term gains are taxed. “Tax credits” consist of tax 
benefits from the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and other available 
credits. “Total tax expenditures” is the sum of all of these tax benefits. 
SOURCE: CBO (2013). 
payments (and 20.6 percent of income) accounted for by the top 1 per-
cent of taxpayers. Table 7.3 indicates that the top 20 percent of income 
earners in 2013 received 45 percent of the tax benefits from tax exclu-
sions—which, again, while disproportionate to that group’s numbers, is 
rather less than the share of this top-income quintile in tax payments or 
income. By contrast, taxpayers whose incomes are in the bottom two 
income quintiles received 15 percent of the aggregate tax benefit of 
exclusions, which is a sizable benefit considering that the bottom half 
of income earners has 11.3 percent of aggregate income and pays just 
3.5 percent of aggregate U.S. income taxes. 
The second column of Table 7.3 presents information on the dis-
tribution of the benefits of tax deductions, which include benefits from 
deducting state and local taxes, mortgage interest payments, charita-
ble contributions, and other expenses. These benefits are more heavily 
concentrated among high-income taxpayers than are the benefits of tax 
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top 1 percent receive 30 percent of the aggregate benefits of tax deduc-
tions; income earners in the top quintile of the distribution receive 81 
percent of the aggregate benefits of tax deductions. These percentages 
correspond roughly to shares of aggregate tax payments. By contrast, 
income earners in the bottom quintile of the distribution receive only 
negligible benefits from tax deductions, reflecting both the low tax 
rates against which they take deductions and the very small fraction of 
such taxpayers who itemize deductions rather than taking the standard 
deduction. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 7.3 display information on 
distributions of the benefits of capital-gain preferences and tax credits. 
These two series exhibit very different distributional properties. The 
benefits of capital-gain preferences—the low rates at which long-term 
capital gains are taxed—are very strongly concentrated among high-
income taxpayers, with the top quintile of income earners enjoying 
93 percent of the aggregate benefit of these low tax rates, while the 
bottom two quintiles of income earners enjoy only negligible benefits. 
The opposite is true of the benefits of tax credits, which arise almost 
entirely from the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit. 
The bottom two quintiles of income earners enjoy 66 percent of the 
aggregate benefits of tax credits, whereas the top quintile of income 
earners receive only negligible benefits. 
The fifth column of Table 7.3 displays shares of aggregate benefits 
from all tax expenditures taken together. Because of the significance of 
tax deductions and capital-gain preferences, aggregate tax expenditure 
benefits are again concentrated among high-income taxpayers, with 17 
percent accruing to the top 1 percent of taxpayers, and 51 percent to the 
top quintile. By contrast, the bottom quintile of income earners receives 
only 8 percent of the aggregate benefits of tax expenditures, and the 
20–40 percent quintile receives 10 percent of the aggregate benefits. 
Table 7.4 presents information on the benefits of aggregate tax 
expenditures expressed as shares of after-tax incomes. This method of 
presenting the values of tax expenditures implicitly modifies the entries 
to adjust for the dollar values of the benefits provided by different types 
of tax expenditures. For example, since the aggregate dollar value of tax 
exclusions greatly exceeds the aggregate dollar value of tax deductions, 
the distribution of tax exclusions has greater impact on the final distri-
bution of after-tax incomes than does the distribution of tax deductions. 
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Table 7.4  Values of Tax Expenditures as Shares of After-Tax Income, by 
Income Group, 2013 (%) 
Tax Tax Capital gains Tax Total tax 
Income exclusions deductions preferences credits expenditures 
group (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Top 1 3.2 3.9 5.3 0.0 13.1 
Top 20 4.7 2.5 1.7 0.1 9.4 
60–80 5.2 0.8 0.2 0.7 7.3 
40–60 5.0 0.4 0.1 1.5 7.3 
20–40 4.5 0.2 0.0 3.3 7.9 
Bottom 20 4.2 0.0 0.0 8.1 11.7 
NOTE: Figures in the table report values of total U.S. tax benefits of each tax preference 
category received by each of the designated income groups, expressed as fractions 
of group income. “Tax exclusions” consist of tax benefits from the exclusion from 
taxable income of employer-provided health insurance, net pension contributions and 
earnings, capital gains on assets transferred at death, a portion of Social Security and 
railroad retirement benefits, and other items. “Tax deductions” consist of tax benefits 
from the itemized deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage interest, charitable 
contributions, and others. “Capital gains preferences” are the benefits of the preferen-
tial tax rates at which long-term gains are taxed. “Tax credits” consist of tax benefits 
from the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and other available credits. 
“Total tax expenditures” is the sum of all of these tax benefits. 
SOURCE: CBO (2013). 
Despite a normalization by after-tax incomes, it remains the case that 
the values of tax deductions and capital-gain preferences appear to be 
concentrated among high-income taxpayers: the top 1 percent receive 
benefits from tax deductions equal to 3.9 percent of their incomes, and 
they receive benefits from capital-gains preferences equal to 5.3 percent 
of their incomes. By contrast, taxpayers with incomes in the bottom 40 
percent of the income distribution receive benefits from tax deductions 
equal to just 0.2 percent of their incomes and receive only negligible 
benefits from capital gains preferences. The benefits of tax exclusions 
in Table 7.4 appear to be spread across the population roughly in pro-
portion to after-tax incomes, and the benefits of tax credits are very 
strongly concentrated among low-income taxpayers, with those in the 
bottom quintile of the income distribution receiving tax credits worth 
8.1 percent of their incomes. By contrast, taxpayers in the top quintile 
of the income distribution receive benefits from tax credits equal to just 
0.1 percent of their incomes. 
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The fifth column of Table 7.4 presents the distribution of the dol-
lar values of tax expenditures measured as percentages of after-tax 
incomes. This distribution of benefits is largely flat across the middle 
three quintiles of the income distribution, with somewhat greater den-
sity in the bottom and top quintiles, and a mild concentration of benefits 
for the top 1 percent of income earners. 
The evidence indicates that taxpayers in the top 20 percent of the 
U.S. income distribution receive a majority of the benefits of tax expen-
ditures, from which many people quite understandably draw the con-
clusion that tax exclusions, deductions, and credits are antiprogressive. 
One problem with this inference is that existing tax expenditures offer 
benefits roughly in proportion to after-tax incomes, suggesting that they 
serve largely as factors that reduce effective tax rates by somewhat con-
stant amounts. The second problem is that evaluating tax expenditures 
in isolation relies on a view of the world in which everything else— 
notably including tax rates—stays unchanged while tax preferences 
disappear. This is unrealistic; governments choose tax rates together 
with tax preferences, and if tax preferences were reduced in magnitude, 
then government would also change tax rates. Consequently, in order 
to know just what effect tax expenditures have on the distribution of 
income, it is necessary to understand the principles that governments 
apply in designing their tax systems. 
THE 2017 TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 
In December 2017, the United States enacted a major tax reform, 
commonly known by the bill’s original title, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(TCJA). This legislation was initially directed at reforming the U.S. 
system of corporate and international taxation, and while the TCJA did 
reduce the U.S. corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent and 
introduce major changes to the U.S. system of taxing foreign income, 
the final bill also included significant cuts to individual taxes and the 
taxation of income earned by unincorporated businesses. As a result, 
forecasts predicted that the TCJA would reduce federal revenue collec-
tions by $1.456 trillion over 10 years; and even in the scenario in which 





enues over that time period would decline by $1.071 trillion because of 
the bill’s provisions (Joint Committee on Taxation 2017b). 
The 2017 legislation significantly reduced individual taxes by low-
ering tax rates, almost doubling the standard deduction, doubling the 
Child Tax Credit, increasing the exempt amount under the individual 
alternative minimum tax (AMT), and making several other changes. 
There were also several provisions that increased individual taxes, nota-
bly by removing personal exemptions, reducing and eliminating several 
popular itemized deductions, and changing the method by which bracket 
amounts are indexed to inflation. The combination of rate reductions 
and limits on itemized deductions produced a lower-rate, broader-based 
personal income tax system. It also produced a personal income tax 
system with burdens less well targeted to ability to pay. 
The 2017 TCJA reduced average effective tax rates at every income 
level. Table 7.5 presents a distributional analysis of the effect of the 
TCJA, comparing tax burdens by income level in 2017 (prior to appli-
cation of the TCJA’s provisions) and 2019. As the table indicates, the 
TCJA reduced personal income taxes by $259.5 billion in 2019, low-
ering the average personal income tax rate from 20.7 percent to 19.0 
percent. The tax reductions were concentrated among higher-income 
taxpayers, in part reflecting the reality that these individuals pay the 
majority of federal income taxes. The roughly 1.7 million taxpayers 
with incomes of $500,000 and above saw their aggregate federal taxes 
decline by $60.8 billion between 2017 and 2019, whereas the 37.5 mil-
lion taxpayers with incomes in the $20,000–$40,000 range received an 
aggregate tax reduction of just $8.4 billion. 
The second and third columns of Table 7.5 present average tax rates 
in 2017 and 2019 for each of the listed income groups. Average tax rates 
declined for each of these groups by between 0.5 and 3.1 percent, with 
most of the large reductions materializing for high-income taxpayers. 
For example, the average tax rate of taxpayers with $1 million or more 
of income fell from 32.5 percent in 2017 to 30.2 percent in 2019; and 
the average tax rate of taxpayers with annual incomes in the $500,000 
to $1 million range declined from 30.9 percent in 2017 to 27.8 per-
cent in 2019. By contrast, the average tax rate of taxpayers with annual 
incomes in the $20,000–$30,000 range fell by only 0.5 percent, from 
3.9 percent to 3.4 percent. As a result, the 2017 TCJA delivered its larg-
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Table 7.5  2019 Distributional Effects of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
Number of 
Income category Tax reduction Average tax rates (%) taxpayers (in 
($ 000) ($ billions) 2017 2019 millions) 
Less than 10 0.4 9.1 8.6 19.3 
10–20 1.8 −0.7 −1.2 20.6 
20–30 3.0 3.9 3.4 21.5 
30–40 5.4 7.9 7.0 16.0 
40–50 6.7 10.9 9.9 12.8 
50–75 23.0 14.8 13.5 27.4 
75–100 22.4 17.0 15.6 17.8 
100–200 70.4 20.9 19.4 30.7 
200–500 65.5 26.4 23.9 9.2 
500–1,000 23.9 30.9 27.8 1.1 
1,000 and over 36.9 32.5 30.2 0.6 
Total 259.5 20.7 19.0 177.0 
NOTE: The table presents the aggregate tax reductions between 2017 and 2019, and the 
average federal income tax rates in 2017 and 2019, for 11 income groups classified by 
adjusted gross income as reported on tax forms. 
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2019). 
est tax reductions (as measured relative to pretax incomes) to the most 
affluent taxpayers. 
Table 7.6 explores the sources of tax burden changes for affected 
taxpayer income groups. Entries in the table represent the aggregate 
magnitudes of tax reductions between 2017 and 2019 for which the 
listed tax bill provisions were responsible. Thus, for example, the tax 
rate reductions in the 2017 bill lowered by $57.8 billion the aggregate 
2019 tax liabilities of taxpayers in the $200,000–$500,000 income 
group. The same taxpayer group also received $23.8 billion in aggre-
gate tax savings from the 2017 bill’s significant reduction in the alterna-
tive minimum tax but paid an additional $25.8 billion in aggregate taxes 
because of the removal of personal exemptions. 
Some patterns are evident from the information in Table 7.6. The 
tax rate reductions in the 2017 bill reduced aggregate 2019 tax col-
lections by $198.4 billion, with the benefits concentrated among high-
income taxpayers. The 2017 bill reduced aggregate tax collections 
under the alternative minimum tax by $38.6 billion; almost all of this 
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Table 7.6  2019 Distributional Effects of Specific Provisions of the 2017 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
Alternative 
Income Rate minimum Personal Standard Itemized Child Tax 
category reduction tax (AMT) exemptions deduction deductions Credit 
($ 000) ($ billions) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Less than 10 0.0 1 m −1 m 182 m 0 82 m 
10–20 0.0 4 m −932 m 3.3 b −4 m 1.0 b 
20–30 0.3 0 m −2.8 b 5.9 b −60 m 2.4 b 
30–40 1.3 2 m −3.8 b 7.0 b −153 m 3.5 b 
40–50 2.7 6 m −4.9 b 7.7 b −231 m 4.3 b 
50–75 12.3 9 m −16.5 b 20.4 b −1.1 b 9.8 b 
75–100 14.7 9 m −17.7 b 16.8 b −1.7 b 7.7 b 
100–200 61.1 690 m −54.6 b 37.2 b −9.1 b 23.9 b 
200–500 57.8 23.8 b −25.8 b 9.6 b −21.5 b 13.5 b 
500–1,000 18.6 13.2 b −39 m 1.1 b −12.3 b 93 m 
1,000 and 29.5 873 m −1 m 425 m −30.0 b 0 
over 
Total 198.4 38.6 b −127.1 b 109.5 b −$76.2 b 66.4 b 
NOTE: The table presents the aggregate tax reductions between 2017 and 2019 due to 
various provisions of the 2017 TCJA, distinguished by income groups as classified 
by adjusted gross income reported on tax forms. The first column reports tax reduc-
tions due to lower tax rates introduced by the TCJA. The second column reports tax 
reductions due to changes in the alternative minimum tax. The third column reports 
tax reductions (all of which are negative, so therefore correspond to tax increases) 
that are due to the elimination of personal exemptions. The fourth column reports tax 
reductions due to increases in the standard deduction. The fifth column reports tax 
reductions (all of which are negative, so therefore correspond to tax increases) that 
are due to limitations on itemized deductions. The sixth column reports tax reductions 
due to increases in the Child Tax Credit. 
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2019). 
tax reduction was enjoyed by taxpayers in the $200,000-to-$1-million 
income range. The elimination of personal exemptions increased aggre-
gate tax liabilities by $127.1 billion, most of it paid by taxpayers earn-
ing between $100,000 and $500,000, and virtually none of which paid 
by taxpayers earning $500,000 or above (whose personal exemptions 
had been already largely phased out under pre-2018 law). Increasing 
the standard deduction reduced total tax collections by $109.5 billion, 
and almost 70 percent of these benefits were received by taxpayers 
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Credit reduced total tax collections by $66.4 billion, with the benefits 
concentrated among taxpayers with middle-to-high incomes; those with 
incomes below $20,000 or above $500,000 received almost none of the 
benefits. 
The 2017 legislation made several changes to itemized deduc-
tions, limiting the ability of taxpayers to claim deductions for state and 
local tax payments, mortgage interest payments, casualty losses, mov-
ing expenses, alimony payments, and various miscellaneous itemized 
deductions, including expenses incurred in income-earning activities. 
In total, these restrictions reduced tax collections by $76.2 billion, with 
the burden heavily concentrated among high-income taxpayers. For 
example, these limits on itemized deductions increased by $30.0 bil-
lion the aggregate tax liabilities of taxpayers with incomes of $1 mil-
lion or more, despite the relatively small number of such taxpayers; by 
contrast, taxpayers with incomes below $100,000 (who itemize their 
deductions at relatively low rates) were largely unaffected. 
Those who have long advocated for broad-based, low-rate income 
taxation got a version of what they asked for with the 2017 Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act. The 2017 TCJA reduced rates and removed deductions 
and exemptions, moving federal income taxation in the direction of 
a flatter—and some would argue, simpler—tax system. The federal 
income tax now collects less money than it would have absent the 2017 
changes and does so in a manner that corresponds less to assigning 
burdens according to ability to pay. While the individual income tax 
features of the 2017 legislation move the federal revenue system in an 
unfortunate direction according to these criteria, one way in which the 
2017 TCJA is useful is that it illustrates what direction not to take in 
crafting more wholesale reforms to the tax system. 
PRINCIPLES OF INCOME TAXATION 
Countries impose taxes in order to raise revenue to finance their 
governments. The cost of raising revenue is that the accompanying 
taxes impose burdens on individuals and businesses that pay the taxes, 
and these taxes also impose costs on the economy as a whole by dis-
torting economic incentives. Income taxation discourages income pro-
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duction, thereby reducing the efficiency of the economy and running 
counter to most government objectives. The economic costs of the 
distortions produced by income taxation almost always rise with the 
amount of revenue collected,4 and with the extent of tax progressivity, 
so a more distortionary tax system puts downward pressure on govern-
ment spending and on the extent to which a government will be willing 
to impose progressive taxes. 
The cost of economic distortions is a function of the degree to 
which price distortions discourage and alter economic activity. Prop-
erly designed income exclusions, tax deductions, and tax credits make 
the tax system less distortionary by directing tax burdens at economic 
activities that are less responsive to taxation. For example, while all 
income taxes discourage labor supply, the effects are more dramatic in 
some instances, and for some groups of workers, than they are for oth-
ers. Age is an obvious dimension along which the labor supply effects 
of taxation will usually differ. For example, workers over 60 years old 
are at far greater risk of retiring than are workers in their forties, so 
high tax rates are much more likely to drive older workers out of the 
labor force than they are to induce exit by middle-aged workers. Con-
sequently, an efficient tax system would offer preferential treatment of 
older workers, all other things being equal. And if a tax system does not 
offer special exemptions, deductions, or tax credits to elderly workers, 
then the labor supply responsiveness of this group will put downward 
pressure on income tax rates in general, since the government will know 
that higher tax rates significantly reduce the labor supply of a significant 
portion of the population. 
Similar considerations apply to the tax treatment of working fami-
lies with young children. Since children require care and supervision, 
parents who work full time must incur out-of-pocket child-care costs, 
many of which are avoidable if at least one of the parents were to stay 
home with the children. High tax rates on working parents discour-
age labor force participation by reducing the net return from work-
ing—which has particularly strong effects on income production by 
parents of young children. The tax system can address this problem 
most directly by providing tax deductions or tax credits for child-care 
expenses incurred to accommodate the careers of working parents, 
which has the effect of more nearly taxing the net economic return to 
working. While the U.S. tax system currently offers modest versions of 
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these deductions and credits, they are very much incomplete, which is 
why high tax rates on labor income would strongly discourage parental 
labor-force participation. 
Certain forms of capital income are similarly sensitive to taxation. 
Capital gains offer an important example. Capital gains are taxed on 
realization rather than accrual, so high rates of capital income taxa-
tion strongly discourage owners of appreciated assets from selling their 
holdings, a phenomenon known as the “lock-in effect.” Owners of 
homes, shares of stock, small businesses, and other valuable properties 
commonly retain their holdings far longer than they would otherwise 
want to, in order to delay triggering capital gains taxes. By delaying 
realizations, an owner implicitly earns returns on the taxes that are not 
paid in the meantime. To the extent that capital income taxes apply to 
capital gains, these taxes distort the economy by keeping homeowners 
in homes they no longer want, investors in shares of companies they 
no longer want to hold, and business owners in businesses they would 
prefer to sell to others. Furthermore, anticipation of these taxes discour-
ages investments in the first place. The reality that capital-gains tax 
realizations are highly sensitive to taxation accounts for the favorable 
tax treatment that the federal income tax currently affords to income 
from long-term capital gains. In the absence of such favorable treat-
ment, there would be very strong downward pressure on income tax 
rates, as governments recognize that the lock-in effect makes high rates 
very costly. 
The examples of the effects of high tax rates on labor supply by 
elderly workers, labor supply by working parents, and capital gains real-
izations, are just that: examples. In fact, there are scores of dimensions 
along which economic activity is more and less responsive to taxation, 
and which therefore from an efficiency standpoint justify favorable tax 
treatment of certain taxpayers and activities, and less favorable treat-
ment of others. In the absence of such tax differentiation, the system 
becomes less efficient and more costly, which makes governments less 
willing to impose the high tax rates necessary to fund significant gov-
ernment operations and to do so in a progressive manner. 
The efficiency considerations that argue in favor of an extensive 
system of tax preferences in the form of exclusions, deductions, and 
credits simply add to traditional equity considerations. Taxpayers in 





abilities to pay taxes, and therefore should be subject to taxation at dif-
ferent rates. Children again offer an obvious example. A married couple 
with labor income of $80,000 is clearly in a different economic position 
from a family consisting of a married couple and five children with a 
family income of $80,000, and it is obvious that the childless couple has 
in a very practical sense greater real income and therefore greater abil-
ity to pay taxes. The U.S. tax system offers only very modest benefits 
to families with children and would need to do much more in order to 
adjust properly for the effect of family size on taxpaying ability. Failure 
to adjust taxes properly for family size means not only that tax bur-
dens are inequitably distributed between taxpaying families, but also 
that there is downward pressure on tax rates in general, since high tax 
rates without proper adjustments for family size would impose severe 
burdens on families in certain circumstances. 
Casualty losses offer another example. A family whose home burns 
down or whose car is stolen incurs significant economic losses in addi-
tion to life disruption, insofar as any losses are uninsured. There is a 
very real sense in which the family’s economic income in the year of 
the incident is lower by the amount of the uninsured loss; and an unin-
sured loss certainly diminishes a family’s ability to pay federal income 
taxes without incurring significant economic hardship. Until 2018, it 
was possible for U.S. taxpayers to claim deductions for casualty losses 
to the extent that such losses exceeded 10 percent of adjusted gross 
income, but provisions of the 2017 TCJA all but eliminated this deduc-
tion. The result is not only the serious inequity that follows from sub-
jecting people to taxation based on inaccurate measures of their annual 
incomes, but also downward pressure on tax rates, to prevent federal 
income taxes from imposing significant hardship on families incurring 
casualty losses and other major economic disruptions. 
There are many other dimensions along which the economic situ-
ations of taxpaying families differ, and which bear on their ability to 
pay federal taxes. Families incur medical and educational expenses, job 
disruptions, investment reversals, loan demands from friends and rela-
tives, and many other circumstances that could be reasonably accom-
modated by provisions in the tax system. It is a reality that tax breaks 
given to one group of taxpayers must be made up by higher burdens on 
other taxpayers, but fortunately there is a simple legislative method of 
performing such an adjustment, which is to increase tax rates. 
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INCOME TAXATION 
A properly designed income tax offers many exclusions, deductions, 
and credits that accommodate individual situations and thereby adjust 
tax burdens according to ability to pay. Such a system also imposes 
relatively heavier burdens on income sources that are least responsive 
to taxation. These features give the tax system a narrow base and rela-
tively high rates. The high rates are indeed important attributes: a tax 
system that imposes burdens in accordance with ability to pay has tax 
rates that rise sharply with income, making the tax-rate schedule highly 
progressive. 
Under any circumstance, it is in the national interest to adopt an 
income tax that imposes burdens according to ability to pay, but at a 
time of heightened concern over the distribution of income there is even 
greater need to adhere to sound principles in crafting income tax provi-
sions. Sound tax design addresses income distribution concerns in sev-
eral ways. The first is by accommodating individual circumstances and 
needs, implicitly adjusting tax burdens for differences in real incomes. 
The second way in which sound tax design addresses income distribu-
tion concerns is by facilitating the imposition of a highly progressive 
tax-rate schedule, one in which high-income taxpayers shoulder much 
more of the tax burden than do low-income taxpayers. And the third 
way is that sound tax design makes it feasible to finance significant 
government expenditures at a reasonable cost, which makes it possible 
for the government to adopt spending measures that assist low-income 
and otherwise vulnerable portions of the population. 
The United States already has a progressive personal income tax, 
and it already permits many exclusions, deductions, and tax credits that 
narrow the base and, to a degree, adjust tax burdens to individual situ-
ations. These features of the income tax are widely criticized, notably 
by advocates for greater tax progressivity, who feel that higher-income 
taxpayers receive most of the benefits of exclusions, deductions, and 
tax credits. Evidence from tax filings confirms that this observation 
is largely correct: high-income taxpayers do indeed benefit from tax 
expenditures, with slightly more than half of the benefits going to peo-
ple in the top quintile of the income distribution, and just 8 percent of 








It is a mistake to conclude from this observation, as so many have, 
that the answer to making the tax system more progressive lies in selec-
tive reductions in tax expenditures. On the contrary: in order to make 
the tax system more progressive, it is necessary to expand significantly 
the number of tax expenditures, particularly those that benefit high-
income taxpayers. The tax-rate schedule can be made more progressive 
only by adjusting the taxation of high-income earners for aspects of 
their economic activities and personal situations that bear on their abil-
ity and willingness to pay taxes. Put simply, with different design, it is 
possible to impose higher tax rates on those with high incomes—but 
this design will certainly entail significant tax breaks for some with high 
incomes. The tax system can thereby do much more to align tax burdens 
with abilities to pay, and to relieve burdens on those who are struggling 
economically—but such a system lies open to critique by well-meaning 
critics who do not appreciate the connection between the breadth of the 
tax base and the progressivity of tax rates. 
Recent legislative developments are far from encouraging. The 2017 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act gave the tax system a narrower base and lower 
rates, reducing its progressivity and also reducing total tax collections. 
In eliminating or restricting tax deductions for casualty losses, alimony 
payments, moving expenses, state and local income tax payments, 
mortgage interest payments, and expenses incurred in income-earning 
activities, the 2017 TCJA significantly reduced the extent to which tax 
burdens align with ability to pay. The tax-rate reductions enacted by the 
TCJA simply add to the mismatch between tax burdens and taxpaying 
ability, and the reduced tax collections make it ever more difficult to 
maintain government programs directed at those in challenging eco-
nomic circumstances. The TCJA was the product of a political process 
driven by many considerations, but underlying some of the changes that 
it enacted was a mistaken sense that a broad-based, low-rate income tax 
is better than the alternative. Certainly this is not the case if one desires 
a tax that imposes burdens according to ability to pay and does so in 
a progressive manner. But even if one’s goal is merely efficiency, not 
equity or progressivity, a good tax system is highly differentiated, offer-
ing multiple exclusions, deductions, and credits. 
It is important not to overlook efficiency in designing a tax sys-
tem, whether or not analysts and advocates are motivated by a desire 
to distribute tax burdens equitably. A more efficient tax system offers 
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greater opportunity to pursue all objectives, including those related to 
equity; and in particular, a more efficient tax system can support a more 
progressive tax rate structure at lower cost than does a less efficient 
tax system. In addition, a more efficient tax system makes it feasible 
for the government to finance worthwhile expenditures, including those 
that may have redistributive effects. Properly crafted tax expenditures 
enhance the efficiency of the tax system by directing tax burdens to 
where they have the least effect of discouraging income production, 
thereby making the economy more productive. 
Postwar U.S. history includes long stretches of time over which tax 
rates were high and the tax system offered extensive exclusions, deduc-
tions, and tax credits. The recent movement has been in the opposite 
direction, and to little good effect from the standpoints of aligning tax 
burdens with ability to pay and financing the U.S. government. Those 
inclined to criticize tax breaks as giveaways to the rich might do well 
to reflect on the alternative, which is a stripped-down tax system with 
relatively flat rates and little if any accommodation for the needs of 
individual taxpayers. In fact, the tax system needs more of what it once 
had, with high tax rates but also extensive tax preferences for certain 
types of income and taxpayers in specified circumstances. Only then 
will it be possible to address the income distribution concerns, and the 
government financing concerns, that properly motivate those interested 
in contemporary U.S. economic policy. 
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